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INTRODUCTION
From

the very beginning of its existence as an independent
nation,

the United States has found itself caught in a

role in international politics.
political figures,

From

Americans both

dilemma over

its

proper

the Founding Fathers to the present

in and out of the

realm

of

government

have debated and argued over the character and direction of American
foreign policy.

In

most instances, these debates have been characterized

as ones betv^een advocates of internationalism and isolationism.

In fact,

the initial debate over foreign policy in the First Continental Congress

was between
ties with

the "internationalists"

European nations,

who argued

that

American

from those of Europe.
than at others.

and

its

demand

in particular

France, and the "isolationists"

interests should be separate and non-entangled

At different times the debate has raged more intensely

In the 1850's the popularity of the

for a

more

was cause

"Young America" movement

active international role by the United States

brought the debate to center stage.
into the Pacific

who sought both commercial and military

for

In the 1890 's the

American expansion

alarm among those who defended America's

traditional policy of independence and non-entanglement.

in

At different times

the first half of the Twentieth Century the debate between internationalism

and isolationism threatened

to split the nation in half particularly in the 1920's

VII

and the

late

1930 's.

The American decision

War

II

an active role

to take

in the

post-World

period officially ended the debate over the direction
of American

foreign policy.

Through membership

in the United Nations,

NATO, SEATO,

and various other international organizations, the United States
signaled
its intention to

community.

take an active part in the politics of the international

Now

firmly committed to

its

international role, the debate

between internationalism and isolationism seemed irrelevant.
breakup of the bi-polar world

American involvement

in

But with the

in the 1960's, the rising controversy over

Southeast Asia, the erosion of Russian control

over the communist world, and the emergence of European and Pacific
centers of economic power there

is

again an important debate over the

character and direction of American foreign policy.

Once again, the debate

presently taking place within the United States has been labeled as one between
the internationalists, those

who want

to continue

American

policies of

containment and intervention, and the isolationists, those seeking to with-

draw

the United States

The focus
foreign policy.

from any international responsibility.

of this dissertation is the present debate over

Specifically, attention will be centered on those characterized

as "isolationist" for there is
label is a

American

proper one.

some question

In fact,

as to whether the use of that

opponents of American "globalism" have

charged that the isolationist characterization of their position grossly

misrepresents their policies and goals for America

in the international setting.

Vlll

They maintain
is

that the isolationist label,

used by the globalist camp

Chapter

V

because of

its

pejorative connotations,

to discredit the anti-globalist
position.

will deal directly with this controversy

relevancy of the isolationist label

by investigating the

to the liberal critique of

American foreign

policy.

The

first part of the dissertation will

of the concept "isolationism. "
in a consistent

manner.

Little

be concerned with the explication

attempt has been

Different people use

attaching different meanings to

it.

As a

it in

made

to

various ways, often

result, there exists a great deal of

controversy over what constitutes an isolationist foreign policy.
particularly important in terms of

This

is

American foreign policy debates since

concept of isolationism has been applied so often to describe

An important

use isolationism

the

it.

part of the explication of the concept isolationism will

revolve around Ludwig Wittgenstein's distinction between criteria and symptoms.

The major point here

is that in

definition of isolationism,

defining criteria.

symptoms

it

is

seeking to arrive at a useful and meaningful

important that the definition include the

In the past the attempted definitions have

been founded upon

of isolationism and not criteria which accounts for their rather

spurious nature.

To

aid in clarifying the arrived at definition of isolationism three case

studies have been chosen.

used
here.

to help clarify the

The

The case studies

of both

meaning of isolationism as

Japan and China are

it

to

has been explicated

third case study, that on Britain's period of "splendid isolation"

be

IX

Will by contrast demonstrate the often
spurious application of isolationism

with regard to different kinds of foreign
policy.

Armed

with a useful definition of isolationism
and hopefully with some

notion as to what constitutes an isolationist
foreign policy the focus of the
treatise will turn to historical and contemporary
In

American foreign

Chapter IV the purpose will be to apply the arrived

policy.

at definition to the

special circumstances of America's traditional foreign
policy, which has so
often been characterized as isolationist.

can be seen as

to

By means

of this examination

it

whether or not this has been a proper characterization.

Finally, Chapter

V

will focus on the current debate in

American foreign

policy and the relevancy of the isolationist label to the liberal
critique of the
globalist position.

Through such an examination

it

will

be possible

to put

the current debate into proper perspective and to clarify the real issues

involved in this debate.

CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION TO CONCEPTS OF FOREIGN POTJCY
In this brief initial chapter the

aim

is to

explain in a general

manner

the prevailing notions about the foundations, definitions
and objectives of

foreign policy.

Such a discussion

is

important in that

it

serves as a needed

guideline and foundation for treatment of the rationale for and against

adherence to a foreign policy of isolationism.

A

foreign policy is a

program designed

position for a nation vis-a-vis other nations.
a

program using peaceful means

the nation.

threat of

of

diplomacy

to

achieve the best possible

It is

usually conceived of as

to achieve the objectives of

Foreign policies, however, have been pursued

war was used as a means

in

of attaining national goals.

which the

The

fact

that the behavior of states can have beneficial or adverse effects on other

states confronts every state with the

major problem

of minimizing the

adversities and maximizing the beneficial actions of foreign states.

Therefore, foreign policy

is essentially a

means

of adjusting the actions

of states to each other.

A

foreign policy is the vehicle by which a state propagates the values

of its society into competition vvdth the values of other nations within the

"

2

international system.

Because different societies have or decide upon

different values, the objectives of a foreign policy
will vary from state

This

to state.

is

so because a foreign policy "consists of a society's

attempt to realize in the international plane certain notions of
what

conceives as good."

1

Not

all

nations will decide on the

it

same goals as

"good.

There are, however, several objectives or goals which
all

foreign policies seek to achieve.

common

Such

in

general

objectives as self-

preservation, security or territorial sovereignty usually rate as the primary
objectives of all nations.

This

is especially true of the goal of security.

All other objectives and the values of that society

mean

relatively little

unless the goal of security has been achieved to some extent.
it is

the security goal which concerns

most

security required before that objective

state's policy -maimers, as the

reached

it

Abdul Said,

is

a never-ending process.

(in

rather difficult to

According

to

of international

Charles Lerche and

Concepts of International Politics ) "what the security

objective of the state amounts to is no

more

than the reduction of all

visible and conceivable threats to a practical

Englewood:

minimum. A measure

of

Abdul A. Said, Concepts of International
Prentice-Hall Inc. 1963, p. 3.

""Charles O. Lerche, Jr.

Politics ,

is

Because of the ever-changing environment

calculate.

politics,

is

Therefore,

,

,

"

insecurity

is

really an inescapable cost of doing
business in the state

2

system.

After the securement of the above primary goals,
there. are numerous

secondary goals which are
foreign policies.

common

These consist

most

to

states in the conduct of their

of (with no particular ranking order intended)

the well-being or welfare of the collectivity,

meaning

the

improvement

of

the citizens' state of being usually calculated through the

measurement

of

"economy" or some measure of prosperity; national prestige,

the

difficult to

measure but one continually sought by

concessions of status from other states) and

promotion of an ideology.

The goals

states in

terms

to

preserve

its

means

to achieve these

serious limitation on

in the event of

war.

its ability to

The subordinate

may possess weapons

preserve

its territorial

^

Ibid

.

,

its

is,

major

superiority

boundaries

state is then forced to devise a foreign

policy which takes into account the serious limitations of

pursuit of

That

territorial integrity, as its

objective, the very fact that an adversary
is a

or

^

of foreign policy are unlimited but the

may want

goal

of

finally, the protection

goals are sharply limited in terms of the capability of a nation.

while a nation

(a

its

means

in the

primary objective.

p. 10.

•^The present century has been one of ideological messianism, more so
than any since the sixteenth century. But even now some of the more militant

ideologically oriented states are having second thoughts about the practicability
of achieving ideological fulfillment via international politics. As a primary
foreign policy goal, promotion of ideology also carries with it definite problems
of measurement as to its success or failure.

4

Kurt London

in his

book How Foreign Policy

Is

Made claims

that

"national foreign policy will formulate and try to achieve
its aims in accord-

ance with

its historic

conditions.

Such a statement s\mimarizes rather concisely the factors

which statesmen take

means

aspirations, its ideological doctrines, and its physical

into account

of foreign policy.

when assessing

Interestingly,

it is

the limitations on the

the physical conditions which

have and do receive a significant amount of attention when one speaks of the
limitations on a state's foreign policy.

Over time, numerous theories

have developed about the influence of climate, geographical location,
territorial terrain and accessibility of seaports on the

policy, enough so that a whole school of thought

making

of foreign

known as Geopolitics has

Despite the controversy created by these various theories of

developed.

geopolitics (some go so far as to claim that geography determines the nature
of a society and its values) and the dubious nature of

of its assumptions,

which make up a nation's physical properties do seem

the factors

influence and thus place limitation upon the
instance,

many

it

was

means

to

of foreign policy.

For

for a long time easy for island nations, such as Britain and

Japan, to isolate themselves from the politics of their respective continental

neighbors.

masses

to

On

the other hand,

it

is

develop their resources

much

to attain self-sufficiency,

contrast, the smaller island nations

Inc., 1949, p. 13.

while in

must depend largely upon commercial

^Kurt London, How Foreign Policy

Company,

easier for nations with large land

is

Made New York:
,

D.

Van Nostrand

5

trade with other nations to provide needed products.

Without doubt, for a

long time such natural barriers between states as oceans, mountain
ranges

and deserts provided enough safety so that states did not have to retain
security arrangements at these points.

Of course, once the technological

revolution of the 17th Century began, but especially since the end of World

War

and "once the barriers of oceans, mountains and deserts could be

II,

easily and speedily surmounted, once distance

was being conquered,

political position of every country naturally had to be re-evaluated

the

by

its

leaders.

The means

of foreign policy are thus shaped by such factors as

geographical location, extent of territory, size of territory, size of
populace, economic geography, technological development, ideology and
national character.

Other factors unrelated

to the state itself

are the power

of its adversaries and allies and the historical objectives of both adversaries

and allies.

becomes necessary

It

for a nation, while holding its

primary

objectives constant, to develop a strategy of foreign policy determined by

several basic decisions which provide a quasi-permanent framework for
tactical decisions.

These decisions revolve around considerations such as

choosing an interpretation of the contemporary historical trends and of their
objectives
relation to the national interest of the state; defining long-term

^Ibid.

,

p.

18.

6

which are

to be consistently

pursued unless external changes dictate

otherwise; the clarification of long term
objectives of other states as

much

as possible; and a general plan of action.

A

strategy must account

for and evaluate the above mentioned
limitations in order that a foreign

policy is selected that

is realistic in

terms of the nation's capabilities

and serves as the most promising vehicle for
enhancing the nation's interests
and achieving

its

objectives.

In other words,

"The task of

the Statesman is

reconcile the desirability of the possible with the
possibility of the

to

desirable.

For statesmen of

the Great

Powers

in the

Twentieth Century, foreign

policy has meant world politics, principally the balancing of power
on a global
scale.

In previous centuries, the

major principals

concerned with the balance of power only

European continent.

in localized areas, notably the

Further, the advent of the nuclear weapon and

potentiality for global destruction has changed

and objectives of foreign policy.
nuclear weapon,

it is

in international politics

Because

now imperative

many

its

traditional conceptions

of the disastrous realities of the

that foreign policy take into account

that nuclear conflict is to be avoided rather than employed.

confrontation between powers must be carefully handled as

Moreover, any
it

has the

potential of leading to nuclear warfare.

The development of nuclear weapons has also meant

that protection

of national sovereignty without nuclear capability is difficult.

^

Op.

cit .

,

Lerche and Said,

p. 16.

As a

result,

were

'

7

many sovereign non-nuclear

nations

must depend on

nations to protect and preserve their sovereignty.

weapons,

it

is highly doubtful that

of protecting their

own

the willingness of other

Yet, even with nuclear

even the super-powers have the capability

integrity in the event of total nuclear war.

As a

result, the foreign policies of all nations, but in
particular the super-

powers, have been increasingly curtailed by the fear of
a nuclear holacaust.
At the same time, they demand increased
realities of the nuclear age.

weapon has meant

that

cope with the dangerous

In other words, the advent of the nuclear

statesmen have relinquished the alternative of waging

war with no consideration
Yet, they also

flexibility to

of the consequences of their decisions for mankind.

must now bear

the additional burden of resolving ideological

confrontation with practical and flexible solutions while operating under the
threat of global destruction.

As

different as are the individual and combined factors that enter into

the development of a nation's foreign policy, there are corresponding

differences in the specific types of foreign policies.

Yet, the tendency has

been to group many different types of foreign policies under one general
category.

Lerche and Said claim

that

"such catch-words as 'isolationism,

'balance of power' or 'imperialism' are often
to characterize particular foreign policies. "

if

somewhat inaccurately used

This

is

done,

the sake of convenience while forsaking all values of clarity.

'^Ibid.

,

p. 12.

it

appears, for

For example,

8
it

becomes hopelessly confusing when one attempts

meant by an "imperialistic foreign policy" since

most powerful nations have been accused

to sort out just

at one

what

is

time or another

of pursuing one.

It

also remains

unclear just what constitutes a foreign policy of
neutralism, or just how a
foreign policy of globalism differs from one of
imperialism,

These categories are widely used
to

by states.

if it

does.

in labeling types of foreign policies

adhered

Yet, they remain largely undefined and even ill-defined
with

no clarity as to what elements of a foreign policy characterize

it

as either

global or imperalistic.

This point can be made about the categorization of foreign policies as
isolationist.

Little thought has been given to a careful explication of what

means currently or has meant

isolationism

historically.

There remain, as a

result, misconceptions about what isolationism is or should be.

concerning what

is isolated,

by whom, from whom, by what means, or under

what circumstances have gone largely unanswered
isolationism.

Questions

in the application of

Foreign policies as different as Japan's two hundred years of

seclusion from the rest of the world and the American adherence to nonalliance or non-entanglement with Europe have equally been designated as
isolationist, adding confusion and fostering unclarity on the concept, thus

rendering

it

almost useless.

isolationism that Chapter

II

It

is

i^he

clarification of the concept of

concerned with.

The attempt

will

be made to

explicate the concept of isolationism in order to give meaning to the

9

categorization of foreign policies under
consistent and responsible manner.

it.

In this way,

it

can be used in

;

10

CHAPTER

II

THE CONCEPT AND POLICY OF ISOLATIONISM
The focus

of this chapter is the difficult yet important
task of explicating

the concept and policy of isolationism.

It is

arduous in the sense that

all

attempts at definitions prove to be a task of giving meaning and
preciseness
concept.
its

to a

an important task in that the crystallization of a definition and

It is

subsequent application to specific instances of contemporary American

foreign policy constitutes the major issue of this treatise.

The task
reasons.

On

of explicating isolationism is

made more arduous

for two

the one hand, there is a definite absence of any significant or

substantial literature on isolationism as a concept or as a theory of foreign
policy.

As a

result, as Kenneth

Thompson recognizes, "The problem

isolationism has been that lacking roots in an enduring theory,

it

of

has taken

root in ad hoc strategies and policies cast in the form of principles such as

non-intervention and non-entanglement.

On

the other hand, the task is

even more complicated by a plethora of meanings attached
by those who use the concept without attempting

to isolationism

to arrive at a meaningful,

'"Kenneth Thompson, "Isolationism" and "Collective Security," in Alexander
De Conde, ed. Isolation and Security; Ideas and Interests in Twentieth
Century American Foreign Policy Durham, N. C: Dul<e University Press,
,

,

1957, p. 169.

"

11
definitive statement of

it.

Consequently, there are many proposed
definitions,

explicit and implicit, of isolationism
which, while useful in the

of clarifying for the

moment

its

narrow sense

use in each particular instance, in the
long

run augment the confusion and distortion of the
concept and thus the policy.

important that an attempt be made

It is

superfluous meanings as possible.

In

many

to rid the

concept of as

many

instances, this can be

accomplished by a careful winnowing process of those definitions
which are
either too broad or too narrow, or those which obviously
apply in

circumstances and not

meanings applied

where

it

meaning

in others.

As

some

will be demonstrated, the range of

to isolationism runs along a

continuum including instances

applies to only hermit-like existence to instances in which the
is

considerably broadened to include "the unwillingness

to

make new

contacts.

A

study of the diversified definitions used will only verify this state

of affairs.

Although the presentation made below of asserted definitions of

isolationism

is

by no means exhaustive, those selected here do represent

the broad range of

meanings generally applied

A primary source

of definitions is a reputable dictionary such as

Webster's Third International Edition and The

English Language.
place alone."

2

Random House

Dictionary of the

Webster's defines isolation as "to set apart from others,

The synonym

for isolation is solitude

Webster's Third International Dictionary

Merriam Company,

to isolationism.

1966, p. 777.

,

which

is

defined as

Springfield, Mass.: G. and C,

12

"completely alone, cut off from

all

humaji contact.

_Webster's defines

isolationism as "the policy advocated by
isolationists.

who believes

in or advocates isolation;

no part in alliances, etc."^

Isolationist:

person

person who wants his country

to take

The Random House dictionary explicates

isolation as "to set or place apart; detach or
separate so as to be alone
the separation of a nation

from other nations by isolationism."^ Random

House presents isolationism

as; "the policy or doctrine that peace and

economic advancement can best be achieved by isolating ones
country from
alliances and
is

commitments with other

nations. "^

In these definitions there

considerable variance between the core sense of isolation and

when applied

to isolationism.

No longer does

universal separateness or aloneness.
in that "taking

no part

in alliances"

What

is to

Nor does

The question arises: what

,

"^

Ibid

. ,

p.

to

"separate

the inclusion of "etc."

is to

be included in "etc."?

,

in

Kenneth Thompson claims

p. 777.

The Random House Dictionary

.

considerable inconsistency

1388.

New York: Random
Op

total or

"The Uses and Limits of the Theories" reprinted

Alexander De Conde's Isolation and Security

.

meaning

be embraced within the scope of an isolationist policy?

In an article,

'^Ibid

is

mean

does not necessarily mean

or place alone" or to be in solitude.
facilitate clarity.

There

isolation

its

cit.

,

of the English Language, College Edition ,

House, 1968, p. 709.

Random House,

p.

709,

"

that "it is futile to talk of a theory
of isolationism for the

term

is

charged

with emotion and has increasingly acquired
pejorative connotations.

He suggests, however, that some of the attributes
surrounding isolation
are "inaction, passivity, lethargy, and withdrawal. "^

Added

to these

Moos enumerated

in

meanings are those

Power and Purpose.

of

Thomas Cook and Malcolm

Isolation to

them means

"exclusiveness, apartness, superiority, and suspicion."^
Isolationism

is

a policy of apartness and exclusiveness based upon
superiority of power

and suspicion of others' intentions.
is

Cook and Moos claim

that isolationism

a selfish policy "to protect and reach self-interested enjoyment of
a special

social vision. "^^
It is

Unfortunately, their definition

is

not

much

of a contribution.

possible to isolate or place apart in instances of non-suspicion and non-

Moreover, their definition examines

superiority.

the

"why"

of isolationism

rather than the "what.

From

this point on, the definition

becomes increasingly broad and

divergent from the core meaning of isolation.

Most of the writers below are

concerned with "American isolation" and have broadened the concept

7

Op.
Ibid

cit.

. ,

,

p.

Thompson,

p.

to suit

1G4.

164.

Cook, and Malcolm Moos, Power Through Purpose; The Realism
of Idealism as a Basis for Foreign Policy Baltimore: John Hopkins University
Press, 1954, p. 47.

^Thomas

I.

,

l^Ibid., p. 46.

14
their particular circumstances.

Alexander De Conde

meant

isolation has

in his Isolation

at various

times "the desire to avoid involvement

the endless quarrels of Europe,

from trouble and
the

same

at still others,

position in

out of foreign

Ronald Steel

The

and Security explains that

At other times,
avoidance of war.

Isolationist Impulse

wars with an unwavering refusal

in

Pax Americana defines

has meant immunity

it

Selig Adler takes

Isolationism

.

in

means

much

to stay

to enter into alliances.

isolationists as "those

who believe

the nation to be overextended militarily, morally and intellectually."''^^

Although later on, Steel backtracks a bit on this definition (he concludes
that the "neo-isolationists" are really internationalists), his is a good

example of the tendency
that

it

to

broaden the meaning of isolationism

to the point

becomes vague.
The same must be said

of Isolatioaism .

for

Leroy Rieselbach's definition

The Roots

Rieselbach, a contemporary writer on American isolation,

claims that isolationism "refers only
overseas commitments with respect
foreign affairs. "

in

13

He suggests

to a reluctance to

to all

or to

extend American

some particular segment

of

that isolationism in its broadest sense "is

^Alexander De Conde, ed. Isolation and Security: Ideas and Interests in
Twentieth-Century American Foreign Policy Durham N. C: Duke University
Press, 1957, p. 4.
'^

,

,

'^Ronald Steel, Pax Americana

,

New York:

Viking Press, Inc.

,

1968,

p. 313.

Leroy No Rieselbach, The Roots of Isolationism
Merrill Company, Inc., 1966, p. 8.
'^'^

,

Indianapolis:

The Bobbs-

15

an attitude of opposition

to binding

commitments

new, or expand existing, obligations
on the basis of this definition,

is

.

.

a policy of the status quo.

isolationism for Rieselbach has

,

Finally, in

Isolationism,

Yet, this

Like both Webster and

come

non-alliance and non-commitment to other nations.

removed from a policy

would create

to foreign nations. "^^

represents a move away from a dictionary meaning.

Random House

that

.

to

mean

a policy of

Here again,

this is

of solitude, apartness or separation.

Dream and

Reality Louis J. Halle expresses

some rather

succinct thoughts on isolationism which only confound the situation.

recognizes that non-participation in international politics

is

Halle

a possible

alternative for a national policy; yet, he maintains that to label non-

participation as isolation is both inappropriate and misleading.

isolationism

is

For Halle,

"merely abstinence from involvement or from permanent,

inextricable involvement in the political or military conflicts of other

nations."
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He

states further that:

does not ordinarily mean, as it did in China and Japan,
commercial and cultural isolation. It does not exclude
trade or immigration. What it does exclude, typically, is
peacetime alliance, any obligation to take sides in the
quarrel of other nations. This is basic. Beyond this,
there may be other forms of non-participation practiced
by particular nations, but the freedom from peacetime
It

alliances or alignment
IP
practice this policy.

is

common

to all nations that

^"^Ibid., p. 7.

^""^

New

Louis Halle,

York:

^^ Ibid

.

,

Dream and

Reality; Aspects of

Harper and Row, 1959,
p. 6.

p. 5.

American Foreign Policy

,
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Halle's contention about isolationism sounds very
definition of neutralism, not isolationism.

mean

much

like a

working

For neutralism has come

to

non-alliance and non-commitment politically and militarily, yet

with an emphasis on cultural and commercial contacts.
difficult to

It is,

nevertheless,

understand why Halle discounts the periods of seclusion of the

Chinese and Japanese as instances of isolation.

Concept Clarification

The task

of explicating a concept is primarily the chore of finding the

defining criterion or in

some cases several

Ludwig

defining criteria.

Wittgenstein in his famous The Blue and Brown Books attempted to
distinction between defining criteria and

"How do you know

of a concept.

answer by giving

'criteria'

symptoms

make

the

relative to the existence

that so-and-so is the case?

We sometimes

and sometimes by giving 'symptoms'."

17

Although his premises and arguments have since been called into question and
in

some instances

qualified, his initial distinction

symptoms remains an important one

between criteria and

in the clarification of concepts.

Wittgenstein distingiiishes between criteria and what he terms

Both arc indications of phenomena which are observed and

symptoms.
from which

it

is

determined that something or other does exist.

Wittgenstein

suggests that criteria are indications which are defining of that something

^'^

Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books

1958, p. 25.

,

Oxford:

Blackwell,
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and that symptoms are by themselves not defining
but may accompany those

phenomena.

Elizabeth Wolgast expresses this distinction
clearly:

Symptoms and criteria are both signs by which we
discover or know that something is the case. In the
case
of criteria, however,

marks

these

it may follow from the presence
of
what the criteria serve exists. To say

that

that one has found

never has

this

symptoms

of that thing or

Problems arise, however, when

symptoms
there

several criteria.

from criteria for

in reality

It is

some cases

often difficult to distinguish

may be

there

the defining criterion is and what a
difficult in

the distinction between criteria and

There may not be one defining criterion,

is put into practice.

may be

phenomenon

necessary consequence.

little

symptom

actual difference as to what

is.

Because

discover "the defining criteria,"

to

symptoms

may be extremely

it

it

easy to

is

confuse symptoms for criteria and vice-versa.

And

yet, to

search for the criteria of a concept

task in explicating concepts.
of a concept

whose role

in

For "to look

our language

is

for rrilori;)

complicated

is the

is In

important

look at the use

— diilicult to

describe or picture, that criteria exist shows us that the use can be

described and that the concept

is

between criteria and symptoms
such a distinction

is that

it

not occult. "

is

^^rbicl_.

,

^^Ibid., p. 353.

the significance of

forces the process of conceptual clarification

4. p. 353.

p. 353.

Although the distinction

not always clear,

•'•^Elizabeth H. Wolgast, "Wittgenstein

Winter 1964, No.
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and Criteria" Inquiry

,

Vol. 7,
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to deal with

That

it.

is,

conceptual clarification

as clearly as possible,

is.

the articulation of the defining criteria of a concept.
In relationship to clarifying the concept of isolationism,
the task

of locating the defining criteria has been

made more

of the

ambiguous and confusing attempts

many

cases, the defining criteria of isolationism

appear

to

difficult as a result

at its definition noted above.

in

In

those definitions

be a state of non-alliance and non-commitment with others.

Granted that non-alliance

is

a relatively simple "state of being" to grasp

mentally (although there are several meanings to the term "alliance"),
yet,

it

is

possible to be non-aligned or to be a

member

of no alliance and

not be isolated in the sense of being separated or secluded from others.
In the case of

there arc

non-commitment, circumstances become more complex as

many

kinds of commitments (for example binding and non-binding)

and commitments on many different levels
in

time of war

is

(a

commitment

to aid

another

very different from a commitment to peacetime commercial

ties).

It is

in

terms

of

suggested here that the above definitions are defining isolationism

symptoms and

not criteria.

isolationism, not the defining criteria.
probability,

but

it

ment

That

is,

total

binding commitments

does not define that concept.

is

a

of

in all

of isolationist policy,

process of isolationism.

may be

symptom

non-alliance will,

accompany or be an instrumental part

does not constitute the
in

Non-alliance

Non-involve-

a component of isolationism, but

The same

is true of,

for

example, the

it
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withdrawal of military forces.

Such a policy or procedure does not
constitute

isolationism although here again

it

may embody

a

symptom

of isolationism.

Other examples of symptoms of isolationism
may be: acting alone,
avoidance of war, suspicion of foreigners, immunity
from trouble or a
reluctance to extend overseas commitments.

What then

is the defining criteria in

isolationism?

Taking a cue

directly from the meaning of "isolate," or "isolation,"
that being

apart from or separated from, secluded or to place alone,
isolationism
is

a policy of seclusion; a severance of all relationships,
commitments,

communication and dependence with or on others; a hermit-like existence
of self-sufficiency.

This definition

is

more

as the important criterion, and

inclusive than those which claim non-alliance
it

runs directly counter to the definition of

Louis Halle.

It

"isolate."

suggests a "state of being alone" or "apart from others"

It

draws

its

the sense of seclusion.
In

It

meaning directly from the criteria defining

means non-involvement on

terms of a foreign policy,

from other nations on

it

means a

all levels.

isolationist foreign policy,

it

In

means

all levels

with others.

policy of withdrawal and seclusion

most cases

for a nation adhering to an

the severance of all official relationships,

communications, and commitments with other governments.

remain some

in

Yet there may

unofficial contacts with other peoples through personal contacts,

illegal criminal traffic or through private

upon the ability or willingness of the

commercial dealings depending

official

government

to control these

20

aspects of the domestic society.

meaning

The point

terms of foreign relations,

in

the effort is

made by

the

it

is that for

must

constitute a policy

government of one nation

to

sever

relations, to take no part in alliances, to
disavow any
level and to

withdraw

isolationism to have

whereby

all significant

commitments on any

into a state of self-sufficiency and
seclusion.

There are two important observations which must be
made here and
which hopefully can help

The

first point

to clarify the

proposed definition of isolationism.

concerns the observation made by Leroy Rieselbach

The Roots of Isolationism

.

He suggests

that isolationism is a multi-

dimensional phenomenon of which several different species
Isolationists

may have

clearly definable group

in

different geographical foci:

may

exist.

one

may

reject all foreign involvements;
oppose all activity outside the Western Hemi-

another may
sphere; a third

may wish to avoid contact with Europe, while
participating actively in Asian affairs.^"*"
He further notes

that:

may also differ along subject matter lines. For
instance, a military isolationist may oppose the commitment

Isolationists

of troops to defend foreign areas; an

economic isolationist

may

object to the use of nonmilitary resources to assist other
nations; a political isolationist may reject participation in
international organizations; or a "general" isolationist

may

decry any overseas commitments ^^ich might impose restraints
on future (American) activity ...
Rieselbach' s point
isolationism to

is

valid and

must be granted

in part; first,

mean separation from or non-involvement

affairs and, secondly, because there are different

Op.
Ibid

cit .

.

,

,

Rieselbach, pp. 7-8,

p. 8.

because he uses

in other nations'

ways and means

of

21
isolation.

For example, a nation can diplomatically

another nation, and in fact this happens
frequently

due to the practice of non-recognition.

terms

of political

Or

isolate itself

from

in international politics

a country can isolate itself in

commitments from a whole continent as

did the United

States during its practice of non-entanglement
in European political and

military affairs in the nineteenth century.

economic isolation by refusing

These are instances

to trade

Or

a nation can subscribe to

commercially with other nations.

of diplomatic, political and

economic

However, they do not constitute by themselves a policy

They are parts

of the

whole and cannot,

if

isolationism

meaningfully, constitute the whole in themselves.

when he claims

isolation.

of isolationism.

is to

be defined

Ricsclbach

that isolationism is a multidimensional

is

correct

phenomenon.

But

he does misconstrue isolationism when he suggests that any single dimension
in itself

constitutes isolationism.

exactly what

it

claims

to be.

Political isolation

from Europe

Because a nation chooses

to

isolated from Europe does not

mean

with other parts of the world.

Because a nation chooses

that

it

is

is

be politically

also politically uninvolved
to

remain

militarily non-aligned does not suggest inactivity and non-involvement on

other levels.

whole or
is

Isolationism as a policy must be practised or adhered to as

hi toto if the

an attempt on

all

concept

is to

have meaning.

levels and by all

means

a policy not directed

at

world or on one or two levels, but rather

it

other nations.

It is

A

policy of isolationism

to separate a nation

from

all

one nation or one part of the
is

a policy of general and

22
consistent abstention and seclusion in all
respects.

The second observation about the nature
a policy which can take two forms.

On

of isolationism is that

the one hand,

it

it

is

can be a policy of

voluntary abstention and seclusion from others by a
state.
hand,

it

On

the other

can take the form of an enforced or non-voluntary
seclusion, an

induced isolation of one state resulting from the actions of
other states.
the latter

It is

form which has been more prominent throughout history as

groups of nations for whatever reason sought

from time

to time.

The forced

to isolate

isolation of a state

via alliance structures and economic boycotts
interest, in

most cases a security

interest,

was normally effected

made

among

"aggressor" states

possible by a

common

the isolating nations.

This formerly important type of isolationism, has largely been unsuccessful
since the era of interstate cooperation was ushered in by the Concert of

Europe.

23

This

is

due

to the fact that "the friendship of a state threatened

by isolation can usually be had so cheaply that
the coalition opposed to

it

the interdependency of the

make

it

it

will soon find a bidder and

will soon begin to disintegrate."^'*

modern world both

Likewise,

politically and economically

extremely unlikely that a nation would or could remain isolated by

others for long.

The Quadruple Alliance successfully isolated France for a short period
of time following the Napoleonic Wars. See Willian Langer, "Diplomatic
Isolation," Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences

24

,

Vol VIII, pp. 353-355.

William Langer, "Diplomatic Isolation," Encyclopedia of the Social

Sciences, Vol. VIII, p. 353.
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Isolationism in the other sense of the term,
that being a self-imposed
policy of abstention and seclusion from the
family of nations, is the form of

isolationism that bears careful examination
here.

For

it is

the concept of isolationism that is being
applied to those

rearrangement of priorities, commitments, and goals

American foreign

policy.

this

sense of

who advocate a

in

contemporary

CHAPTER
ISOLATIONISM IN JAPAN,

Before delving
it

is

III

CfflNA,

into the specifics

AND GREAT BRITAIN

surrounding "American isolationism,"

important, as a point of contrast, to examine carefully
instances or

examples

of foreign policies

which contain the criteria

isolationism as defined above.

to be found in

Two such examples are Japan's

policy of

isolationism between 1638 and 1853 and China's isolationism in ancient

times, but primarily during the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries.

In addition to these

two examples, a study of Britain's so-

called "period of splendid isolation" will be undertaken, the purpose of

which

is to

serve, along with the examination of American isolation in the

fourth chapter, as an example of misconstrued isolationism.
that by establishing such a dichotomy the

meaning and

It is

thought

definition of

isolationism can best be exemplified.

Although the major thrust of these four case studies

is to clarify

what does and what does not constitute isolationism, throughout each of the
studies several other matters of concern will be examined.

which must be dealt with
of isolationism possible?

is

under what circumstances

Are there instances

in

is

One issue

a foreign policy

which a nation, although
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desirous of isolating

itself, is actually

prevented from doing so due to

geographical, political or technological restraints?

Hopefully, this

examination will make apparent any requirements
involved in the implementation of an isolationist policy.

Secondly, questions must be raised about why
a nation would choose
isolationism over international involvement.

Are there common aims and

goals which can best be served by isolationism?

What are the circumstances

surrounding the adoption of an isolationist policy?
Finally, an examination

must be undertaken as

abandoned the policy of isolationism as

its

circumstances surrounding the decision

Was

it

to

to

foreign policy.

why a nation
What were the

break down the walls

a decision forced by outside influences or was

it

of seclusion?

a decision taken

voluntarily in the best interests of the nation?

By

dealing with these issues through the specific circumstances of

the four case studies,

it

issues can be drawn.

It is

is

hoped that some general conclusions about the
also anticipated that the question of the

obsolescence of isolationism

in today's

at least dealt with thoroughly

through the study of such issues.

the

assumption that the United States

is

environment might be answered or
If so,

then

returning to a policy of isolationism

can be seriously questioned.

Japan

The

first study

hundred years, and

is

in Isolation

concerns Japan's period of isolation of over two
presented here as a classic example of isolationism.
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During

this time, the Japconese had no relations,

commercially, culturally,

religiously or politically with the other nations of
the world.

policy of the
in

Tokugawa shogunate, beginning with

1638 and ending only under the guns of

was a successful policy

The

official

the final Act of Seclusion

Commodore Perry's Qeet

in 1853,

of repulsion of all foreign influences and contacts

with the other nations of the world.

Any complete account

of Japan's policy of isolationism

must begin

with a discussion of the special elements of Japanese geography, domestic

and international politics, plus other factors which are pertinent

to

an

explanation of why isolationism was a feasible policy for the Japanese
the early Seventeenth Century.

in

Several of the specific factors involved in

explaining the feasibility of Japan's policy of isolationism will provide

adequate substance for later generalization on isolationism.

The geography of Japan provides an important element as
she could successfully initiate a policy of isolationism.
the sea

to

why

For many centuries,

served as a barrier to Japanses travel abroad and to foreign

invasion of Japan.

In fact, until the

shipbuilding and navigation, which
(luring the period of

advancement

was introduced

in the technology of

to the

Japanese largely

open commercial trade by the seafaring nations of the

West, the threat of foreign invasion against Japan was largely

nil.

George

Ballard in his book The Influence of the Sea on the Political History of Japan

maintains that "the

first of those (isolation periods)

was

the period in
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which a great measure of compulsory isolation
was imposed by natural
causes and the sea was a safeguard. "1
initial

Likewise, by the time of the

stages of the imposed isolationism on the
Japanese by the Tokugawa

rulers, the sea

was

still

a very formidable obstacle to overcome
for those

who desired contact with Japan. Even though

the wide reaches

of the sea

had been crossed and had, as Ballard suggests,
become a source
for the Japanese,

it

was

still

true that the sea

of the successful artificial isolation of Japan.

of

danger

was a very instrumental part
Ballard submits that concern-

ing the artificial isolation "no such policy could have
been either initiated or

maintained except

in

an island whose inhabitants were debarred by law from

taking to the water, or perhaps in a country such as Tibet
whose natural
frontiers are very difficult to cross.

Despite the advancements in

navigation and nautical technology, sea travel was and remained for sometime
a slow and hazardous undertaking.

This was especially true

harsh reception given by the Japanese

As Ballard suggests, "The

safely.'

to those

who managed

effect of the sea

was

in light of the

the journey

to

impose a

certain degree of isolation, conferred a degree of safety greater than that

^George Alcximdor Ballard, The Influence
of Japan London: Albcmorle, 1921, p. 12.

of the Sea on the Political History

,

^ Ibid
3

.

,

p.

7.

some time. In fact, one
main purposes which brought Perry to Japan in 1853 was to request
safe passage to American whalers shipwrecked off the coasts of Japan.
the

Indeed, the sea remained a hazard for quite

of
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obtainable in any other way. "4
of the

This circumstance greatly aided the
designs

Tokugawa government when

A second
to isolationism

it

decided to sever

all official contacts.

factor enabling the Japanese successfully
to adhere

concerns the international political conditions
of that period.

The major threat

to the

Japanese came from the western seafaring nations

of Portugal, Spain, England and Holland, which had
technological ability to

seek out Japanese trade and cultural contacts.

Yet, during the entire two

hundred years that Japan practised isolationism, these nations were
involved
in struggles with

they

each other on the European continent.

seemed content

reality, they

to abide

by the Japanese desire for isolation.

were so drained by

make

the concerted effort needed to

force the Japanese out of their self-imposed seclusion.

Japanese, despite their acknowledged lag
to withstand

which attempted

were

Yet, in

the efforts against each other that they

could not muster enough resources to

were able

For the most part,

As a

result, the

in technological military

development,

and indeed deal effectively with the few foreign vessels

to force their

way

into

Japanese waters and ports.

These

isolated incidents and did not constitute a concerted effort to reopen

Japan.

As

a result of the international power struggles

who posed a

among those

real threat to Japan's isolation, the Japanese

were able

maintain their policy far longer than other circumstances would have

warranted.

^

Op.

cit .

,

Ballard, p. 7.

nations

to
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A

third element which greatly
aided the propagation of
Japanese

isolationist policy

was

the successful national
unification of

one centralized structure.

Until the latter part of the
sixteenth century,

Japan was a feudal state controlled by
local barons.
nationalist of any consequence

Sixteenth Century

was

to

power under

The

first

was Nobunaga, whose ambition

bring about national unification.

By

aclmowledged
in the late

aligning

himself with the rising tide and forces of
Christianity. Nobunaga overpowered

many

of the local barons.

political

the

In this

manner, he was able

and military power of the Buddhists who had

Empire

of Japan.

to erode

much

of the

until then controlled

Yoshi Kuno describes Nobunaga's contribution

to the

unification process, "Nobunaga, for his part,
branded the communities and

militant Buddhists as national enemies because they
opposed his work of
national unification, and he dealt with them brutally and
mercilessly, being

bent on destroying their fighting power.

After the death of Nobunaga in 1582, the task of national unification

was carried on by Hideyoshi, who

after his successful invasion of Kyushu,

and his victory in 1590 over the Hojo family, the last and most powerful
military force against unification, completed the national unification of

Japan.
It

remained the task of Hideyoshi' s successor

to consolidate the

5

Yoshisaburo Kuno, Japanese Expansion on the Asian Continent
University of California Press, 1937, 1940, p. 6.

,

Berkeley:
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power

of a central authority over the whole of
Japan.

This was accomplished

by the first of the Tokugawa Shoguns, the ambitious
and brilliant lyeyasu.

During his sixteen-year reign, lyeyasu established the
Tokugawa claim

to

legitimate authority over the entire Japanese islands
and entrenched that
authority in a national bureaucracy.
the

By

Tokugawa rulers were beginning

repression and national seclusion.
of Japan, the

to

the time of lyeyasu's death in 1616,

embark upon

the policy of Christian

Because they held sway over the entirety

Tokugawa regime was able successfully

to

administer the laws

and decrees of repression and seclusion throughout the islands.

Such a policy

would not have been possible under the feudal organization which existed
Japan only twenty-five years before.

in

The consistent cooperation which was

needed for the successful administration of a policy of national isolation

would not have been possible

in a society controlled

by local or regional

rulers whose major preoccupation was protecting or increasing their

personal power.

National isolation was possible because there existed a

national povver structure to enforce
Finally, there
of isolationism.

it.

were other factors which increased the

possibilities

At the beginning of the period of seclusion, Japanese

teclinology in shipbuilding and ocean navigation

was lacking.

What

knowledge of sea navigation and nautical technology they had was a result
in large part of their recent intercourse with the

It

was easy

for the

Tokugawa Shoguns

western seafaring powers.

to enforce their decrees against sea
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travel and regulation of shipbuilding
because for the

most part there was not

a great deal of activity which was not under
the auspices and control of the

Tokugawa Shogunate.

A

final ingredient

making possible Japanese isolation was the

fact that

the Japanese had been throughout their history
largely an isolated people

and society.
this respect.

Mention has already been made of the importance of the
sea
It is

in

also a fact that Japanese relations with the peoples
of the

mainland of Asia, notably the Chinese and Koreans, were for the most
part
Therefore, isolation from others was a natural phenomenon for the

hostile.

Japanese, an important factor in the ready acceptance of the Tokugawa
policies of isolation by the Japanese people.
of the people in

terms

Furthermore, the homogeneity

of their culture and race, a consequence resulting

from their being an island people,

facilitated the isolationist policy, especially

the expulsion and repression of all foreigners and foreign influences.

During the

five

the official policy of

decades previous

to the final act of seclusion in 1638,

Japan was one of open trade and multi-relations with

other nations, in particular with the western nations.

This program, beginning

under Hideyoshi and greatly expanding during the early years of rule by
the first

Tokugawa Shogun, lyeyasu, sought

influence of Japan internationally.

It

became

expand the power and

was also designed

technology and modernize Japanese society.
trade, initiated by Hideyoshi,

to

to

upgrade Japanese

This "open door" policy of

the official policy of lyeyasu during

o
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the early 1600's.

He was able

to

pursue such a policy much more vigorously

than had Hideyoshi because of the consolidation
of national power which had

taken place under the Tokugawa Shogunate.

The specific goals

trade policy of lyeyasu were largely threefold.

.of

First, he wanted the

development of foreign commerce for economic
reasons.

Secondly, he

greatly desired the creation of a Tokugawa merchant
marine.
the

Western seafaring nations

for technological

know-how

to trade with Japan, lyeyasu

in shipbuilding

the open

(For permitting

asked in exchange

and nautical navigation.)

Third,

he wanted better tools and knowledge of resource
development in order to

develop the new mines in Idau and Sado.

He hoped

to obtain

these through

commercial exchange
While lyeyasu permitted open commercial trade with

which so desired, politically he adhered
neutrality.

James Murdock

in

A

all

nations

to a policy of non-alliance or

History of Japan states that "the great

old statesman (lyeyasu), while according a hearty

welcome

to law-abiding

subjects of any and every foreign State, was resolutely resolved that Japan

should not in any way become embroiled in any differences beyond the
territorial waters of the country.

Japan vis-a-vis
neutral."

all

During

European nations

Murdock suggests

all

in the

the

terms of lyeyasu's sway,

Far East had been

strictly

that:

James Murdock, A History of Japan New York: Frederick Ungar
Publishing Company, 1964, Vol H, part 2, p. 485.
,

What lyeyasu wanted was foreign trade and
foreign
instruction in certain matters for his
subjects, and the
greater the number of rivals and competing
nationalities

that could

be enticed

to

Japan the better

economic interest of the country.

The open trade
without

its pitfalls.

it

for the

^

policy, while beneficial in

Not only was

was

it

most respects, was

times

difficult at

to

keep an even keel

between competing commercial interests, the missionary
zeal
competing Christian nations of the West proved
Tolcugawa Shoguns.
the

number

to be a

not

of the

major threat

to the

During the early years of lyeyasu's open trade policy,

of Christian priests and converts, and the strength
of

Christianity within Japan grew phenomenally.

Yet, because of the over-

riding concern for commercial trade and technological development,
"the

early Tokugawas were clearly willing to

matter of that religion
fact,

as

to

make great concessions

in the

which they themselves were so indifferent."^

James Murdock suggests,

the

Tokugawa Shogun used

In

the presence

of the Christian Jesuits to enhance trade with the Christian nations.

He

(lyeyasu) maintained that religious rivalry

thing for the peace of the country, but

it

is

was no good

perfectly clear

that he certainly adhered to the doctrine that competition
is the soul of trade . . . the favours he bestowed on the

seem to have been graduated in
accordance with their proved efficiency as decoys for foreign
merchantmen to the harbours of the empire. ^

priests of the rival sects

Despite the advantages to trade accorded by the lenient policy toward
Christianity, the growing strength and local influence of the Christians in

'Ibid_.

^

,

p. 627.

Ibid ., p. 486.

9lbid_.

,

p. 480.
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Japan forced lyeyasu and his successors

to

deal effectively with the Christian
menace.

change their policy

in

order

to

In reversing the policy of

leniency toward the Christian religion,
the Tokugawa Shoguns over a
period
of years dating

from 1612

to 1638

moved from

a policy of open trade and

cooperation with other nations to a course of
isolationism and seclusion

from the world.
Beginning with the Anti-Christian edict of 1611
(actually lyeyasu

proclaimed the

first anti-Christian edict of his rule in

1606 which was

really a reinforcement of a previous edict
announced by Hideyoshi in 1587

but never carried out) which prohibited the conversion
to Christianity of

any officers of lyeyasu' s government and the military followed

in

quick

succession by stiffer edicts of expulsion against the Christians themselves
in 1614

and 1616, lyeyasu sought

power.

to

cope with the Christian threat

At the same time, he desired not

trade relations which were of

much

to close or inhibit the

benefit to the Japanese.

to his

commercial

Murdock

explains that "lyeyasu, while prepared to accord foreign traders a hospitable

welcome
in his

to Japan, the old

statesman was thoroughly bent upon being master

own house and upon seeing
"''"^

his g-uest.

to

it

that his hospitality

However, with the death of lyeyasu

measures against

the Christian religion,

if

w;)s

in

was

not abused by

1616 and despite the

ai^' ivl.'iuflv

clear to the

succeeding Shogun that so long as foreign trade went unrestricted, and the

abuse of the edicts continued unpunished, the power and authority

^^Ibid

.

,

p. 502.

of the
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Tokugawa Shogunate remained threatened. Starting with Hidetade

in

1616

and continuing with lyemitsu in 1623, Christians were dealt with severely.

No longer were they expelled

as they had been under lyeyasu, but they

were now tortured and put

to death

because Christian nations

illegally

by the Tokugawa authorities.

smuggled the Christian priests and

missionaries back into Japan, lyemitsu halted
In 1623, the

Tokugawa authorities expelled

Portuguese.

The English had

left

all

trade with foreign nations.

the Spanish; in 1638, the

on their own account, but for over two

hundred years they too were excluded from the islands

Norman

Moreover,

of Japan.

E. H,

explains that "after 1640, all foreigners and foreign trade were

excluded from Japan except for a small trading station in Deshina (Nagaski)

where the Dutch and Chinese were kept under
limited trading rights.

strict supervision and allowed

In 1637, the Shogunate forbade any

the coimtry; to disobey their law and to return to Japan

Japanese

meant death.

to leave

To

enforce seclusion, the capacity of each ship was henceforth limited to five

Thus, in the short span of forty years, Japan had moved

hundred koku.

from a policy

of open trade and exchange, tolerance of religious and cultural

differences and political neutrality to a policy of isolationism and xenophobia.

Questions arise as to the reasons behind such a drastic reversal.
It is

correct to say that the threat presented by Christianity to the Tokugawa

Shogunate and Japanese society was a major cause or reason for the policy

"'•'^E.

series,

H. Norman, Japan's

New York,

Emergence as a Modern

1940, p. 13.

State , I.P.R. Inquiry
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of isolationism.

Christianity posed a comprehensive threat to
the Japanese

on political, religious and cultural terms.
Politically, Christianity and its adherents posed
a threat to Japan

as early as the rule of Hideyoshi in the latter half of the
sixteenth century.
In 1592, the fear of foreign invasion by Spain of which
the Christian Jesuits

were but

the advance party

The

minds

of the

Japanese by

the Spanish governor of Manila,

letter contained an account of all the titles of the Spanish

sovereign, Don Felipe

Morga, a Spanish

in the

Gomez Perez Dasmarinas,

a letter written by
to Hideyoshi.

was implanted

II.

official

In 1596, further fears

who

were raised by Dr. Antonio

unwittingly showed a

map

of the

world

to an

envoy of Hideyoshi.

... in which could be seen all the countries which had been
discovered, and Espana and the other kingdoms possessed
by his Majesty, among which were Piru (Peru) and Nueva Espana.
When

the favorite Ximonojo asked how these distant kingdoms
had been gained, the pilot replied that the religious had entered
first and preached their religion, and then the soldiers had
followed and subdued them.

A

similar account

sailors

come

is

recorded by E. M. Cooper.

were heard boasting

She claims that "Spanish

that after the traders and missionaries

the troops of Spain to annex Japan."

13

would

The Japanese Shoguns'

suspicion and fear of an impending foreign invasion led by the Christians

already in Japan was substantial.

As

late as 1622, a date well into the

Henri Bernard, "Les Debut des relations diplomatique entre
et les Espana des lies Philippines," MN, I (1938) p. 122.
13

E. M. Cooper, Japan, Australia:

Pergamen Press,

le

period

Japan

1970, p. 43.

of Christian persecution,

was profound, he was

Murdock

finds that "Hidetada's distrust of
Spaniards

afraid of a foreign invasion, and he
looked upon the

foreign priests as the avant-couriers and harbingers
of a Spanish conquest. "^^

Furthermore, the fears and suspicions

of foreign conquest

by the bitter rivalry between the western nations
riches.

As Gustav Voss

in the

were enhanced

race for Japan's

explains:

powers— Portugal,

All the great maritine

Spain, England
economic rivalry
for political as well as commercial advantages. They used
every imaginable means to outwit and outrace each other in
their mad rush for the riches of Japan. The Dutch merchants,
for instance, envious of the profits made by Portuguese and
Spaniards, helped to prejudice the Japanese authorities against

and Holland—were deep

their Catholic rivals.

in nationalist and

Repeatedly, they represented to the

Shogun that the missionaries had but one intention, that of
turning Japan into the state of a colony under the cloak of
Christianity.

The

distrust of Christianity by the Shoguns

domestic strength of the foreign missionaries.
had taken up the Christian

faith.

some

In

had come under Christian influence.

It

was reinforced by

the

Large numbers of Japanese

instances, whole cities and towns

was widely acknowledged

Nagaski was under the control of the Jesuits.
Christian foreigners were not hesitant about

It

became apparent

tal<:ing

that

that the

sides in local power

struggles, especially as their strength grew, and as they had a definite stake
in the

outcome

of those struggles.

Kimo,

in

addressing himself to this point,

claims that "one reason for lyeyasu's dislike of Christians was that they took

^'^Op. cit.

,

Murdock,

p.

623.

'^Gustav Voss, "Early Japanese Isolation," Pacific Historical Review
Vol. 14, No. 1 (1945), pp. 20-21.

,
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the side of Hideyori. the son

of Hideyoshi, in the battle of

hopes of regaining religious freedom. "^^ Such
activity,

in

Osaka

in

1615

if left

unrestricted, constituted a serious challenge to
the power and authority
of the

Tokugawa Shogunatc within

the

Empire

of Japan.

This fact, coupled

with the fear of foreign invasion by the Christian
nations, proved

to

be one

reason for the eventual repression and expulsion of the
Christians and
Christianity.

Christianity

From

grounds.

was also considered a menace

to

Japan on religious

various Japanese documents, the Buddhists and Confucian

reaction to Christijmity can bo clearly discerned.
exile in 1587, Christianity

was considered an

In the first

"evile religion."

Voss gives an excellent account of the religious opposition
his article "Early Japanese Isolationism."

Mc

decree of

Gustav

to Christianity in

states:

This Buddhist opposition to Christianity dated back to the very
days of St. Francis Xavier. During an early stay in Kagoshima,
the bronzes, in the name of the outraged deity of Buddhism,
called upon the prince of Satsuma to expel the foreign creed. ^'^
In

examining the pages of the Annual Letters

pronouncement

that Japan, as the 'land of

evil religion of Kirishitan

was put

at the

,

llic

Voss discovers "the
CJods'

.^-hou.

.

nol acc<

|ti

(he

head of the document and that

missionaries are openly accused of planning the destruction of Buddha."

^^

1

^Op. cit.

7

Op.

cit.

^^Ibid.

,

,

Kuno, p. 50.

,

Voss, p. 26.

p. 2G.

18

39

Voss continues:

The idea that Japan is the nation of Shintoistic
deities and
Buddha recurs in almost every subsequent
pronouncement against Christianity.
Whether we can
the land of

.

.

.

speak of Taiko Ilidcyoshi's lifetime as the
beginning of a
Shinto revival is a question open to discussion,
but it is
certain as someone has said, "the sacred
fires of the great
Shintoistic tradition

were far from being extinct. " They
smoldered beneath the ashes and helped to forge the
weapons
intended to erase everything Christian and
Occidental from
the face of Japan. Both Shintoism and Buddhism,
as well
as the philosophy and ethics of Confucianism,
played their
part in furnishing motives and arguments for the

rejection

Western thought and

of

Finally, Christianity

religion. 19

was rejected by

the Japanese authorities because

Christian teaching and doctrine ran counter to ancient Japanese
loyalties.

The Christian

articles of faith

any other loyalty.

demanded

that one place loyalty to

God before

This was in direct conflict with the traditional Japanese

views regarding ancestor worship and

filial piety.

E. M. Cooper maintains

that Hideyoshi disliked the influence of the Catholic priests,

who urged

their

converts that their first allegiance should be to their religion and to the Pope.

Obedience

to an outside

power could prove much more dangerous than

obedience to a rebellious daimyo."^^ There was no room in Christianity
for ancestor worship nor for anything other than the worship of God.
this reason, the Christian religion

opposed to the Japanese way of

^^

Ibid

^^Op.

.

,

p. 27.

cit.

,

Cooper, p. 43.

For

was pronounced as barbarous and

life.

Again Voss addresses himself

radically

to this

40
point:

Thus, the Christians were attacked for not being loyal
because of their worship of God, who claims the first right
to obedience. Such an accusation was bound to have its
effects. A doctrine that placed loyalty to God above loyalty
to the national ruler could easily be represented as

whom Bushido, the way of
was the all-inspiring ideal of Nipponese
manhood, and who saw in "chuke" and in the human relations
revolutionary to a Japanese to

the knightly samuri,

of the gorin the leftist expression of his religious patriotism
and the perfect blend of the traditional virtues of the Japanese

citizen.

Christianity

seemed

revolutionary tendencies

full of

and intrigues.

The Japanese

tradition of religious tolerance also

threatened by the Christian religion.
of the religious

to

wars

in the habit of

to

be

Both lyeyasu and Hidetada learned

of the Christian nations through their secret envoy

Europe. lyeyasu learned "that

were

seemed

in their

own countries, they (Europeans)

burning or beheading each other when one believed

He was not

something slightly different from another.
the superiority of the Christian religion."

22

at all

convinced of

Hidetada, for his part,

learned about the ravages of the religious wars

in

Europe

23

and sought to

expel Christianity before such an occurrence could plague Japan.
In conclusion, the following is taken

Kokumin-Shi

,

from Tokutomi, Kinsei Nippon

a series of documents which concretely express the attitude

of the Japanese authorities toward Christianity:

Op.

cit.

,

Voss,

p.

31,32.

^Inago Nitobe, Japan ,

New York: Charles

^The Thirty Years War.

Scribner's Sons, 1931, p. 92.
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Christianity wholly ignores both the traditions

1.

and the laws of our nation.
2.

religions.

Christianity ignores and despises our national
It is continuously causing national troubles

and disturbances.
3.

The Christian churches and organizations make

themselves centers of attraction to dissatisfied people
and stragglers. They are headquarters for disturbing
elements in Japan.
4. Because of their religious interests both the
Christian priests and the Christian converts in Japan
establish relations with the kingdom of Spain and serve
as spies for the Spanish king, thus paving the way for an
invasion of Japan.

Christian priests always enter into secret understandings with ambitious and unruly Japanese, and help
5.

them

to utilize religious influence for their

own

selfish

purposes. 24

For these reasons, the Japanese concluded

that in self-defense they should

cut off all communications with the outside world in order to prevent further

inroads of Christianity.

Besides the threat which Christianity presented
there were other reasons for the policy of isolationism.

was

the fear held by the

Tokugawa Shoguns

to the Japanese,

One

of these

that continued trade and increased

technological development would lead to increased power of local barons

and possibly the overthrow of their authority.
for rejecting foreign intercourse

Tokutomi,

was the fear

"One of the traditional reasons
that the guns and wealth

Kinsei Nippron Kokumin-shi, Vol. 14, pp. 244-245.

it
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would bring might make possible a
successful revolt against Tokugawa
"25
rule.
Further apprehensions were caused
by the notion that continued
intercourse with foreigners would gradually
erode the traditional values and

customs of Japanese society.

This notion

and apparent threat of Christianity.

is

intertwined with the specific

But even with the repression of the

Christian religion, the modernization
process could not help but change

Japanese society drastically, as
result,

And

it

Edwin Reischauer suggests

indeed did two centuries later.
that "Stability

became

As a

the watchword.

achieve stability, change or the threat of
change had to be eliminated.

to

This meant the freezing of society. "^6

A

final

reason behind the embarkment upon a policy of
isolation by

the Japanese concerns the intentions and
ambitions of the

and, in particular, lyeyasu.

The movement toward national unification was

accomplished through the efforts
Shoguns.

It

became

Tokugawa Shoguns

of lyeyasu, the first of the

his guiding principle that the

empire be retained within the Tokugawa family.

power

Tokugawa

of the Japanese

That was one principal

reason for his war on and the ultimate destruction of the offspring of
Hideyoshi.

Shortly before his death in 1616, lyeyasu, in order to insure

the legitimacy of rule for his descendants, deliberately ended the ancestral

claim

25

to

power

of the Hideyoshi family by putting

W. G. Beasley,

London:

Select

them

to death.

By

this

Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy 1853-1868

Oxford University Press, 1955,

p. 20.

26

Edwin O. Reischauer, The United States and Japan Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1965, p. 7.
,

,
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action,

lyeyasu rid the Tokugawa Shogunate
of

power once he

died.

its

chief domestic rival for

With respect to the challenge of
Tokugawa from abroad,

lyeyasu initiated the movement toward
isolation and seclusion.

James Murdock who gives a

It is

hint as to the reasons behind such
a

lyeyasu, however, evidently

felt that his

descendants,

move.

all of

whom might likely be no better than— if not actually
inferior
to— the "average man" would find their greatest danger
in

the support that

Europeans might too readily extend to local
chiefs who wished to emancipate themselves
from the yoke
of the House of Tokugawa— now invested
with the Shogunate
of Japan. It is fairly safe to say that neither
Hideyoshi nor
lyeyasu would ever have closed Japan to Western
intercourse.

Japan was closed in the interests of the safe workings of
the
administrative machine devised by lyeyasu to safeguard
the

supremacy

of his stodgy successors. 27

For these reasons

then, seclusion and isolation

law of the Tokugawa House for over two hundred years.

Shogun of

became
It

was

the fundamental
felt

by every

that period that only through isolationism could his country
be

preserved from corruption and defeat.

was enjoined

From

1638 through 1853, isolationism

alike by the dictates of patriotism and by the sanctions of

ancestral law.

The one remaining question yet
tion behind the Japanese
to this question, the

to

be dealt with concerns the explana-

abandonment of isolationism

answer

is

in 1853.

relatively simple and clear.

With respect

Japan was

forced out of isolation by the superiority of weapons possessed by the naval
fleets of the

felt,

Western nations demanding trade agreements.

Japan had sealed herself

Op

.

cit.

,

Murdock,

off

p. 577.

from

the rest of the world.

For too

long, they

Her society
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had remained stagnant, without benefit
or knowledge of the technological
revolution in the West.
fleet into the

When Commodore Perry

Japanese harbor

at

Uraga

that

Japan open her ports and society

was

at hand.

fleet, the

Unable

to

summer

American

of 1853, .demanding

to Americaii trade, the end
of isolation

counter the sophisticated weapons of
the American

Japanese were obliged

to entertain the

knowing well that other nations were
a question of power.

in the

sailed his

to follow the

The Japanese capacity

isolationism no longer remained.

American demands,

to

Americans.

It

was simply

enforce their policy of

Japan was obliged to cope with the

realities of international power-politics as they
existed in 1853 and not as
in 1G38.

China

The second case study
nation of China.

In

many

in Isolation

of isolationism focuses on the vast and
ancient

respects, as the discussion will reveal, the

Chinese experience of isolationism

is not unlike that of

Japan.

This

is

especially true in relation to the circumstances surrounding
the Chinese

reaction to and rejection of foreign influences, especially
Christianity; and
to the eventual

nations.

abandonment of isolationism under pressure from Western

Similarity

is

not surprising, given the fact that both Japan and

China developed the major course of their isolationism from the sixteenth
to the

middle of the nineteenth century and

foreign, mainly European, encroachment.

in

response

to like

pressures of

45

There are, however, important
differences between the two
nationsisolationist policies.

These differences are not of a
nature

cause a loosening of the definition of
isolationism.

that they

would

They do, however,

point up the fact that isolationism
can be adhered to for numerous and

various reasons and under significantly
different circumstances, geographical,
political

and cultural.

Throughout their long history, the Chinese
people have been isolated
in large

measure by geographic circumstances. Although China

unlike

is,

Japan, a land-based nation which stretches over
an enormous amount of
territory, the nature of

its

geography, (notably the perimeter areas),

constitutes a virtual land-based island.

China's borders presented for

a long time a considerable obstacle to any concerted
attempt at
establishing a consistent commercial or political relationship.

Cressey suggests

that

"China

is like

a huge oasis.

On

George

all sides,

she

is

surrounded by the most perfect of physical barriers. "^^
Kenneth Latourette
notes the influence of these geographic elements:

The boundaries of China have had a great influence
on her history and on the character of her people and
civilization. On the east is the Pacific Ocean which in the
old days discouraged rather than encouraged commerce
it shielded China from outside influences and the Chinese
showed little disposition to cross it.^^
.

.

.

28

George Cressey, "Three and a half million Square Miles, " in Devere
Pentony, ed. China; The Emerging Red Giant San Francisco: Chandler
Publishing Company, 1962, p. 18.
,

,

29

Kenneth Scott Latourette, The Development of China

Mifflin

Company, 1937,

p.

6.

,

Boston:

Houghton

Further, Latourette states:

China's land boundaries

reinforced her isolation. On
the west, northwest, and
southwest are great mountain
chains
some among the highest in the world.
They are buttres-sed by'

vast elevated semi-arid plateaus.

.

.

.

The

isolation

was

nearly complete. On the southeast
and northeast, to be sure
the barriers are not so effective,
but until the last hundred
years there were not in either direction
peoples from whose
culture China could learn much. 30

As a

'

result of their geographic isolation,
the Chinese developed a

civilization with little influence

geographic isolation was

to

from outside sources.

The impact

continue from the earliest times until
a

of

more

recent period when modern technology and
the development of sea, land

and air travel overcame these barriers

The development

to outside influences.

of the early Chinese civilization,
uninhibited by

foreign influence, was in large measure due
to the seclusion provided by
the geographic barriers noted above.

documented

Yet, historians of early China have

numerous accounts various instances

in

of contact

between the

Chinese Empire and the other major culture of the world,
the Roman

Empire

of the first three centuries A.

only under the powerful

D.^^ These contacts took place

Han and Chin regimes

in China.

Only a strong and

rich regime could afford to provide protection for
commercial traffic

outside the Chinese Empire.

Because of the inconsistent and haphazard

nature of these contacts, they had

^^Ibid.

31

,

p.

little

influence on the Chinese.

7.

See Frederick Teggart,
California Press, 1969,

Rome

and China. Berkeley:

University of
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C. P. Fitzgerald maintains that:
did not in any

way modify

thought or literature.

they traded with

it

"The contact had no

political significance,

the policies of statecraft,
had no influence on

The Chinese knew

at long

that the

Roman

world. existed,

range, they admired what they
knew, but

had no direct bearing on their lives,
made no modification
the world.

in their

all this

view of

""^^

Out of the early geographic and cultural
isolation came the Chinese
conception of the world.
to a nation

or state.

In ancient China, there

The sense

Having developed a civilization
parity, the Chinese

came

to

of unity

was no sense

came from belonging

in isolation

from any other

to

any other.

of even close

Any people who

not imitate or learn from the Chinese were
barbarians.

China and the World

to a civilization

view their empire as the center of the universe.

Chinese culture was considered superior

in

of belonging

did

V. P. Dutt writes

;

From time immemorial

right

down

to the

middle of the

nineteenth century, the Chinese looked upon themselves
as
the repositories of the only fine culture extant in
the world,
and their country as the centre of the universe. The
Chinese

empire was the finest civilization and all others who lived
its domain were barbarians who ought to bow
before
the superior culture of the Universal Empire and drink
from
the fountain of all knowledge and wisdom to be found only in
outside

this

empire.

32

'CP.

Fitzgerald, The Chinese View of Their Place
Oxford University Press, 1964, p. 9.

in the

World

,

London:

Vidya Prakash Dutt, China and the World; An Analysis of Communist
China's Foreign Policy New York: Preager, 1966, p. 28.
,

48

Kenneth Latourette maintains

that:

This lack of intimate

contact with other cultural groups
bred m the Chinese a feeling of intense
pride and disdain
They had known no other people with a
civilization equal to
their own
what wonder that the Chinese, especially
.

.

.

educated Chinese, should have a profound
contempt for
foreigners. To him they were barbarians. 34

the

Quite naturally this philosophy of cultural
and intellectual superiority

on the part of the Chinese carried over into
their relations with other nations.

As

a result, the Chinese state was for two
thousand years aloof and self-

centered as no other great civilization has been.
foreign intercourse was one of inequality.

Since

The Chinese conception
all

of

peoples outside of

China were naturally inferior, the only relationship which
could exist between

them was

that of vassalage.

Those who sought parity but were unable

to

force themselves upon the Chinese were rejected outright
as inferiors and

barbarians.

Fitzgerald

makes

this point quite clearly:

The Chinese have never had much experience of alliances.
Living in their own world in which they were long supreme,
their relations with other organized states as from time to time
existed in their vicinity were either hostile or those suzerain to
They never envisaged foreign policy in terms
The old rooted outlook that
China was the supreme central empire needing no friend, haviag

tributory.

.

.

.

of alliances, of balance of power.

no equal hold

fast.

"^^

Following fi-om this superiority complex, the Chinese were incapable of

grasping the concept of the nation-state which came out of the Renaissance

and the Reformation

34

Op.

in

Europe.

cit .

,

Latourette, p. 11.

•^^Op. cit.

,

Fitzgerald, p. 52.

Furthermore, "they were incapable of

recognizing even the existence of any
other distinct -but equal-national

or social entities.
the Great

relationship

Empire and other peoples and

that

was possible between

was subordination. to

the

Chinese.
Politically, the subordination took the

form

of tribute.

Those

peoples who were either overpowered by
the Chinese armies or who

wished

to

be part of the Chinese Empire and who
eventually were

assimilated into

From
superiority,

came

the basis of Chinese isolationism once the
western

make advances toward China

until that time, the

depended upon the

in the sixteenth century.

Chinese central authority had had no conscious

policy of anti-foreignism or isolation.

many

the system of tribute.

these two elements, geographic isolation and
cultural

nations began to

Up

were controlled through

it

ability of the

instances, repulse

it,

Chinese.

^'^

Mongols

of central

steppe.

The challenge by

Contact with foreigners merely

Chinese Empire

in particular those

However, those contacts were with

to sustain

who sought

it,

or in

to rule the

the inferior cultures of the

Asia and the minor nomadic tribes of the northern
the

West did not come

until the

geographic

barriers could be surmounted via the improved technology of the sixteenth

and later centuries.

Roberts. Elegant, "China's Next Phase,
October 1967, p. 139.

"

Foreign Affairs

on
•^'Principally the Mongols from the north and west.

,

Vol. 46,
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The development

of a consistent policy of
isolationism

Ming and early Ch'ing dynasties parallels
trade routes by sea.

by the

the rapid expansion of

The increased mobility

of the

late

Western

commercial vessels

of the Dutch, Portuguese. Spanish
and later the English, brought to
the

coast of China traders in search of the
riches that China had to offer.

The early years

of trade with the

West were marked by a rather

tolerant attitude on the part of the Chinese.

can explain their

initial

posture.

significant as foreign arrivals

the Chinese traditionally
inferior.

taught

Several circumstances

First, the

from

the

amount

West were

of trade

was barely

infrequent.

Secondly,

were tolerant toward those they considered

Moreover, their religious beliefs of Confucianism and
Buddhism

them forbearance.

leniency being the way of

Initially,

life in

even Christianity was tolerated,

China.

Thirdly, the Chinese government

never regarded international trade as a means of enrichment and
thus
ignoring rather than sponsoring or rejecting

it.

Lastly, the trade which

was

carried on was on Chinese terms, as "all foreigners were treated
as
subjects of the emperor.

them

to

If

terms by suspending

they

all trade. "

were regarded as another group
Celestial

Furthermore, the Europeans

threat to

who had nothing

to teach the

it.

the beginning of the sixteenth century, the continuous and increased

activity of the

.

too restive, the Chinese brought

of barbarians

Empire and thus posed no

By

38^
Op

became

cit.

,

Western traders brought a sharp reversal

Latourette, p. 82.

in

Chinese policy.
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As was

true in Japan, the Western trade

was accompanied by Christian

missionaries seeking to spread their
religion amongst the heathen
Chinese.

Chae-Kwang Wu

in

The International Aspect of the Mi...inn..v

in China, writes:

At the beginning of the sixteenth century,
the benevolent
government began to change. For the
first time it adopted the closed door
policy and instead of treating aliens liberally it put extreme
restrictions on them. The
reason for this sudden change of policy is not
hard to seek. It
lay in the aggressive and unscrupulous
actions of the Portuguese,
Dutch, Spaniards and English. They were the
disturbers of
peace and order.
attitude of the Chinese

The Chinese

hostility

toward Christianity was induced by several circumstances.

First, so long as the propagators of a

did not attempt to

meddle

new

religion remained peaceful and

in the politics of the country, they

persecution and proscription.

were not merely interested

It

became apparent

in the

that the Christians

propagation of religion but were also

involved in the local politics within the Chinese Empire.
that "Christian missionaries have

of their

own governments

.

.

.

come

China to advance the interests

that, in reality,

an agent of some foreign government.

A second cause

to

The Chinese saw

that the missionaries pretend to

China for the people's benefit, but
is

were free from

come

to

each and every one of them

"'^^

for the turnabout in the Chinese attitude lay in the

Christians' arrogance; specifically, their obvious attitude of superiority

^Chae-Kwang Wu, The
China

,

Baltimore:

^ Ibid
40

.

,

p. 132.

International Aspect of the Missionary

John Hopkins Press, 1930,

p. 132.

Movement

in
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Which was

in contradiction to the

emphasis was on changing and
western culture and ideas.

Chinese view of the world.

The Christian

civilizing the Chinese in accordance
with

Wu

explains this when he comments:

Tainted with the materialistic civilization
of the West
and bound by their own prejudices, tastes,
modes of thought
and plans of work, they have seldom been
willing to adapt
themselves to the environment in which they
labor. Some
even go so far as to thinly that a Chinese is not
soundly
converted to Christianity until he learns to eat
with a knife
and fork, or is not validly married until he
conforms to
western usage in this respect.

The Christians also made
to

it

a point to insult the Chinese civilization
by failing

acknowledge or accept the Chinese tradition of ancestor
worship, by

hostile activity toward the traditional religions of
Confucianism and Buddhism,

and by propagating the claim that Christianity was the religion
of peace.
Finally, the Christians, in building their churches and
other

religious sanctuaries, set up within the interior of China virtual
enclaves
of Christianity, in

many cases

resisting the authority of local Chinese officials.

These sanctuaries provided a base from which the Christians could carry
out their religious and political

programs with

little

interference from

Chinese authority.

Such actions on

llio

of

Llio

Christian missionaries, coupled with

the anti-Chinese activity of the Chinese Christians, caused the

Ch'ing Emperors
to

appear again

to

proscribe Christianity.

until the

^^Ibid., p. 134.

Ming and

The Christian religion was not

West had forced open

the door to China in the
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middle of the nineteenth century.

Subsequent actions on the part of the

Christians after the reopening of China in
the nineteenth century lends
credibility and justification to the motives
behind the Chinese proscription
of that religion in the time of the

A second
this period

was

Ming and Ch'ing dynasties.

significant reason for the Chinese isolationist
posture during

the Chinese preoccupation with the
security of the empire

from Mongol invasion.

The defense

of Inner

Asia has always held a prominent

place in the priorities of the Chinese Empire.

At the time of early western

expansion across the seas, the Chinese were becoming
more and more

concerned with the Mongol threat on their northern and western
fronts.

As

a result, despite the earlier Chinese capacity for maritime
power and expansion
of trade via the sea, all efforts at

the defense of China proper.

maritime growth were sacrificed

for

As John Fairbank remarks, China turned

away from her maritime trade and contacts

to insure the successful defense

of the mainland.

After 1644, China's new Manchu rulers, intent on building
their continental empire, ignored the sea. To suppress Ming

remnants, they even applied tactics once used by the Ming to
discourage Japanese pirates: the Ch'ing shut down maritime trade,
evacuated coastal islands and moved the coastal population ten
miles inland behind a patrolled barrier.
This driving concern for the defense of the Empire, combined with the
prohibition of Christianity, provided the major initiative for China's

isolationism.

Yet, there were other compelling reasons for such a policy.

42

John K. Fairbanks, "China's Foreign Policy
Foreign Affairs Vol. 47, April, 1969, p. 456.
,

in Historical

Perspective,"
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One

of these

was

the

would eventually lead

awareness by the intelligentsia

to the erosion of traditional
Chinese culture, philosophy

and, ultimately, political power.
to

be accessible

that foreign influences

To permit Western culture and ideas

masses would mean competition

to the

for those

myths

nurtured by the rulers for centuries which enabled
them to command the
loyalty of the people.

Certainly, questions would be raised about
China's

being the center of the universe and the Emperor being
Son of Heaven.
it

would become apparent that the Western culture had

advanced far beyond the Chinese culture.
erosion of the idea that
the Chinese.

all

in

Surely,

many respects

This could only result

in the

foreigners were barbarians with nothing to offer

Finally, the rulers and the intelligentsia would be exposed
as

propagators of these myths

in

order to hold onto power.

Thus, the Chinese

authorities sought to control contacts and trade with the

West

maintain their privileged positions in Chinese society.

As Werner Levi

in

order to

suggests:

A

further reason for the control of trade not directly related to
may have been the desire of the ruling
class to preserve an agrarian, self-sufficient society. Such

the tribute system,

a society did not need trade, which could only lead to

its

destruction.

Further on he maintains

that:

Behind the abstinatc Chinese refusal to alter ancient political
customs lay an additional, more materialistic consideration.
The demand for equal treatment by the foreigners struck at the
roots of Chinese society and threatened to undermine the position
of the ruling classes.

'^'^

'^^Werncr Levi, Modern China's Foreign Policy
Minnesota Press, 1953, p. 13.

^%id.

,

p. 13

,

Minneapolis:

University of
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Another reason for Chinese isolationism

in this period of initial
contact

with the West was the development
of the dogma that -'national
security could
only be found in isolation and

.

.

.

that

whoever wished

to enter into relations

with China must do so as China's vassal. "^^
This dogma of isolation had

developed

in reaction to the

the twelfth century.

As

aggressive activities of the northern tribes
during

a result, Levi maintains,

There was no provision in the organization of
the Chinese
government for the conduct of foreign relations in
the Western
sense. There were no such relations. In
fact, the Book

of Rites

ordained that "the officials of the Empire shall
have no intercourse
with foreigners. ""^6
Later,

when

the foreign influences began to batter at the
exclusiveness of China

in the nineteenth century, the only

system

of foreign relations

Chinese for as long as possible were those of superior

employed by the

to vassal, a continua-

tion of their traditional policy.

Finally, the Chinese attitude that trade could only transpire
with those

foreign states

who aclmowledged

the superiority of the Chinese and

who were

willing to partake in the Chinese tributary system evoked sentiments of

from the Western nations.

hostility

Unable

to

understand the Chinese attitude

and unwilling to submit to their demands for humility, the West was faced
with either the impossible task of forcing themselves on the Chinese or of

respecting their demand for isolation.

"The China power was as yet

^^

Ibid

.

,

p, 13.

'^^Ibid., p. 4.

Because, as Latourette points out,

too strong,

communication with Europe as yet
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too difficult, and trade too
unimportant to warrant a serious

wrest better terms from China or
western nations were

left

to

open her

armed

effort to

to foreign trade, "^V the

with the alternative of respecting
China's

isolation, at least, until such time
as they

were powerful enough

to

overcome

it.

Drawing from the above discussion,

it

seems apparent

that the over-

riding reasons for Chinese isolation from
the early sixteenth century to the

end of the eighteenth were the preservation
of their culture

.-md

traditional

philosophy, plus continued domestic political
control by the Manchu

and ruling classes.

Emperor

Implementation of the isolationist policy was pursued

through measures of anti-foreignism, tribute payment,
anti-Christianity,
control of trade, the doctrine of superiority and
proscription of maritime

development.

The success

of these

measures was aided

significantly by the

natural barriers provided by China's geography and by the
size and strength
of her armies.

So long as these conditions remained constant, and the

Manchu dynasty "was

strong enough to exclude Christian teaching and limit the

activity of the few Catholic missionaries to strictly supervised
scientific
woi-k, the cont:u;t with the

West remained

slight. ""^^

The Chinese policy

of

national isolationism remained consistent and viable under these circumstances
for nearly three hundred years.

47^
Op

.

cit.

,

Latourette, p. 82.

"^^Op. ciL, Fitzgerald, p.

:}2.

As a

result, Fitzgerald suggests:

57

Up

end of the eighteenth century,
the Chinese
stood intact, aloof, uninterested
in the West
unwilling to learn, unable to believe
that the barbarians
had anything of value to communicate. 49

world

to the

still

The one remaining question related

to the

period of Chinese isolationism

concerns the circumstances surrounding
the abandonment of that policy.

was true

in the

As

case of Japan, the Chinese were forced
out of their isolationist

posture by the superiority of Western
military capability due to advanced
technological development of weapons and
communication systems.

The task

of opening China to

the nineteenth century.

It

the Industrial Revolution,

Western influence took

was England,

who

Beginning with King George

the larger part of

the first nation to feel the impact of

led the other nations to the coast of
China.

Ill's letter in

1793 to

Emperor Ch'ien Lung

of

China requesting trade relations and the Emperor's
subsequent refusal, 50 the
English initiated the assault on China which was
capitulation.

to

end

in

her complete

Like Japan, China was forced out of her isolation
and compelled

accept the foreign contact because of the overriding
evidence that resistance

would be disasterous.
not have been any

^^Ibid_.

50
to

to

,

p„

In hindsight,

any number of military victories could

worse or more complete than

the eventual tragedy which

;]2.

An

excellent example of the Chinese attitude toward people they considered
be inferior barbarians is the response of Ch'ien Lung to the letter of King

George III. It is significant, also, because it demonstrates that even after
nearly three hundred years of isolationism, the Chinese desire to remain
isolated is quite adamant. The letter is taken from J. L. Cranmer-Byng,
"Lord Macartney's Embassy to Peking in 1793 from Official Chinese Documents,"
Journal of Oriental Studies, IV (1957-58), 134-7.

"
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overcame China due

to Occidental imperali

The Cultural Revolution
In relation to the previous discussion
on China and isolationism, a

brief word on the foreign policy of

Communist China, notably during

the

recent Cultural Revolution of the middle and
late 1960's. seems relevant.

Chinese foreign policy under the leadership of
the Communist Party of China,
in particular.

Chairman Mao Tse-tung, has

isolationist.

It

often been characterized as

has been argued that since 1949 China has
remained clearly

outside the international family of nations, showing
no willingness to
participate in the United Nations nor its activities, all
the while maintaining

"You, O King, live beyond the confines of many seas, nevertheless,
impelled by your humble desire to partake of the benefits of our civilization,
you have dispatched a mission respectfully bearing your memorial. Your
Envoy has crossed the seas and paid his respects at my Court on the
aimiversary of my birthday. To show your devotion you have also sent
offerings of your country's produce.

have perused your memorial: the earnest terms in which it is
couched reveal a respectful humility on your part, which is highly praiseworthy.
"Swaying the wide world, I have but one aim in view, namely to
maintain a perfect governance and to fulfill the duties of the state: strange
and costly objects do not interest me. ... As your Ambassador can
see for himself, we possess all things. I set no value on objects or
ingenious, and have no use for your country's manufactures. This, then,
is my answer to your request to appoint a representative at my Court,
a request contrary to our dynastic usage. ... It behooves you, O King,
to respect my sentiments and to display even greater devotion and loyalty
in future, so that by perpetual submission to our Throne, you may
secure peace and prosperity for your country hereafter.
"I

.

.

.
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a constant vorbage of hostility
against all efforts at international
cooporation.

Such an image of Communist China,
while largely eorrect.
take into aeeount the reasons
behind sueh a position.

A

of China's foreign poliey sinee
1950 demonstrates that

a national policy of isolationism.

communist leadership

the

to

That

is,

it

withdraw from

Chinese society from the rest of the
world.
195()'s,

was a recognized part

as such maintained

many

was

all

became a

eareful examination

does not constitute

not the intent or desire of

commitments or

to seclude

China, during the decade of the

of the international

communist movement and

cultural, economic, political and
military ties with

other communist states, primarily the
Soviet Union.
Sovict schism

it

fails to

reality within the

Even after

communist world

Chinese foreign policy was not isolationist.

the Sino-

in the early I960'

In fact, as the self-appointed

champion of true Marxist- Leninist Communism,
China's foreign policy was
predicated upon winning over as many nations to

revisionism of the Khrushchev-led Russians.

its

side against the

The Chinese were particularly

aggressive in their foreign relations with the new nations
of the Third World
as

it

was here

th.-it

the competition for ideological alliance included
not only

the Soviet Union but also nations of Lhc capitalist world.

Secondly, China remained outside of those international
organizations

which were dominated by the non-communist nations;

51

in

particular those

China and Russia signed a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual
in 1950 and numerous others during the 1950's.

Assistance

controlled by the United States.
for her absence

from these associations.

Chinese would have participated
they considered to be a

large measure, the

American policy

in

(Although

mere instrument

of containment.

it

is doubtful that the

any relationship or organization
which
for

American imperialism.)

Communist Chinese were

who were responsible
the

But China was not wholly
responsible

It

was

In

isolated as a result of the

the United States and its supporters

for a certain degree of Chinese
isolation

because of

"Free World policies of economic, cultural and
military boycott,

non-recognition and their plan of military encirclement.

China's reaction

did not, however, constitute a policy of
isolationism as they successfully

searched for their own friends

in the

The recent cultural revolution

communist world.
in

Communist China, which ran

course between 1965 and 1969, has also been considered
isolationist overtones.

Due

to

to

its

have had

the lack of communication and the absence

of first-hand knowledge of what transpired inside the People's
Republic of

China during those years of tumult,

it

is not too difficult to

such a characterization could be made.

understand how

Closer examination reveals that

China's foreign policy during the Cultural Revolution suffered from a

profound lack of direction.

Inevitably, jmy sign of a radically different

program would have been evident had there been a conscious attempt on

the

^^The Chinese Communists have also been portrayed as renegades of
international law. They, however, maintain that international law is based
on western philosophy and culture; thus, foreign and unfair to non-western
nations.
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part of the Chinese to isolate
themselves.
Ironically, during these years,
the only consistent policy
pursued

abroad by the Chinese was that of
spreading Mao Tse-tung's thoughts
on

world revolution and national liberation.
pushed the Maoist
with

whom

that the

line so intensely that

It is

many

ironic because the Chinese

nations in the Third World

China had established diplomatic relations
reacted by demanding

Chinese diplomatic missions leave their
countries.

China was forced

to recall

many diplomats, who were

the Maoist line too ruthlessly.

Likewise,

Mainland

expelled for pursuing

many Chinese diplomats were

expelled by the host nation because of their
occasional violent activity against

those nations as a means of expressing their support
for the revolutionary
forces which were rooting out the impurities within
Chinese society.

way, thoy hoped

to

make

their position secure

In this

when they returned home and

also to justify their presence in a revisionist or even capitalist
country.
In other

words, the excesses of the Cultural Revolution

over into and affected Chinese relations abroad.

in

China spilled

The result was growing

diplomatic isolation of China brought on by the reaction of her ruthlessness

and brashness abroad.
tionism.

But diplomatic isolation does not constitute isola-

China continued

years of the Revolution.

to rely

In fact,

during the time of the revolution.

on trade during even the most tumultuous
foreign

commerce played an important

role

Foreign trade provided needed materials

not available as a result of the disruption to work.

The Chinese Communists

also maintained diplomatic missions as well as commercial and cultural ties
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in those countries

which permitted them.

Once the excesses

of the cultural

revolution ended, and the Foreign Office
was put back in order,

apparent that

it

was absence

it

was

of a consistent direction in
foreign policy rather

than a conscious national policy of
isolationism which lent the appearance
that

China was withdrawing from the rest of
the world.

Summary
The case studies

of Japan and China

of Japan and China of the

Ming and Ching dynasties

represent instances of a nation in pursuit of
isolationism.

Based upon the

definition of isolationism explicated previously,
these t-wo studies are intended
to

be representative of isolationism

in

accordance with

its historical

meaning.

During their respective periods of national isolation,
both Japan and China

managed

to

sever

in that they alone

all official

provided the necessnrv imi

for their society and

from

contacts with other nations, were self-sufficient

were able

to i)lacc

the rest of the international

">

community.

nation.

program
purity.

In other

seclusion

Both were able

And most important, both
a.

to

repulse

nations pursued a

national level.

was, for both Japan and China, a policy which was applied
all levels.

in

Neither had military nor

conscious policy of isolation that was executed on

and on

resources

'line

themselves apart or

commercial commitments with any other
foreign contact and influence.

III

Isolationism

to all other nations

words, isolationism constituted the specific

for achieving their national goals of security, prosperity and cultural

Isolationism was thus the vehicle or means to accomplish those
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specific ends.

Several general observations about
isolationism arise out
of the preceding case studies.

In both instances the policy of
isolation

greatly aided by the respective geographic
conditions.

It is

was

probable that

isolation could not have been possible without
these natural barriers to choke
off foreign intrusion.

might generalize that
to

On
it

the basis of the Chinese and Japanese
experience one

is

much

easier for a nation with "island-like" geography

pursue isolationism than for one which

foreign influence and encroachment.^^

is

As

geographically vulnerable to

many

a result,

nations

may

not

possess the option of isolationism as a possible foreign policy
as they lack the
geographic elements necessary.

A second

^'^

observation, is that isolationism

policy can only be successfully executed with the
of society.

This cooperation

Isolationism
incursion.

is

For

not possible

may be

if

enforced or

some segments

full

it

more

than any other foreign

cooperation of

may be

all

elements

voluntary.

of the society are

open to outside

this reason, isolationism is a national policy of exclusion,
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For example, Germany lacks any substantial geographic barriers, thus
making her vulnerable to foreign incursion, whereas her neighbor Switzerland
possesses formidable barriers.
54

In theory, a nation lacking sufficient geographic barriers could

by building man made obstacles

compensate

themselves. However,
historically, these attempts have been largely unsuccessful. The fortified
walls of the early city-states were vulnerable to siege and ultimately the cannon.
The French Maginot Line, erected as a defense against Germany, was avoided
by going around it. Even the Great Wall of China had its leaks. Had it not
been for the geographic setting in which it was erected, it too would not have

been of much consequence.

in the effort to isolate
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pursued by society as a whole and
rendering equal treatment

to all other

peoples. Both Japan and China,
basically because of the
controls exercised

by the central authorities over the
domestic society, achieved the
necessary
support for a successful isolationist
policy.

A

third point is that isolationism
for China and Japan

was possible

largely as a consequence of the
state of scientific and technological
develop-

ment

in that

period.

Both countries adhered

just before the Industrial Revolution.

to isolationism in the centuries

Development of communication,

transportation and weapon systems had
not progressed to a very sophisticated
stage.

In large

foreigners

measure, isolation was possible

who desired

to

make inroads

into

in that

Japanese and Chinese societies

simply did not possess the technological
resources
obstacles of geography,

let

period because those

to

overcome the physical

alone the obstacles of national resistance.

The question must be raised whether or not isolationism
as a foreign policy in the

modern world. When

probe any corner of the world how realistic
isolation?

Of what advantage

is

it

obsolete

intercontinental missiles can

it

to

speak of a nation

a policy of isolationism

sacrifice technological development because

on vital research?

is

is

if

in

a nation must

lacks the resources to carry

Ultimately, the retardation of technological growth will

imperil that nation's security, thus negating the primary goal for which

adopted the policy of isolationism.

China and Japan failed

to

(This is one of the problems that both

understand

technological backwardness

it

until the reality of their

was made apparent by

the West.)

economic and
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Finally, unless a nation in its
isolation is able to generate
sufficient

technological growth on a par with

threatened.

and China.

its

resources and technology.

in

its

security will be

a nation's growth and

Such was the case with Japan

In both cases, the purity of their
respective cultures

paramount.

As

measure

The

to the resulting

later

of use as a foreign policy

if

is

of isolationism

was due

In general, isolationism can only be

which promotes the nation's goals, both long and

the effort is

This

capabilities.

abandonment

backwardness of those societies compared

with the advanced nations of the West.

short range,

was

a result, scientific research and
experimentation were not

stressed in either society.
in large

adversaries,

must not cause stagnation

Isolation

development of

its

made on

all levels to

true with respect to

all

develop the national

foreign policies, but

especially relevant to isolationism since self-sufficiency

is

it

is

an essential

ingredient in fulfilling the goals of separation from the outside world.
It is

hoped that the meaning of isolationism can be clarified from the

previous discussion.

Up

to this point, the

approach

to a

sharpening of the

concept of isolationism has been to explore examples of what isolationism
It is

apparent that the concept

is

being defined in

Granted that over time, meanings relating

to

its

is.

historical sense.

concepts change.

Such changes

occur because some aspects of a concept have more relevancy and thus take on

more meaning
It is

foundation

at different times.

important that concepts which have taken on new meaning have
in the historical

neutrality has taken on

sense in which they were used.

new meaning with

(For example,

the advent of the Cold

War;

yet.
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its

meaning

is

based

new meanings may

in its historical
underpim^ings.)

Without the foundation

result in the distortion of
that concept.

The subsequent case

studies, one on British foreign
policy in the

nineteenth century and the other a
study of American foreign
policy, deal

with isolationism in a newer context.

Much

of the discussion, especially

concerning American foreign policy, will
be concerned with tracing the

evolvement of the new and different meaning
attached
this matter,

it is

hoped

to

its historical

what

is not

and what

In

demonstrate just how far the sense of isolation

has shifted from
is

to isolationism.

moorings.

isolationism,

By

setting up a dichotomy between

some conceptual

clarification

may be

established.

Britain and "Splendid Isolation"

In the examination of British foreign policy
of the nineteenth century,

three basic questions will be raised.

First, what

were

the broad policy

outlines under which British foreign policy operated
during this century,

particularly during the years of "Splendid Isolation"?
the

meaning

(or

meanings) of the concept isolation as

British foreign policy?

And

meaningful for conceptual clarity.

fulfill

was applied

to

the requirements established as

An important

question

Can Britain's foreign policy be considered as

meaning become so diffused

it

thirdly, in light of the definition of isolationism

presented above, does British policy

point.

Secondly, what was

that

when applied

is

raised at this

isolationist?

to British policy

Or has

it is

the

basically

67

misnomer?

a

The nineteenth century foreign policy
labeled "Pax Britannica. "

of

Great Britain has been

was a century when British power and

It

innuence were spread throughout the world
when
at its peak.

The foundations

of its strength

the British

Empire was

were based on overwhelming

naval power which enabled the British to achieve
an unchallenged mastery of
the seas.

its

As a

workshop,

result, Britain

its

the "world's leading

banker, and the carrier of

the nineteenth century

the days of ancient

During

was

was a time

of

its

economic power-

goods. "^^

For

the British,

power and prosperity unparalleled since

Rome.

this century, British foreign policy

can be divided into two

distinct phases.

The

Napoleon

Treaty of Vienna, was a period of rapid expansion overseas.

ajid the

The peace and
of

first,

stability

which began

in

1815 following the defeat of

on the European continent established by the Concert

Europe permitted the British

to concentrate on expanding their

economic

and military interests into the non-European regions of the world.

Under

the

guise of protecting British nationals, they gained footholds in Africa and

Asia, especially securing their position in the Indian sub-continent.
a period of expanding and consolidating British power abroad.

It

was

At the same

time, she continued to position herself into the "balancer" role on the

European continent and concentrated on thwarting any European challenge
to her position as the

55

headmaster of Europe,

Milton Israel, ed.

,

Involvement

in

European

Pax Britannica, London: Oliver and Boyd, 1968,

p. 2.
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was considerable as

politics

the British sought to maintain
peace and stability

through the Congress system.

The second phase

of British policy, the one
characterized as

"Splendid isolation," began under the Liberal
ministry of William Gladstone
in 1868.

If

the previous policy

was one

of expansion and consolidation of

British interests abroad, the major emphasis
in her policy now turned to

protecting these interests
of France,

in the face of the

Germany and Russia.

aggressive colonial aspirations

Through the successive ministries

Gladstone, Disraeli and Salisbury, British foreign
policy

is

of

depicted by

British historians as one of "isolationism, " a policy
which sought to protect

her interests, yet retain the nation's ability
In 186(5, the

to act freely

and independently.

Earl of Derby expounded the principles which were to form
the

foundation of British foreign policy until the end of the nineteenth
century.

He stated

that

it

was

the British government's duty "to keep itself upon

terms of goodwill with

all

surrounding nations, but not

to entangle itself

with any single or monopolizing alliance with any of them."

Prime Minister Gladstone sought
Anxious

to retain the

to put

^'^

In 1868,

these principles into practice.

Concert of Europe as a mejms of ensuring peace.

5Gr

This shill in policy was duo to a revulsion against the costly and al
times unfortunate exj^erienccs of the IH.^O's and 186()'s, cs])ociall\ fix
Crimean War. Also, Prime Minister Gladstone hold a 'I'lTci .:i
concerning Britain's proper foreign j)()licy Ironi thai ol orii I' Im- sli>n.
See Paul Knaplund, Gladstone's Foreign Policy Conn,: Archon Books, 1970,
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James Hansard, Hansard's Catalogue and Breviate
Oxford: Blackwell, 1953, p CLXXXIV.

of Parliamentary Papers

,
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he wrote:
I do not believe that
England ever will or can be unfaithful
to her great tradition, or can
forswear her interest in the
common transactions and the general interests of
Europe

her credit and her power form a fund,
which in order that
they be made the most of should be
thriftly used. ... 58

But

Preoccupied with domestic matters, Gladstone
was determined
all

needless and entangling alliances.

During his

1874, Britain gave no leadership to Europe.

to avoid

first administration,

1868-

Writing on Gladstone's policy.

William Edwards suggests that "Gladstone's
government adopted a policy of
splendid isolation.

It

took no part in the remaking of Europe but
attempted

to assert the important principles of the
sanctity of treaties

Congress

of

made by

a

Powers. "^^

Disraeli continued the Gladstonian principles of isolation
during his

ministry.

His policy was "reestablishing the Concert of Europe
without

committing Great Britain

To these endeavors
at

he

to a close alliance with any foreign

was

faithful despite his taste for

times degenerated into jingoism,

The ascendancy

of

power. "^^

imperialism which

.

Lord Salisbury

to the

Prime Minishership

in

1885

ensured the continuance of Britain's policy of "isolation." Salisbury was a
staunch supporter of the Gladstone and Disraeli principles of non-alliance

and non-entanglement.
58

was Salisbury's contention

Harold Temperley and Lillian Penson, eds.
Cambridge: 1938, Document No. 123.

Policy
59

It

,

that Britain's insular

Foundations of British Foreign

,

W. E. Edwards, British Foreign Policy

1934, p. 65.
^Qfbid

.

,

p.

84.

,

I;ondon:

Methuen and Company,

Ltd.
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position and her great naval power
alliance unnecessary.

made

the

burdensome conditions

Through careful articulation

of an

of his position.

Salisbury was able to defend the
Victorian tradition of entering
into no
alliances in time of peace or avoiding
any

commitment

retaining a free hand for British
diplomacy.

m

to go to

war and

of

his study of Salisbury's

foreign policy, J. A. S. Grenville
claims that:

Salisbury did not believe that in a changing
world there
could still be permanent alignments or
even "short term"
alliances.

Circumstances might alter and then if the
material interests of a nation should conflict
with her written
engagements, the latter would be of little consequence.
Support for this position also came from
Earl Rosebery who occupied the

Prime Ministership

for a brief period

between 1892 and 1895, after which

Salisbury again held the reins of power.

Kimberley on April

28,

Rosebery,

in a letter to

Lord

1895 argued:

We cannot embroil ourselves in the quarrels of others
unless our own interests imperatively demand it. I
say,
because our commerce is so universal and so penetrating that
scarcely any question can arise in any part of the world

without
involving British interests. This consideration instead of
widening rather circumscribes the field of our action. For if
we
did not strictly limit the principle of intervention we should

always be simultaneously engaged

The end

in

some

of British policy of "splendid isolation"

1902, with the signing of an alliance with Japan.

6

J. A. S. Grenville,

Press, 1964.
Ibid

.

.

p.

forty wars.^'^

came on January

30,

Circumstances had

Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy

.

London:

A thl one

p. 3.
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Changed as the continental powers
of Prance, Germany, and
Russia challenged
the British

supremacy and security policy

via a series of alliances.

of British interests could no
longer be achieved in isolation.

Edwards explains

that "Isolation

William

had become dangerous and Great
Britain

must be strengthened by a close alliance
with a nation strong enough
military and naval support

if

Protection

to give

necessary. "^^^he concluding of the
alliance

with Japan marked the end of "splendid
isolation" for Britain.

It

also

signaled the end of a century of Pax
Britannica.
In general, British foreign
policy

the

from 1868 through 1902 adhered

broad policy outlines of non-alliance
and non-intervention.

Edwards concludes

that Britain's policy

to

William

was one where "she played a leading

part in the Concert of Europe but refused
to fetter her liberty by making
an
alliance with any other power, and remained
aloof both from the Triple

Alliance which was formed by Germany,
Austria and Italy in 1882 and the
64

speech to the Birmingham Liberal Unionist
Association on May 13
1868, Joseph Chamberlain articulates the position as
to
In a

why isolationist
He states that "all the powerful States of Europe have
made
alliances and as long as we keep outside these
alliances, as long as we are
policy

dead.

IS

envied by

and as long as we have interests which at one time or
another
we are liable to be confronted at any
moment with a combination of Great Powers so powerful that not even
the
most extreme, the most hotheaded politician would be able to
contemplate it
without a certain sense of uneasiness. " (From The Times
Saturday, May 14,
all,

conflict with the interests of all,

,

1898.
65

Op

-

cit.

,

Edwards,

p. 123.
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•Dual Entente, which France
concluded with Russia in 1893." ^6
^ord Strang,

a Permanent Secretary of the
Foreign Office, summarized
British policy

during this period as "to establish
the Kingdom's peace and
security by
isolationism; her prosperity by
protecting world trade; and to use
her navy
to

safeguard overseas interests and lines
of communication with the
Empire.

Specifically, this

meant the necessity of preserving
Britain's "free hand" or

of avoiding any "entangling,"
"exclusive," "monopolizing," "separate,"

"single" or "special" alliances with other
powers.

The British use
isolation" as a

means

of the

term

isolation and specifically
"splendid

of depicting their foreign policy
did not

until late in the nineteenth century.

the historical

As a matter

of fact,

it

become popular

was

not until

meaning of the concept was abandoned and
replaced by a less

disparaging meaning that isolation was used

to

characterize Britain's foreign

policy.

Up
that

it

until the 1890's, isolation

had been used historically;

as a refusal to collaborate in any

was used by

first, in the

the British in the

sense explicated in this treatise,

way with other

depreciatory implication of a nation's weakness.

nations; secondly, as a

(This is understandable in

the context of British participation in the isolation of a

^'^^lbkl_.
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,

weak post-Napoleonic

p. ix.

Arnie Laurens, Britain Is

1964, p. 216.

^^Op.

manner

cit.

,

Howard,

p. 35.

No

Island, London:

Cossell and Company, Ltd.,
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France on the European continent.)

It

was

in this latter

sense of an involun-

tary position of weakness which the
British applied to isolation that
gave
its

pejorative connotations.

it

Christopher Howard maintains that to
the British

"a policy of isolation was something that
one attributed to one's political

opponents or against which one advised one's
colleagues.
It is

not until the middle 1890's, during the
debate over Britain's foreign

policy's constituting "splendid isolation" or
"dangerous isolation" that
indications of a change in the atmosphere and
meaning surrounding isolation

are apparent.

In a

speech by George Joachim Goschen on February
26, 1896,

the two meanings of isolation, one old and one new,

Goschen suggested

were

articulated.

that:

There may be the isolation of those who are weak and who
therefore are not courted because they can contribute nothing,
and there, on the other hand, is the isolation of those who do not
wish to be entangled in any complications and will hold themselves
free in every respect.
Our isolation is not an isolation of
weakness; it is deliberately chosen, the freedom to act as we
choose in any circumstances that may arise. '^^
.

.

.

The controversy created by Goschen's speech was enormous.
"the

normal meaning

context was, as

of the

it still is,

word

'isolation'

"^^

71

.

,

Op.

for support in case of need.

p. 21.

The Times
cit.

,

,

London:

Howard,

p.

in international

an embarrassing lack of friends among other

powers on whom reliance can be placed

Ibid

when employed

Until then,

February 27, 1896,
1.

p. 7.
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Goschen's acknowledgment of isolation
as a deliberate policy of Britain
and
his insistance that

such a policy was preferable

to any other for the present

ran counter to previous thinking about
isolation.

The importance

of

Goschen's

speech, which becomes apparent in
subsequent defenses of his position
by
others, is that the meaning of isolation
has been altered to
in

which Britain found herself

became fashionable
isolation."

at that time.

To put

it

more

fit

the circumstances

succinctly,

it

to label British foreign policy as that
of "splendid

72

Isolation used in the sense that Goschen and his
supporters spoke of

meant a policy
power.

March

of systematic avoidance of any

it

permanent alliance with another

Sir William Harcourt, in a speech before the
House of
of 1896, spoke of two kinds of isolation.

He explained

Commons

that there

in

was

"isolation which arises from the unfriendliness of the
world, but also that
isolation

may

be that you have not desired to enter into permanent or
entan-

gling alliances. "

From

this, isolation

"freedom of action" because
international politics.

that

was

became synonymous with

the phrase

the goal intended for Britain in

British policy was based upon the preservation of the

72

The popularity of the term "splendid isolation" was due in large measure
press campaign of 1895-6. The major contributors to its popularity
and, therefore, largely responsible for its becoming fashionable were the
Contemporary Review the Speaker, the Spectator and the Saturday Review
to the

,

''Spencer Wilkenson,

Policy.

.

The

Awakening Essays Toward a British
Westminister: A. Constable and Company, 1897, p. 143.
Nation's

:

75

nation's freedom of individual
action^

was expected

to retain this publicly

Isolation in the sense of
non-alliance

acknowledged British goal.

However, as Howard so aptly points

out, "It is significant nnd

can

hardly have been a coincidence that
talk of Britain's 'isolation' as
a matter of
deliberate choice

became fashionable

within a few months of

its

being

generally realized that France and Russia
had

come

detached position was thereby rendered

more conspicuous."^^ From

this,

all the

together.

Britain's

Howard concludes:
Had

not been for her aloofness from the
groups of travellers
Dual Entente and the Triple Alliance) much less
would, in all
probability, have been heard of Britain's deliberate
"'^5
"isolation.
it

(the

In all likelihood, this is probably correct,
especially since the British had

previously shown

little

reluctance to involve themselves in European power

politics as the balancer of conflicting interests.

Yet, because British policy

non-involvement

of non-alliance and because her

European alliances distinguished her from those other

was thought

nations, she
to act,

in the

was one

to

be "isolated" which meant retaining the freedom

unrestrained by commitments to others.
In conclusion, the

essence of "isolation" for the British was that

Britain be free from any alliance in the sense of a formal written agreement

pledging her, should a certain stated contingency arise, to go to war

in

support of another power; indeed this freedom was sometimes stated

in
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p. 25.

p. 24.
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so comprehensive as to imply,
not merely that Britain was
not bound by any
alliance, thus defined, but that
she

was under no

kind that entailed the "casus belli.

But

exclude cooperation with others
when

This
in

is the

it

treaty obligation ot any

was a policy which

common

interests necessitated

meaning drawn from Joseph Chamberlain's
speech

December, 1898.

did not

at

it.

Wakefield

77

One crucial question remains: Could British
foreign

policy, during

the period 1868 to 1902, be defined
as isolationism without distorting the

meaning of

the concept?

have any relation to

In other

its historical

words, does the concept of isolationism
sense

if

Britain's "splendid isolation"

qualifies as an instance of that policy?
In the light of the criteria of seclusion, non-contact,

non-commitment,

and non-involvement in or with others established by the
definition explicated
previously, Britain's "splendid isolation" does not constitute
a policy of
isolationism.

Here,

it

appears

is

an example of the meaning of isolation

T6

Ibid

.

p. 40.

,

77

"When

spoke, as I shall speak again, of the splendid isolation of this
gave expression to my deep-rooted conviction that the British
Empire, by which I mean the United Kingdom and her children across the
sea, is well al)]c to defend against all attack its own possessions and its own
exclusive interests. That is a task which we will undertake alone, and in its
performance we ask for no help and wc need no alliances. But there are
other interests which are not ours exclusively, which others have with us in
common, and surely it is not unreasonable to anticipate that in promoting these
interests there shall be a certain amount of cooperation. " (From The Times
country,

I

I

,

December

9,

1898.)

"

77

being sufficiently broadened and
distorted as

to forego its application
in a

precise sense.
It

should be

remembered

that during her "splendid
isolation" the

British Empire spread around the globe.
relinquish their colonial possessions

being isolationist.

The

enough

is

fact that the British did not
to disqualify her policy as

However, a case might be made

that during her

"isolation," Britain did not expand her territory
abroad, thus "isolating"

herself in a restrictive sense from expansion
opportunities.
is

Such an argument

countered by the fact that between the years 1870 and
1900, the British

Empire absorbed

4, 754, 000

square miles of land and 88, 000, 000 people.

Also

during this period, the aggressive policies of the French,
Germans and

Russians on the African continent forced the British to abandon
their longstanding policy of non-intervention in the local politics of the
societies with

which they traded.

Now,

it

was imperative

that they establish British rule

over these new territories or else face the prospect of French, German and

Russian intervention.

All this occurred during the period of "splendid

isolation.

During the nineteenth century,

it

was

the British desire to be "self-

serving, to pursue a nationalist program unencumbered by long-term
obligation and entangling alliance."
isolate themselves

from involvement

78

Op.

cit.

,

78

Israel, p. 1.

Yet, the British

in

were unable

European affairs or

to

to

prevent

1

78

increasingly burdensome commitments
to their empire.
of great

On

power plus the

this point Grenville

will to maintain that

submits

The possession

power required commitment.

that:

British interests in the last
quarter of the nineteenth
century came into conflict with those
of other nations all
over the world. Consequently, no
British foreign secretary
could adopt a completely isolated
position, even had he so
desired.

The argument
reluctance to

commit

for British isolation has been
perpetuated through their
the nation to alliances.

There were,

occasions when the British government
declined

powers.

This

several

to collaborate with other

is especially true in relation to
their refusal to join either the

Triple Alliance or the Dual Entente.
that "All

in fact,

Christopher Howard points

powers decline on certain occasions

intervening at particular junctures,

if

out,

however,

to collaborate with others in

their interests so require.

One could

not build a theory of a sustained policy or
attitude of 'isolation' on such

episodes.

Further, while Britain's Prime Ministers, notably
Salisbury,

were not willing

to

commit

the nation to any long standing formal alliances,

they were not reluctant to intervene in the
politics of the Continent when
British interests seemed threatened.
In

Again Grenville remarks:

many respects

isolationist.

Salisbury's policy had been anything but
His first great state paper of 1, April. 1878,

ended Lord Derby's efforts

to hold aloof from continental affairs;
substituted for a policy of drift an assertion in precise terms
of England's claim to be heard on any settlement of the Eastern
question.
it

79
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Further evidence of this contention
comes from Harold Temperley
and
Lillian

Pensoa

in their study,

FcHmdations^nBri^^

They claim:
Dislike of binding alliances did
not prevent Salisbury

from establishing, and Rosebery
and Kimberley from
mamtaining, entente relationships. All
were prepared

admit that an entente might have to
be reinforced by
practical cooperation. Therefore,
"isolation" is too
strong a term to apply to British
^2

to

policy.

Finally, to argue that British
foreign policy in the last third of the

nineteenth century parallels that of
Japan and China during their isolation

periods would be a misrepresentation of
the meaning of isolationism.
at

no time

in the later nineteenth

century did the British pursue a policy of

isolationism in the sense that they had no allies
or friends.

Laurens suggests, "Britain

is

Clearly,

no island

if

by that

is

For as Anne

meant an

isolationist

country proudly protected against outside influences
by a natural barrier and

seeking only to remain aloof from the arrogant restlessness
of the world. "^^

To adhere

to a policy

which seeks

to limit intervention but

in the politics of other nations, refuses to join

remains involved

formal alliances while

cooperating in other ways, seeks out trade and cultural ties with
other nations,

and
to

is

engaged

in colonial

impcralism

is

quite different

from one which seeks

withdraw and set apart a nation from the rest of the world.

82

Op.

_cit.

,
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cit.

,

Laurens,

p. 218,

p.

516.

As was stated

before, to be non-aligned is not
to be isolated.
is not to set apart

or suspend contaet from.

To

limit ones intervention

To categorize British foreign

policy as isolationism is to abandon
the essence of the concept,
the

consequences of which are unclarity and
lack of meaning
political science.

in the language of

81

CHAPTER

IV

ISOLATIONISM AND TRADITIONAL AMERICAN FOREIGN
POLICY
In a farewell

address of 1796 George Washington gave this
IS
advice. It was important, but not strange
or even
original. In urging the people and their
leaders to avoid perm^
nent European alliances, Washington merely
expressed a
conviction of long standing, a sentiment even
then almost hallowed
by age. Isolationism was a natural, almost a
spontaneous reaction
to social and political conditions in Europe
and particularly
against Europe's military strife.
nation

A
policy

some

constant premise continually expressed concerning
American foreign

is that for

150 years isolationism served as the cornerstone upon which

America's foreign policy rested.

The notion

that isolationism is the sacred

heritage of American diplomacy has found favorable response

and diffuse audiences.

Nurtured by intellectuals and

among large

common men

alike,

it

is

a tradition which has enjoyed acceptance in both public and private
circles.
It

has been successfully propagated by both proponents and opponents of

isolationism.

Even

at the

present time, the idea that America's successful

beginning as a sovereign nation and
national

power was due principally

position in the mainstream of

its

to its policy of isolation holds a

American

Fred Rippy, America and the
Chicago Press, Sep. 1938, p. 3.
"'^J.

,

subsequent rise to a position of inter-

prominent

political thought.

Strife of

Europe

,

Chicago:

University of
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The popularity
three faetors.

of the isolationist tradition
is based principally
on

First, the physical
separateness of the

from Europe and Asia supports the
claim
from the rest of the world.

American continent

America developed

that

in isolation

Travel and communication between
the Americas

and other continents were not only

difficult

and dangerous but time-consuming.

Secondly, there exists the idea that
the American experiment in
democracy
constituted a unique experience in
government from the Europc:m tradition of

monarchial rule.

The idea

remaining attachments
to

of

that

America was attempting

to an elitist

throw

off all

and repressive European society proved

be readily accepted by the American people.

American society and

to

its institutions

of

The theory

that the novelty

government have been preserved

by means of a conscious and consistent policy of
isolation remains implanted
in the

minds

of the

American

"the notion that isolation

is

public.

the one

Kenneth Thompson maintaincs that

means

of preserving

democracy runs

like

a red thread from the views of the founding fathers to Senator
Borah to

Senator Robert A. Taft."2
Third, imd probably most important, the popularity of the
concept
a product of the

adhered
idea that

argument

that isolationism

was

the policy advocated and

to by the founding fathers of the United States.

American foreign policy

is

grounded

Supporters of the

in a tradition of

isolationism

have consistently based their views on the writings of the early American

2

Op

cit.

,

Thompson,

p. IGl.

is
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leaders.

Most notable among these and

the

most

cited and quoted as evidence

of isolationism are Washington's
Farewell Address,

Thomas

Jefferson's

warning against entangling alliances, and
the Monroe Doctrine.

Of the three sources, the most frequently
mentioned as an
expression of isolationism

is

explicit

Washington's Farewell Address of 1796.

Leading advocates of American isolationism
as William E. Borah find

comfort and support for their position

in the

warnings of Washington.

Speaking

before the United States Senate on February
21, 1919, Borah articulated the
traditional connection between the statements of
Washington and isolationism.

When Washington assumed the responsibilities as administrator of this Government, he immediately set about
to change that
condition of affairs: to wit, to separate the European
system from
the American system, to withdraw our people from her
broils, to

American Nation, and to divorce us from
quarrels and turmoils of European life.^
individualize the

Quoting directly from Washington's

text,

the

Borah established the connection:

Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why,
by inter-weaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe,
entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European
ambition, rivalship, interests,

Historian

J.

isolationism.
at length the

Fred Rippy
In his

is

humor or caprice ?4

another advocate of the American heritage of

book America and the Strife of Europe

pronouncements

Rippy discusses

of the founding fathers, interpreting

evidence of the traditional policy of isolationism.

3

.

them as

Concerning the Farewell Address,

William E. Borah, American Problems, (Edited by Horace Greene),
Duffield and Company, 1924, p. 72.

New York:
"^

Thc Farewell Ad dress in William A. Williams, The Shaping
Diplomacy, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1956, p. 42.

of

American
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Rippy maintains that "Washington
merely expressed sentiments which
had
long prevailed in the nation as well
as in his

own mind. "5 Q^^^ing from

the

Farewell Address, Rippy supports his
claim:

The rule of conduct for us in regard to
foreign nations is
extendmg our commercial relations to have
with them as
little political connection
as possible
Europe has a set
of primary interests which to us
have none or a very remote
relation. Hence, she must be engaged
in frequent controversi es
the causes of which are essentially
foreign to our concerns.
Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to
implicate ourselve s
by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes
of her
in

.

.

.

politic^s or

the ordinary combinations and collisions
of her friendships or

enmities.

Further proof of isolationism was expressed by
Washington,
Rippy,

when he warned against

that

was American policy

it

joining

claii
ims

permanent alliances, "maintaining

to steer clear of

permanent alliances with the

rest of the world."'''

The writings

of

Washington are not the only sources for proving

that

the founding fathers intended the foreign policy of the United States to
be one
of isolationism.

In fact,

Rippy claims that in the statements of Washington's

contemporaries much stronger assertions can be found.

Among

and most complete are those of John

Jefferson.

early months of the Revolution,

Op.

cit.

Op

cit.

.

Ibid

.

,

,

,

Rippy, p.

Adams

declared:

8.

The Farewell Address

p. 42.

Adams and Thomas

,

p. 42.

the clearest

In the
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That we ought not to enter into any
alliance with her (France)
which would entangle us in any future wars
in Europe; that
we ought to lay it down, as the first principle
and maxim
never to be forgotten to maintain an entire
future European
In 1784,

Adams was

America could be

neutrality in all

wars

.

.

.

^

convinced that "if

cut off forever,

if

the keel of another never to be laid,

earth and, in

fifty

intercourse between Europe and

all

every ship we have were burnt, and

we might

be the happiest people on

years, the most powerful."^

Thomas Jefferson
policy of isolation.

also is looked on as a founder of the

The most

often quoted

among

on foreign policy, as evidence of isolation,
as president in 1801
relations abroad:

still

when he stated

the

his

American

numerous statements

is that of his

Inaugural address

famous maxim for American

"Peace, commerce, and honest friendship with

all

nations,

entangling alliances with none, "^^/^l
Finally, the supporters of isolationism look to the

a major expression of that policy.
in establishing the

As important as

American relationship

to

Monroe Doctrine as

the Farewell

Address was

Europe, the Monroe Doctrine

is

^John Adams, The Life and Works of John Adams, (edited by Charles Francis
Adams), Boston: Little and Brown, 1850, 10 vols, pp. 505-506.
^Op.

cit .

,

Adams,

Vol.

Ill,

p. 357.

^^Thomas Jefferson, The Complete Jefferson (assembled and arranged by
Saul K. Padover),

New York: Tudor,

1943, Vol

III,

p. 386.

'''There are other examples of isolationist sentiment running throughout the

writings of such notable American patriots as Alexander Hamilton, Thomas
Paine, Richard Henry Lee and James Monroe. See Rippy and Debo, "The
Historical Background of the

American Policy

of Isolation," in

Studies in History, Vol IX, No. 3, 4, April, 1924.

Smith College

presented as the basic document laying
the foundation for the
European
relationship with the

American

continent.

According

to those

who

perceive American foreign policy as
traditionally one of isolationism,
there

a definite linkage between the policy
established by Washington

is

and the principles enumerated in the Monroe
Doctrine.

Address

is the first real public articulation
of

(In fact,

Rippy claims that

it

In the

the Farewell

American isolationism

constitutes Washington's "rule of
isolation."),

Monroe Doctrine embodies

the

If

the expansion and refinement of that
policy.

same speech noted above, William Borah draws

the relationship

between the two:
Washington succeeded in establishing the policy that
we
should not interfere in European affairs. It would
have served
no good purpose and would not have been beneficial
to the
American people in the least had we simply remained aloof from

European affairs but had permitted Europe to transfer her
system to the American Continent. Therefore, the Monroe
Doctrine. It was designed to support the policy of Washington.
He had warned against the danger of entering Europe—the
Monroe Doctrine declared that Europe should not enter America.
Permit me to say that one of these cannot stand, in my judgement, without the support of the other. It is an inevitable
result of Washington's teaching that the Monroe Doctrine should
exist

.

.

In essence, claim the advocates of

American

Doctrine set apart the Old World from the New.

isolation, the

Monroe

Rippy maintains that

"Monroe's doctrine was less the establishment of a precedent than the
confirmation of an old ideal.

'

Op

.

cit.

,

Rippy, p. 30.

It

merely repeated the maxim of isolationism
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With emphasis on

its

expanded American phase, recalled
the universal setting,

and once more directed attention
of the

new world was

to

to the old antagonist. "13

be preserved by

^he uniqueness

abstention from the Old and the

its

adamant separation of the old from the new.
These are the three primary sources from
which come
that

American foreign policy has been

the

argument

traditionally one of isolationism.

By

rooting their argument in the revolutionary
writings of the founding fathers,

supporters of this interpretation of American diplomacy
and foreign policy

have in essence sought
it

to

wrap

their case in the

with testimonies to American patriotism.

American

The success

flag

and surround

of their efforts

can be measured to a large extent by the popularity of
this interpretation
within America.

ment

It

has yet to be successfully challenged.

of the "traditional policy of

American isolationism"

Even
after

the abandon-

World War H

has failed to discredit the premise that United States foreign policy was
founded in isolationism, and that America owes her power and position in the

world today

to

adherence

to that policy.

The second major purpose

of this treatise is to challenge the characteri-

zation of historical and contemporary

isolationism.

principles of

By means

American foreign policy

of a thorough examination of the

American foreign policy from

its

demonstrated that the concept of isolationism
izing United States' foreign policy.

to illustrate that the interpretation

1

o

Op

cit.

,

Rippy, p. 30.

premises and

earliest stages,

is

as one of

inapplicable

it

will

be

when character-

Furthermore, the attempt will be made
represented by Rippy, Taft and others

is in

88

essence incorrect, principally as a result
of their
thus apply in a meaningful

manner

inability to define

and

the concept of isolationism.

Before presenting the arguments against the
isolationist interpretation

it

might prove useful to discuss the origins of
United States foreign

policy and the events surrounding the evolution
of the basic tenets of
political

By way

and military separation from Europe and
commercial expansion.

of such a discussion the needed background
on the precedents to the

Farewell Address and the Monroe Doctrine can be established.

This will

aid in clarifying the arguments challenging the
isolationist interpretation.

The Revolutionary Period
It is

difficult to

prove that

in the pre-revolutionary

years there was a

general and conscious anti-European sentiment throughout the
colonies.

Although many people had endured the

search of a new

life in

a

new

land,

it

difficult

voyage across the Atlantic in

would be incorrect

existed universal rejection of the old world.

to say that there

The sentiment was present,

however, especially among the more politically conscious, such as William

Penn who expressed those sentiments
from

that of the old world.

of hope for a

new

life

separate and unique

In a letter to the colonists written in 1710, he said:

Friends, the eyes of many are upon you; the people of
nations of Europe look on that country as a land of
ease and quiet wishing to themselves in vain the blessings

many

they conceive you enjoy.

14

Isaac Sharpless,

A Quaker Experiment

A. J. Ferris, 1898, p. 100.

in

Government

,

Philadelphia:
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It is

enough for the purposes here

to suggest that although there
exist no

articulate expressions of overwhelming
repudiation of European politics,

the very fact that

America held

out hope of a

new beginning

settlers is indicative of their favorable
feelings toward the

Moreover,

that

for

among

early

new world.

such feelings found adamant expression early

revolutionary period indicates that they did exist

many

in the

the early pioneers

regardless of how dormant they were.

The

first

the politics of

statements concerning a desire to separate America
from

Europe came early

in the revolutionary period.

Among

early advocates of American independence from Europe
were John

and

Thomas

Adams

Paine.

in separating the

especially sought to and

new nation from

Adams

was largely successful

the intrigues of European politics.

early as 1775, he expressed the idea which was to
tenet of Washington's Farewell Address.

the

become

As

the fundamental

Debating the issue of foreign

assistance in the Continental Congress, he said:

.

.

.

that

we ought

maxim never
in all future

to unite with

to lay

it

down, as a

first principle

and a

to be forgotten, to maintain an entire neutrality

European wars; that it never could be our interest
France in the destruction of England ... On the

other hand, it could never be our duty to unite with Britain in too
great a humiliation of France; that our real, if not our nominal

independence, would consist in our neutrality. If we united with
either nation, in :my future war, we must become too subordinate and dependent on that nation, and should be involved in all
European wars, as we had been hitherto; that foreign powers
would find means to corrupt our people, to influence our councils,
and in time, we should be little better than puppets. We should
be the sport of European intrigues and politics; that, therefore,
in preparing treaties to be proposed to foreign powers, and in
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the instructions to be given to
our ministers, we ought to
confine outselves strictly to a treaty
of commerce. 15

Thomas Paine was
Adams.

In 1776, he

also an early supporter of the
position voiced by

wrote

in

Common

Sense

;

Dependence on Great Britain tends directly
to involve
European wars and quarrels. As Europe
our market for trade we ought to form no
partial

this continent in
is

connec-

tion with any part of

it.

steer clear of European

the true interest of America to
contentions, which she never can do
It is

while, by her dependence on Britain, she
weight in the scale of British politics. 16

Adams and Paine
from Europe, and

in

in their respective

is

made

make-

the

passages argue for independence

Paine's case, from Britain specifically.

Adams

lost

his arg-ument against foreign connections

when

from France

His warnings did not go unheeded

although

it

in the

war against

Britain.

the colonies sought aid

took the experience of the French treaty to justify them.

though he lost his argument against the French treaty

Adams was

EiVen

able,

during the negotiations for French aid, to eliminate many of the dangers
inherent in such a commitment which he had warned against.

^^Op.

cit .

,

Adams, Vol

II,

^'^

pp. 505-506.

^^Thomas Paine, Common Sense, New York: Willey Book Company,
p. 27.

17

Originally, Adams had argued against any foreign assistance, but it
soon became clear to those concerned with the prosecution of the war
that the colonies had no chance of winning without obtaining supplies of
gunpowder and other war materials. Faced with this prospect, it was
difficult for Adams to maintain this position.

1942,
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In securing aid

Adams

from the French

played a major role.

in the

form

of a treaty of alliance,

Consistent with his desire to refrain
from the

quarrels of Europe, he sought French aid
for America, giving only

commercial privileges

America could

in return.

his part,

Adams

thought that

negotiate a treaty of foreign assistance
and remain aloof

from European quarrels only
agreement.

For

if

certain principles were upheld

in the

These principles included:

No political connection. Submit to none of her
1.
authority; receive no governors or officers from
her.
No military connection. Receive no troops from
2.
her.
Only commercial connection; that is, make a treaty
3.
to receive her ships into our ports; let her
engage to receive

our ships into her ports; furnish us with arms, cannon,
saltpetre, power, duck, steel. 18
Not

all of

the Revolutionary leaders

on these points. 19 Some
'

felt that

were

in

agreement with Adams

stronger ties should be established with

any European ally who might aid the colonies against Britain.
later in his autobiography, recalled the debate

treaty was put before the CongTess.

when

Adams, much

his proposal for a

He wrote:

18

Op

.

cit.

,

Adams,

Vol. U, pp. 488-489.

19

For example, Richard Henry Lee, Samuel Adams, Patrick Henry
and Elbridge Gerry argued against John Adams on the issue of foreign
assistance. They felt that commercial ties would not be enough to
induce other nations, particularly France, to join the war effort.

"
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When
that

came before Congress, it occupied
the attention of
body for several days. Many
motions were made to
It

m

msert
it articles of entangling
alliance, of exclusive
privileges, and of warranties of
possession . . .20

The

first indication that a

majority of Congress agreed with the

Adams

arg-ument of non-involvement in the
affairs of Europe was the adoption
by
that

body of the treaty advocated by him.

of non-entanglement,

marked

meaning no

The acceptance of the principles

political or military

commitment

to

Europe,

the first appearance of a rising
expression of sentiment in favor of

such principles.

It is

significant that this occurred close to twenty
years

before the Farewell Address.

The actual experience

of the

Americans

in their alliance with the

French, beginning in 1778, only succeeded in furthering their
suspicions of

Europe and increasing the Americans' desire

to

separate themselves as

quickly as possible from the intrigues of European politics.

Fred Rippy and

Angie Debo in their study, "The Historical Background of the American
Policy of Isolation,
the two allies.

It

" cite

was

numerous examples

felt

of conflict and distrust between

by many American diplomats that France,

in

accepting the provisions of the treaty, expected to be able to gain commercial
20
21

Adams, Vol

Op.

cit.

One

conflict of interest

,

II,

p. 516.

between the French and Americans arose as a
result of the willingness on the part of the French to sacrifice American
Rippy and Debo also cite a conversation menwhich he relates feelings of distrust
towards the French. Adams writes,"
[The French] were our good
friends and allies and had conducted themselves generously and nobly, and
we should be just and grateful. But they might have wishes which we were
not bound by treaty not in justice or gratitude to favor, and these we ought to
fishing rights to the British.

tioned by John

Adams

in his diary in

.

be cautious

of.

.

.
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and political concessions from the
colonies after the termination of
the war.
It

was also thought

that the

French were sabotaging the American

efforts to

gain recognition of their independence
from other European governments.

Rippy and Debo confirm this point when
they write, "This suspicion that

France was working against American
recognition by other courts comes
out frequently in
the other

Adams's correspondence and seems

American envoys.

that he suspected

Dana wrote from

St.

to have

Petersburg to Adams

France of scheming against him there. "^^

The conclusion

of the

war brought about increased expressions

desire to disassociate the American nation from
Europe.

Adams spoken

been shared by

The warnings

He wrote,

to disassociate

"It

of

before the war were now echoed by many prominent
Americans.

Alexander Hamilton, on March 24, 1783, expressed his desire
Washington

of a

now

to

George

from Europe and strengthen the domestic

only remains to

make

society.

solid establishments within, to

perpetuate our Union, to prevent our being a ball in the hands of European

powers, bandied against each other

at their pleasure. "^^

an early supporter of alliances, expressed much the same
wrote:

"I

may make

^^Op.

wish most sincerely that the
our

cit.,

common

full

Richard Henry Lee,
attitude

possession of wisdom and virtue

country, the United States, independent, indeed not

Rippy and Debo, p. 115.

•^Alexander Hamilton, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, ed.
Cabot Lodge, New York: G. P. Putnam's sons, 1904, 12 vols..
p. 327.

when he

,

Henry
Vol DC,
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of one but of all the nations upon earth.

John Adams:

confess

"I

will be the best thing

I

^^^^^ expressions came from

have sometimes thought that after a few
years

we can do

to recall

it

every minister from Europe, and

send embassies only on special occasions, "^^
and from George Mason,
"I

wish America would put her trust only

little to

in

God and herself and have

as

do with the politics of Europe as possible. "^6

One other circumstance

out of which the tenet of political separation

from Europe originated was the war between France and Britain
and
subsequent event of the American proclamation of neutrality

Previous to

this, the United States

European entanglement by

its

had signaled

in 1793.

its intention to

refusal to join the League of

the

avoid

Armed

Neutrality,

a collection of nations attempting to unite in the effort to protect their

commercial

interests.

(The United States had reluctantly withdrawn

its

application from the League only after considerable debate and only because
it

was attempting

Debo maintain

to establish the principle of non-alliance.)

that

"Congress decided

in 1783 to

European convention because participation would
policy' of the United States.

This

is

Rippy and

remain aloof from an
violate the 'fundamental

probably the first instance of an action

24

Richard Henry Lee, The Letters of Richard Henry Lee, (collected
and edited by James Curtus Ballagh), New York: Macmillian, 1911-14,
LL, p. 280.
2 volumes. Vol.
,

2^0p._cit.

,

Adams,

Vol. VIII, p. 37.

Kate Mason Rowland, The Life of George Mason
Sons, 1892, 2 volumes. Vol II, p. 47.

,

New York:

G. P. Putnam's
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destined to be repeated

many times

in the history of

American detachment

from general European conferences."^'^

By

the time of the outbreak of

the desire to abstain

conscience.

from European

war between France and

affairs

The ensuing proclamation

was firmly rooted

Britain in 1793.
in the

of neutrality by the Washington

Administration was evidence of consistent
application and adherence
principle.

After

much

American foreign

debate

policy, the

among those concerned with

members

American

to that

the course of

of Washington's administration,

including those two archrivals and political
opponents Alexander Hamilton

and Thomas Jefferson and the Congress agreed
with the terms and restrictions of the Neutrality Proclamation.

(Their only major disagreement was

on how to explain away the French alliance of
1778.) Again, Rippy and Debo

confirm the point concerning the consistency
Farewell Address.

They maintain

that

of

American policy up

to the

"The Neutrality Proclamation was the

natural expression of a policy that had long since

come

to be

regarded as a

fundamental principle of American intercourse with foreign nations. "28/29

Besides the desire for political and military detachment from Europe,

commercial interests influenced early American foreign policy
27
28

Op

.

cit .

,

Rippy and Debo,

p.

to a large

124.

The arrival

of the French Minister plenipotentiary to the United States,
Genet, in 1793, and his subsequent activities on behalf of his
government constituted an early test for the United States policy of neutrality.

Edmond

President Washington's request for Genet's recall was further evidence of
American desires to stay out of European politics.
29

Op

.

cit .

,

Rippy and Debo,

p.

163.
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extent.

There

is

much proof

that the

American Revolution was a

result of the British mercantilist
activities toward the

economy.

One expert Curtis

American

partial

colonial

Nettles, relates in an article on the

history of the mercantilists' activities in
the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. 31

He reports how

Britain, during this period, through the

mercantilist practices of trade and manufacturing
restrictions, had managed
to achieve extensive
that the situation

economic control over the colonies.

became so oppressive

to the colonial

Nettles claims

commercial interests

that,

In its total effect, British policy as it affected
the
colonies after 1793 was restrictive, injurious, negative.
It offered no solutions of problems.
In the meantime, the

colonists having lived so long under the rule of mercantilism
had become imbued with mercantilist ideas. If the British
imperium would not allow them to grow and expand, if it
would not provide a solution of the central problem of the

American economy,

the colonists would have to tal^e to
themselves the right and the power to guide their economic
development. They would find it necessary to create a new
authority that would foster American shipping and commerce,
make possible the continued growth of settlement, and above
all, stimulate the growth of domestic manufacturing industries.

30

There

much controversy concerning

the effect of the British MerAmerican economy. For another view see
George Louis Beer, The Commercial Policy of England Toward the American
Colonies, New York: Peter Smith, 1948, and Louis M. Hacker, The Course
of American Economic Growth and Development New York: Wiley, 1970.
is

cantilist practices on the

,

See "British Mercantilism and the Economic Development of the Colonies,"

The Journal

of

Economic History

,

XII No. 2 (Spring 1952), pp. 105-114.

Also Curtis Nettles, "British Policy and Colonial Money Supply," Economic
History Review , Vol

III,

1931-32, pp. 219-245.
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Thus, another result of English
mercantilism was the
American Revolution and the creation
thereafter of a
mercantilist state on this side of the
Atlantic. 32

possible to reach the conclusion as
does Charles Beard in

It is

Economic Interpretation

of the Constitution that

members

An

of the Second

Constitutional Congress had considerable
vested interest in the commercial

policy and the expansion of

economic
case a

American trade because they constituted

elite within the colonies.

bit,

33
it

Although Beard

may have

can be claimed, as Felix Gilbert does,

the

overstated his

that:

A reflection of the economic motive can be seen in
the close connection which in American eyes,
existed
between commerce and foreign policy. Of course, it was
natural for people whose main contacts with the outside
world were those

of trade

and commerce

to

regard these

activities as the principal object of foreign relations
.
.
.
Thus, the existence or non-existence of commercial relations with other powers appeared as the touchstone of
participation in a state system as an independent power.

Throughout the actual revolutionary period there
the desire on the part of the
to develop

Americans

is

ample proof

that every effort should be

and expand the colonial commerce.

of

made

John Adams, while arguing

against political involvement, maintained, "I wish for nothing but

commerce, a mere marine

treaty with them. "^5

Earlier, he had stated

32
Ibid

.

,

p. 108.

D. W. Brogan, "The Quarrel Over Charles Austin Beard and the
Constitution, " Economic History Review Vol. XVIII, 1965,
pp. 199-223.
•^•^See

American
34

,

Felix Gilbert,
Princeton:

Policy

,

35op.

cit.

,

the Farewell Address Ideas of Early American Foreign
Princeton University Press, 1961, p. 16

To

Adams, Vol

;

DC, p. 409.
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that in dealing with

treaty of

Europe "We ought

commerce. "36

i„ ^is restrictions to

made with France. Adams again
could be made.

"America's plan

to have

interest of

insisted that only

is

commerce, and

America a

America

in

all

in favor of

commercial

Paine's contention

that well attended to, will secure

Europe; because

free port. "^^

any treaty

commercial connections

From Common Sense comes

us the peace and friendship of

Europe

be upheld

Thomas Paine was another who spoke

dealings with other nations.
that

to confine ourselves strictly
to a

is the

it

Needless

interest of all

to say. it

that she be a free port, for this

was

dependence upon British commerce could be broken.

was also

the only

in the

way her

Other statements

displaying a desire to keep the commercial interests
of America in the
forefront of foreign policy early in the Revolution

Franklin and Robert Morris.

by John Adams that the

came from Benjamin

These statements, added

first debate of the Continental

to the fact

recorded

Congress concerned

the state of trade and the question whether colonies could
exist without

commercial

ties abroad, bolster the

argument

that the foreign policy

decisions of the early statesmen were influenced by commercial interests.

This fact became even more apparent after the end of the war with
Britain

Armed

of

1783.

in

Despite the United States having refused to join the League

Neutrality,

commercial expansion was very much a motive

36

37

'

Vol.

Ibid

.

Op.

cit.

,

,

II,

p. 506.

Paine, p. 26.

of its

"
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foreign policy.

Even before

the end of the war, the

American nation had

signed commercial treaties with Holland,
Sweden and Prussia.

The Proclamation

of Neutrality in 1793,

was thought

further the commercial interests of the
United States.

to

be a way to

By remaining

neutral,

not only would the Americans avoid
involvement politically and militarily
in the

war, but they could expand their trade
by selling

to both belligerents.

Furthermore, the announcement of neutrality
meant, as has been discussed,
the

abandonment

of the

French treaty of 1778.

depended on trade with Great Britain as

As a

period.

Neutrality

was one means

(The Jay Treaty is another), as

A. H.

had during the entire colonial

result, the fiscal policy of the Washington
administration

under Alexander Hamilton depended
British.

it

The American economy

Bowman

it

in

large part on the acquiescence of the

of possibly gaining that acquiescence

meant undercutting

the

French alliance.

suggests that "Hamilton and his supporters were motivated by

devotion to the revenue-producing commercial connection with England and
to the

course England represented rather than by a concern with America's

real interests. "^^

Here again, evidence exists

that the

commercial interest

of the United States played a significant role in the development of

American

foreign policy prior to the Farewell Address.

This brief history of the evolution of the principal motives of

American foreign
38, „
Albert

policy, namely, political separation from

Europe

Bowm;in, "Jefferson, Hamilton, and American Foreign Policy
Political Science Quarterly Vol. 71, 1956, p. 33.
II.

,

,
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and commercial expansion, reveals the
circumstances and sentiments
later expressed in Washington's
Farewell Address and the
It is

Monroe Doctrine.

the interpretation of these two
documents and the explicit and implicit

meaning attached

to

each that constitutes the thrust of the
challenge

to the

isolationist interpretation.

The Farewell Address
It is

at the

generally conceded that Washington's
Farewell Address, delivered

end of his second term as president of the
new American nation,

the first

major

political

pronouncement of importance.

in the fact that the principles and

maxims

Its

importance

articulated by Washington

guide the nation through a century of growth and
maturity until
rightful place in the international

When Washington
principal motives behind

lies

were

took

to

its

community.

delivered his Farewell Address, there were two
it.

One concerned

Washington addressed himself
strife.

it

is

the domestic situation.

to the potential

problem of domestic

political

Basically, Washington warned that political disunity of the kind

apparent between the Federalists and the Republicans posed a grave threat
to the future of the Union.

Secondly, Washington sought to articulate the

principles of foreign policy which would guide and protect the nation from
foreign interests.
of

Many have claimed

American isolationism, and

a policy of isolationism.

that he

that

Washington set down principles

meant

for the United States to pursue

In contrast, the point

argued here

is that

Washington
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did not

mean

isolationism,

guided by

for the United States to
adhere to that policy.

American foreign

maxims

Rather than

policy has been, from its
very inception,

of political and diplomatic
independence, neutrality a^d

commercial expansion.
Drawing upon the experience

of twenty

years of national independence

and his perception of established
American interests, Washington concluded
that:

The great rule of conduct for us in regard
to foreign nations
m extendmg our commercial relations, to have with
them as little political connection as possible.
So far as we
have already formed engagements, let
them be fulfilled with
IS,

perfect good faith.

Here,

let

us stop.^^

The question must be raised as

to

whether or not

this "great rule of

conduct" constitutes a conscious policy of
isolationism.
an interpretation contend that

appear

to contradict

it

does do so.

such an interpretation.

Advocates of such

There are two points which
First, and foremost, is

Washington's contention that while America should remain
politically
uninvolved, commercial ties were to be maintained and
encouraged.
in

Washington's position

is that

political and can be separated

commercial interests are

from the

political realm.

in

Implicit

essence non-

This contention was

basic to American political theory at this time and can be traced to
the early

revolutionary-period debates over soliciting aid.
in their desire to

Some American merchants

expand commercial interests and holdings perpetuated the

idea that commercial ties would not involve the United States in the politics

39

Op

.

cit.

,

The Farewell Address

,

p. 42.

102
of Europe, and

it

such connections.

was

in the best interest of a developing
nation to

In other words,

commercial

interests, being essentially

non-political, did not present any danger to
the nation as they

susceptible to political intrigue.

encourage

were not

Supporters of the isolationist interpretation

point to this idea and contend that since

commerce was

of non-political nature

it

did not play any important part in developing the
political stance of America

in

terms

of foreign policy.

That

is,

foreign policy is concerned with

principles guiding political relationships and, therefore,
America in her

pursuance of a policy of political separation from Europe was adhering

to

isolationism.

This contention rests upon dubious foundations.

commerce

is of

a non-political nature

is

at

that

Utopian and demonstrates a certain

naivete" on the part of the Founding Fathers.

commercial and

The theory

There

is

much evidence

political interests are intricately United.

that

Indeed, the efforts

acquiring control over their economic destiny meant that they first had to

win their

political independence.

Furthermore, commercial interests must

be protected; thus, the need for military establishments which break down
the facade of non-political interests.

Political realists such as Alexander

Hamilton were well aware that foreign commerce could not escape involve-

ment

in

power

politics.

Writing in the Federalist

,

he posed the question:
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Has commerce hitherto done anything
more than change
Have there not been as many wars
founded upon commercial motives since
that has become the
prevailing system of nations as were
before occasioned
the objects of war.

.

.

.

by the

cupidity of territory or dominion? 40
In speaking of Hamilton's position,
Felix Gilbert suggests that

"To him,

regulation of commercial relations remained
subordinate to power politics.

Commerce was
ment

of their

a weapon in the struggle of power politics,
in the arrange-

commercial

relations, nations did not follow idealistic

principles but only their interests.

The importance
foreign policy is

made

"^''^

of this position is that

it

negates the argument that

without regard to commercial interests.

Consequently,

a nation desiring to isolate itself from political entrapment,
as did the

United States, cannot
expansion.

or

it

same time pursue

is not to

say that commercial isolation was not advocated by some

The Second Continental Congress, hoping

Imees, cut off

all

commerce with

that country

followed this with a complete interdiction of
to be disastrous not only to

effort.)

to bring Britain to her

and then for a brief period

all

commerce.

(These measures

American trade but especially

to the

war

Both Jefferson and John Adams expressed sentiments of complete

40

Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist
Press, 1961, No. vi.
4l0p.

commercial

isolationism.

This

proved

a policy of

Isolationism requires abstention both politically and commercially

is not

colonials.

at the

cit, Gilbert, p.

131.

,

Cambridge:

Harvard University
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isolation at times.

Jefferson wrote in 1785:

You ask what I thinl< of the expedience
of encouraging
our states to be commercial? Were
I to indulge my own
theory, I should wish them to
practice neither commerce
nor navigation, but to stand with respect
to Europe precisely
on the footing of China. We should
thus avoid wars, and
all our citizens would be
husbandmen. 42

Adams had

Earlier,

suggested that America might recall

and send no more even for commercial
reasons.

complete isolation was not possible "for

it

would give up the most of their commerce

all its

ministers

Yet, as Gilbert maintains,

would mean that the Americans
to live

by their agriculture.

Such

an option existed in theory only."'^^

The second part
of the Farewell

ment

Address

of the

argument against the

is that

of existing political and

isolationist interpretation

Washington did not advocate the abandon-

commercial commitments.

American foreign policy were indeed

isolation,

it

If

the goal of

would have been necessary

for the United States to discard any and all existing ties with foreign
parties.

This Washington clearly was not prepared to do.

For not only would

it

have

had grave commercial consequences, but such a move would greatly damage

American

credibility in the international community.

While cognizant of the dangers that these relations presented,

Washington was
all

still

reluctant to forego a policy of complete separation on

accounts from Europe.

'^^Op. cit.

43

Op

.

cit.

,

,

Jefferson, Vol. IV, p. 469.
Gilbert, p. 74.
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Why

forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation?
own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by
interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe,
entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European

Why

quit our

ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice?
It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent
alliances with any portion of the foreign world so far,
mean as we are now at liberty to do it.
.

.

I

.

Taking care always to keep ourselves by suitable
establishments on a respectable defensive posture, we

may

safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary

emergencies.

From

these passages most observers draw the conclusion that American

foreign policy was isolationist, implemented through the principles of nonalliance and non-entanglement.

words proves
did

However, careful analysis of Washington's

this conclusion incorrect.

warn against permanent

In the first place, while Washington

alliances (this in response to the problems

arising out of the French Alliance of 1778), he clearly states that temporary
alliances are to be employed as a
interests^

^^Op.

45

cit.

In fact, as one

,

means

of defending or enhancing

American

observer notes, history shows that "neither

The Farewell Address

,

p. 42.

term "alliance" in the eighteenth century may again
who argue the case that commercial interests can be
separated from politics. F. Gilbert, in his book To the Farewell Address

The meaning

of the

raise the hopes of those

,

points out that during the eighteenth century there developed a distinction
between political alliances and commercial alliances, the result being that

have an alliance with foreign nations and yet remain separated
politically from them. It might well be that this was the meaning given to the
distinction between "permanent alliances" and "temporary alliance" by
Washington, although there is no hint that this is the case. Even so, the
argument that commerce does involve a nation in the politics of foreign nations
it

was possible

to
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Washington nor Jefferson intended
permanently from the exercise of

that the United States should refrain
its

due influence in matters which properly

concern the peace and welfare of the community of
nations.

Washington did

not object to alliances for special emergencies,
nor did Jefferson object to

special alliances for the accomplishment of definite
objects.

"'^^

As has

been discussed, the precedence of employing alliances has
already been
established, even of the permanent type, during the early years
of the nation's

diplomatic history.

The conclusion can be drawn

that to characterize

America's traditional policy as "non-alliance" may be dubious

in light of these

events.

Secondly, analysis of the concept "non-entanglement" done in the
sophisticated and thorough
Historical Meaning of the

manner

that Albert

American Doctrine

Weinberg manages

of Isolation"

in

"The

provokes the

conclusion that "America's Index Prohibitorum ends at a point that leaves,
believe

it

or not, as

much

outside as within."

47

First applied in a pejorative

sense to the existing alliance systems of the eighteenth century, an entanglement

overrides such a distinction.

Regardless

of

whether or not an alliance

labeled "traite d'alliance offensive et defensive" or "traite de

is

one

commerce,"

agreements reached in each have in some way involved political maneuvering. Or they may at sometime cause interests to clash which will in all
the

probability have political overtones.

^^John H. Latone, From Isolation to Leadership
Doubleday, Page and Company, 1922, p. 4.
^'^Albert K. Weinberg,

Isolation,"

American

"The Historical Meaning

,

(Revised),

of the

New York:

American Doctrine

Political Science Review, Vol. 34, 1940, p. 545.
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"in international life as in the love life,
is not a

relationship so intimate that two destinies

association but a

become intertwined-and by

implication not for better but for worse. "48

Adams

mere

j^^.^^^^ expressed by John

during the debate over joining in alliance with
France and thus

destroying America's "real independence," this
sentiment was confirmed

by the Farewell Address. 4^ Furthermore, claims
Weinberg, "Americans

became aware

that the attribute of entanglement

was

but must be watched for throughout international

life

envisaged in non-entanglement

is

freedom

preserved through the avoidance of certain

not peculiar to alliances,

.

.

.

What

of action in so far as

is

it

really

is

political relationships with others. "^^

In explaining the specific nature of these relationships,

Weinberg concludes:

In sum, non-entanglement is the absence of voluntarily
incurred relationships, formal or informal, which remove

the substantial control of the nation's action, or even of its

experience from its own choice by placing
influence, or career of other nations. ^1

48

Ibid

.

,

it

in the will,

p. 541.

49

John Adams wrote in 1777, "I do not have to be entangled in the politics of
Europe." Common Sense (Philadelphia, 1776, et al 38) Thomas Jefferson
also used this term, but later in 1787, he wrote, "I know too that it is a maxim
with us, and I thinly it a wise one, not to entangle ourselves with the affairs of
Europe. " (Paul L. Ford, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson Memorial edition,
,

.

,

IV, p. 83.)

50

Op

.

cit.

^"Ibid.

,

,

Weinberg,

p. 541.

p. 542.
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Given this
differs greatly

definition,

non-entanglement as a maxim of foreign
policy

from the principles

of isolationism.

exclude relationships between nations which
one,

it

when

in

tie

For while

it

does

together two destinies into

does not prohibit "single-handed action from
interposition to war and

accord with comity, in behalf of world interest;
moreover, even

intervention in behalf of world interest

coincident national equity.

Nor

is

is

allowable when there

entanglement seen

is

a

in free international

collaboration such as consultation and coincident action. "^^

Humanitarian

and economic activity on an international level for the purposes
of mankind are
also not conceived of as being relationships of entanglement.

concluded, "Fundamentally, nothing
thinking

makes

it

entangling or disentangling but

so. "^"^

Isolationism prohibits
level.

is

The doctrine

all

connections and activity on an international

of non-entanglement bars only "certain relationships. "

Given Washington's statements,

it

seems clear

a policy of non-entanglement, meaning that
interests and destinies which
to

mesh, (except

isolationism.

In fact. Weinberg-

for

it

that while he

was advocating

America and Europe had separate

would be unwise (and dangerous for America)

commercial

ties) that policy

should not be confused with

For as A. B. Hart maintains, "The diplomatic history of the

country shows that the government has never hesitated to assert itself

^^ Ibid

.

,

p. 545.

^^Ibid.

,

p. 545.
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anywhere on the globe

if its

interests

seemed

Finally, the claim that the Farewell

sufficient.

"^^

Address embodied a clear-cut

statement of isolation can be challenged by arguing
that the Farewell

Address was directed

at the

French.

Mention has already been made

problems arising out of the alliance with Franco, particularly
during
peace negotiations of 1782.

embarrassing

to the

French and English

The French

Americans
in 1793.

for the United States to

come

The Americans,

war between

the

Although there was no binding legal commitment
to the aid of the French, there

among some Americans.

French expected reciprocal support

assistance.

the

become increasingly

after the declaration of

obligation which caused discomfort
that the

alliance had

of the

was a moral
It

was

lil^ely

in return for their earlier

in an effort to establish their

commercial interests

abroad and their political independence from Europe, could not realistically
support the French.

French expectations

of

American support amounted

to a

case of overt European manipulation of American national interests, which,
if

permitted, would end in the subordination of American interests to those

of Europe.

As a

result of these circumstances, one of the purposes behind the

Farewell Address was
in. American affairs.

54

to strike a

powerful blow against European meddling

As Samuel Bemis pointed

out, the

message was

Albert Bushnell Hart, The Foundations of American Foreign Policy ,
New York: The Macmillian Company, 1910, p. 2.
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especially directed toward the French, for
while "it did not disown the

French alliance,

it

taught a patronizing ally that

we were independent and

a sovereign nation, and that the French
Republic could not use in

America

the tool that had been so successful with
the border satellite states in Europe,
the lever of political opposition to overthrow
any

the

way

of

French policy, purpose and

government

interest. "^^

that stood in

Through his policy

statements on avoidance of foreign alliance and
entanglements, Washington

addressed himself
not isolation.

to these questions of

independence and national sovereignty,

Samuel Bemis summarizes the position taken here concerning

the formative period of

American foreign

policy:

What we have generally construed as a policy

of "isolation"

we

ought really to interpret as a policy of vigilant defense
and maintenance of sovereign national independence against
foreign meddling in our own intimate domestic concerns.

The Monroe Doctrine
Although the Farewell Address

is

most

often mentioned as the principal

source of the basic tenets of American foreign policy,
the

Monroe Doctrine

at a later period, the

is

a

more

definitive statement.

Monroe Doctrine should

inconsistencies in foreign policy that

55

Samuel

it

can be argued that

Because

it

was issued

clarify any changes or

may have occurred

after the Farewell

Bemis, "Washington's Farewell Address: A Foreign Policy of
Independence," American Historical Review Vol. XXXIX (January, 1934), p. 267.
F.

,

56
Ibid

.

,

p. 268.

Address.

The Monroe Doctrine does contain statements
relating

to the

heretofore unstated American postion that
Europe's proper relationship

with the American continents was to be one
of non-involvement.

This

is

significant to the purposes of this paper, as
advocates of the isolationist

interpretation point to the principles of foreign
policy in the Monroe

Doctrine as a complete statement of American
isolation from Europe and

American insistence

that

was, they contend, the

Europe keep

final step in

based upon the uniqueness

Americans

of the

out of the

American

continents.

It

separating the new world from the old,

American experiment and

the desire of

have the freedom to develop apart from the intrigues and

to

embroilments of European
of isolationism as

politics.

enumerated

The challenge

in the

to this position

than the assertion previously

It is

the logical extension of the tenets

Farewell Address.

comes from two

made and defended

does not embody principles of isolationism.

American desire

for

principal sources other

that the

Farewell Address

These sources consist of the

commercial expansion and the

political

motives behind

the establishment of the Doctrine.

There

is

evidence that a major motive behind the Monroe Doctrine

stemmed from

the possibility of increased

America

European powers could be prevented from re-establishing

if

the

the colonial status of the

toward independence.

American commerce

in South

former Spanish colonies then on their way

Important American commercial interests existed

112
in Hispanic

America by

1823.

In his article. "United States

Commerce

with Latin America at the Promulgation
of the Monroe Doctrine,"
Charles

Lyon Chandler presents an extensive analysis

of those interests.

He

states that by 1823 approximately a fifth
of the exports of the United States

went

to Latin

America, and an equal proportion was imported
from there.

Also, claims Chandler, this proportion had
been increasing at a fast and
steady rate. 57

since 1812, most of the mainland provinces
of Latin

America had become de

commerce

facto independent of Spain,

of those provinces

new markets

in those

was thrown open

which meant that the

to the world.

Having acquired

former Spanish provinces, the United States as well

as the European powers developed considerable stake in the
existing status
quo.

There was fear among the Americans, notably Secretary
John Quincy Adams, that the commercial connections
in the provinces of South

ment

America would eventually

of colonial rule over them.

because

it

was a reminder

Adams

of the

of State,

European powers

lead to a re-establish-

"disliked colonialism not alone

of political subordination, but because

it

was

57

Charles Lyon Chandler, "United States Commerce with Latin America at
Monroe Doctrine," in William A. Williams The Shaping
of American Diplomacy Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1956, p. 136.
The table presented below and compiled by Chandler demonstrates the rapid
and substantial growth in trade between the two American continents.

the Promulgation of the

,

%
%

1821

1822

1823

of Total U.S. Exports to Hispanic

15.0

16.2

18.8

of

17. 7

16. 8

22.0

America
Total U.S. Imports from Hispanic America

113

connected in his mind with the commercial
monopoly and the exclusion of
the United States

from the markets of the New World. "^8
This fear and

dislike of colonialism, articulated in
cabinet debates by John Q.

became a

principle laid

down

in the

Adams,

Monroe Doctrine.

The American continents, by the free and independent
condition
which they have assumed and maintained, are
henceforth not to be
considered as subjects for future colonialization
by any European
.60
powers.
.
.

There can be

little

doubt that the commercial interests of the United

States would be greatly aided by the enforcement of
this principle in contrast
to the

European re-assertion

of control over Hispanic

America.

Not only

would colonial rule mean favored treatment for the mother countries
a monopoly over natural resources), but

it

(in fact,

would also make possible the

exclusion of United States' trade interests with South America.

At this time

58

Dexter Perkins, "The Monroe Doctrine" in William A. Williams' The
Shaping of American Diplomacy
Chicago: Rand McNally, 1956, p. lisT
.

r

q

John Quincy Adams had a profound effect on the ideas and maxims of the
Monroe Doctrine. William F. Reddaway, who is perhaps the best critic of

Monroe Doctrine maintains that the document contains to
ideas of Adams. See William F. Reddaway, The Monroe

the history of the

a

great extent the
Doctrine Cambridge, England: University Press, 1898. Albert B. Hart in
his The Monroe Doctrine; an Interpretation. Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1916, concurs, suggesting that Adams was the primary force behind the doctrine.
President Monroe's inability to give real leadership was overcome by the force,
influence and foresight of Adams. As a result, the Monroe Doctrine includes the
,

positions espoused by John Quincy

monarchy or home government

Adams

including avoiding any discussion of the

European nations, support for a unilateral
declaration by the United States, and embodiment of his position on the question
of

colonialization.

George F. Tucker, The Monroe Doctrine
p. 18.

,

Boston:

George R. Reed, 1885

of
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the idea of colonial acquisition

was

was repugnant

to

possibility that they would join in the

little

rule in the

Western Hemisphere.

American statesmen. Thei

move

To do so would

to re-establish colonial

only

damage

their

revolutionary heritage and the claim to the uniqueness
of their domestic

experiment.

The maintenance

Monroe Doctrine,
policy.

yet

it

of free trade

was an important motive behind

did not represent a departure from earlier

was a consistent application

It

expounded as early as 1778.

of that policy of

As was true

the

American

commercial expansion

of its relationship with Europe, the

United States involvement in South America was of a commercial
nature.

Therefore, to claim that
of the tenets of the

commerce played an important

Monroe Doctrine suggests

the founding fathers in their foreign relations

embodied
ist's

in the

Monroe Doctrine.

It

part in development

that the principles

were

still at

which gxuded

work and were

also raises questions about the isolation-

claim that the doctrine was established on the principles

of

an isolationist

foreign policy.

The second point
the

of contention with the isolationist interpretation of

Monroe Doctrine concerns

the political motives for its implementation.

While advocates of the isolationist interpretation and those opposed

to

it

agree that the Monroe Doctrine establishes firmly the American intention of
political separation

policy.

from Europe, they

differ on the

motives behind such a

Isolationists interpret the statements of President

Monroe as

logical

and consistent extensions of isolationism enumerated by the Founding Fathers.
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Those who challenge such an interpretation maintain
of the

American policy

motivated

first of all

of independence

that this refinement

from European

politics

was

by the conditions surrounding the balance of
power and,

secondly, by the United States' desire to retain a
pre-eminent power position
in the

Western hemisphere.
With the movements in this hemisphere, we are of
more immediately connected, and by causes which
must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers.
The political system of the allied powers is essentially
different in this respect from that of America. ... We owe
it therefore to candor and to the amicable relations
existing
between the United States and those powers to declare that we
should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system
to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace
and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any
European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere.
But with the Governments who have declared their independence
and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great
consideration and on just principles, acknowledged we could not
view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them or
controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European
power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly
disposition toward the United States. ^1
necessity

This message of warning was motivated by the American desire
influence the balance of power

ment

in

among

the

European powers.

balance-of-power politics was nothing new by 1823.

Monroe Doctrine,

in fact, since the nation's inception,

power on

Ibid., p. 19.

the

European continent.

American involveLong before the

American statesmen

had recognized that their interests and security were related
of a balance of

to

to the

maintenance

Hans Morgenthau maintains

"
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that:

We have always striven to prevent the development of
conditions in Europe which would be conducive
to an European
nation's interfering in the affairs of the
Western

Hemisphere
Those
European nation,

or contemplating a direct attack upon the United
States.
conditions would be most likely to arise if an

predominance unchallenged within Europe, could look
across the sea for conquest without fear of being
menaced
the center of its power; that is, in Europe itself. G2
its

He goes on

to

at

suggest that the United States has consistently opposed
those

powers who demonstrated

the capability of dominating

supported those powers who have attempted
not surprising that the formula for

John Adams early

in the

to

Europe and has

restore the balance.

It

is

American foreign policy espoused by

American Revolution

of "Independence, confederation

and alliance" was based upon principles regulating the balance of power.

Addressing himself

to the

formula and thoughts of John Adams, M. W. Graham

concludes:

.

.

.

He therefore appears

to

have concluded from the evidence

of the antecedent colonial experience that since the colonies
had enjoyed a condition of non-aggression while Britain was

balanced by France, the United States of America would enjoy
independence and freedom when and while holding the balance
between England and France.
In short,

it

appears that the inarticulate major premise of Adams'

New York:

"'^Hans J. Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest,
A..

Knopf, 1952, p.

Alfred

5.

^•^Malbone W. Graham, "The Revolutionary Leaders and Foreign Policy,
in William A. Williams, The Shaping of American Diplomacy Chicago:
,

Rand McNally and Company,

1956, p. 23.
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reasoning was that the United States had merely to adjust
the existing
balance of power and then, by an abstentive neutrality,
to hold
openly expressed terms were short-term alliance,

must be

full

It

freedom

was

of

commerce and no

this attempt to adjust

mean

to the

The

alliance at all there

territorial guarantee.

Knowing

that the extension of

former Hispanic American continent would

the extension of balance-of-power politics into the Western Hemisphere,

Monroe was determined
European balance

Hemisphere
It

so.

and influence the European power balance

which partly motivated Monroe's warning.

European colonial rule

if

it

of

to prevent it if he could.

power was allowed

that delicate

to

become

He feared

that

if

the

a part of the Western

power balance would be even harder

to maintain.

would also mean that the United States would be directly involved as a

participant in the balance instead of influencing

wide reaches of the Atlantic Ocean.
be entangled with those of Europe
into the

^

%id

if

American
the

it

indirectly from across the

interests could not help but

European system was allowed entrance

Western Hemisphere.

.

,

p. 23.

^^It should

be mentioned that not

all

scholars of the Monroe Doctrine agree
colonial rule over the ex-colonies of

Europe was intent on extending its
South America. Dexter Perkins is one who questions the
that

validity of such a

contention.

Regardless of whether such a movement was afoot among the European powers,
the fact remains that- Monroe and his Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams,
were under the impression that such an occurence was true and made policy
decisions based upon it.
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In connection with the balance-of-power motive
is the fact that

the

Americans desired, as Alexander Hamilton declared

become

in 1787,

"to

the arbiter of Europe in America, and to be able
to incline the

balance of European competitions in this part of the world as our
interests

may

dictate. ".In order to

accomplish such ends, Hamilton advocated

in

the Federalist:

Let the Thirteen States, bound together in a strict and
indissoluble union, concur in erecting one great American
system, superior to the control of all trans -atlantic force or
influence, and able to dictate the terms of the connection

between the old and the new world.

The goal was American ascendancy

By

1823,

likely to

it

has

become clear

Western Hemisphere.

that the United States'

from outside the hemisphere."

preserve the unique position of the United States

Monroe

"predominance was not

be effectively threatened by any one American nation or combination

of nations acting without support
to

in the

in the

In order

Western Hemisphere,

dictated in his address the terms of the relationship which were

acceptable to the United States between the old and new world.
the

6T

Monroe Doctrine was

not a statement of isolationism but

In other

was

words,

the

establishment of the political relationship between European and American
continents, both North and South, which would guarantee United States'

predominance

^^Op.

cit.

,

cit.

,

in

American

affairs and

Hamilton, The Federalist , No. xi.

67

Op.

would not prove injurious

Morgenthau,

p. 5.

to its national
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interest.

Conclusion

In

of early

summarizing the indictment against the

American foreign policy two other

of these centers

ary period

points should be made.

around the fact that nowhere

The

first

in the literature of the revolution-

there any appearance of the term "isolation" to depict American

is

From

foreign policy.

John Adams contended
neutrality."

isolationist interpretation

68

the earliest days of the First Continental Congress,
that "our

nominal independence would consist

in

our

Other statements by other American colonial leaders include

the use of non-entanglement, independence, neutrality and avoidance of foreign

alliance to describe the principles of foreign policy.

There

is

no mention of

a "policy of isolation" which evokes the conclusion that the application of the

concept of isolationism to American foreign relations

There

tations.

is substantial

is

due to later interpre-

evidence that a foreign policy embodying the

historical principles of isolationism

and applied early in the war only

to

was seriously considered by

the colonists

be rejected as unacceptable because of the

disastrous repercussions to commercial and war interests.

^^Op.

cit.

,

Adams,

Vol.

II,

p. 505.

true of Jefferson's attempt at complete isolation
through the commercial embargo of 1807-1809. It, too, was a failure because
American commercial interests suffered.

^^Much

the

same was
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Secondly,

if

American foreign policy was indeed

would have been no need for the young nation
adherence

to the principles of neutrality

and England

A

in 1793.

to

isolationist, there

announce

its

once war broke out between France

nation in isolation need not proclaim

in the conflicts of others as

it

intention of

its

does not possess the means for involvement.

Further, impartiality in a contest does not denote isolation from

proclaiming
but of

its

its

America sought recognition

neutrality,

impartiality

rights as a neutral power.

A. H.

Bowman

it.

By

not of its isolation

claims that the real

issue was not neutrality, but whether the United States could maintain

freedom of action (meaning commercial dealings with both belligerents) and
diplomatic independence.
tion of neutrality

independence.

was a

"'^^

Samuel Bemis agrees, noting

that the

"proclama-

tangible expression, not of isolation but of diplomatic

other words, the Proclamation of Neutrality was a

blueprint to keep the United States out of the embroilments of European politics

and to establish

its rights

of such a contention is

as a neutral commercial party.

The correctness

made more apparent because America went

1812 partially in defense of the neutral rights.

It

did not go to

war

to

war

in

in support

of isolation.
Finally, there are in the challenge to the isolationist interpretation of

American foreign
the

policy consistent themes.

commercial interests

and direction.

is the

consideration given

of the United States in arriving at policy decisions

The second,

ment from European

One

is

the desire for independence and non-entangle-

politics although this did not

mean

a rejection of

its
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culture or historical ties.

ment

that the

Finally, there is consistency in the acknowledge

European balance of power played an important part from

the

very beginning in determining United States foreign policy and America's
relationship to that balance.

Towards A New Definition
This
It is

is not to

consistent in

its

say that the isolationism interpretation lacks consistency.

misinterpretation of the foundations of American foreign

policy and its misapplication of the concept of isolationism to that policy.

However, the isolationism interpretation can claim one success.

managed

to

bestow a name or

may

incorrect that label

la^bel

It

has

on American foreign policy no matter how

be; not that there is a shortage of attempts to

characterize American foreign policy in other ways than isolationism.

Vandenberg

The Trail

in his book,

Arthur

of a Tradition, labels the traditional foreign

policy as "Nationalism, " a policy striving to maintain the independence of the
nation.

He

that policy.

rejects "isolation" and "internationalism" as improper definitions of

Vandenberg claims

'national' defense.

.

.

.

ours

71

determining America. "
of

that

"Ours

is the

case for the defense

is the trail of self-sufficient,

self-reliant, self-

Kenneth Thompson suggests that the true characterization

America's foreign policy rests

in the policy of national reserve,

^Arthur H. Vandenberg, The Trail of a Tradition

Putnam's Sons, 1926,

— the

p. vii.

,

New

York:

meaning

G. P.
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"a deliberate and more or less regular abstention
from certain
relationships. "

72

Other labels such as "political isolation,

"Americanism" and "insulation," while possibly accurate

political

" neutrality,

at

times,

fail to

renect the basic tenets upon which American foreign policy
was founded.
It is

possible to arrive at a definition of American foreign
policy

other than those presented above and other than isolationism.

Throughout

the early period, her statesmen had been primarily
concerned with

guaranteeing the nation's independence.
policy as one of independence,

it is

By characterizing American

meant

that the nation retained

foreign

"freedom of

action" in its commercial and political or diplomatic ventures abroad.

Independence for the Founding Fathers meant the ability
to define the nation's interests separate

Weinberg

states, "to

to act unilaterally,

from any others.

Or

remain non-entangled." Non-alliance

as Albert

in

terms

of

refusing to join in any permanent alliance system was a means to that end.
Neutrality also was a

means

in time of war.

possible,

It is

of maintaining the nation's independence primarily

were one

inclined, to

make use

of

present-day

concepts in international language to characterize America's traditional
foreign policy as one of "neutralism"; that
in international

power

is,

a policy seeking independence

politics through political and military non-alliance.

This does not prevent participation

in joint efforts to

out unilateral action in behalf of the national interest.

7

^p

.

cit.

,

Thompson,

p. 165.

serve humanity or rule
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The Evoluti on of Isolationism
At

first,

it

seems surprising

in

American History

that the isolationist interpretation of

United States foreign policy with the amount of
evidence brought to bear
different times against

it

for such a long period.

ism"

has remained fixed

Yet, in

many ways,

in

the

minds

the use of the

of

at

most Americans

term

"isolatio)!-

to label foreign policy is not unlike its application
to British forcig-n

policy of the late nineteenth century, in that

accepted by the public.

it

survived because

it

was

Albert Weinberg makes this point clear:

Isolation as a superficial description of American policy
the coinage, not of advocates of reserve, but of opponents
seeking to discredit them by exaggeration . . . history of the

was

term exhibits the increasing use by anti-isolationists

of this

conscious or un-conscious strategy, the repeated denunciation
of it not only l)y adherents of moderate reserve but by
"irreconcilables" as well, and, finally and only rather recently,
the bravado or thoughtlessness of an extremist minority in
accepting a label that misrepresented even them. If, together
with the other spectators, diplomatic historians came to use
the word, it was only because they were w ell aware that mere
scholars can change no social ha})it .
[My italics. ]

Popular coinage of a term over a period cannot avoid eventual distortion
of its historical meaning.

Such

American foreign

The point has already been made through the

policy.

is

the case with isolationism as

it

applies to

previous analysis of the early period in America's history that the foreign
policy of political independence, non-entanglement, commercial expansion

•'Op. cit.

,

Weinberg,

p. 539.
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and neutrality in war has been misconstrued
as a policy of isolationism.
Unfortunately,

American

distortion of the concept of isolationism
does

not end with the revolutionary period.

Its

application in different periods,

while taking on various and often spurious connotations,
reflects a history
of distortion and misrepresentation of the historical

This

is true

meaning

even at present although the United States

of isolationism.

firmly committed

is

to international objectives in its foreign policy.

Twentieth Century Isolationism

The task

in

America

of tracing the applications of isolation to

policy is an arduous one simply because

it

has meant so

American foreign

many

things to

people.

Generally, the concept has been used circumstantially; that

meaning

is defined

any given time.

by the specific circumstances

The

first

of

American

general application of isolation

to

many

is,

its

politics at

America's

traditional foreign policy appeared about the middle of the nineteenth century

when

"interventionists desirous that 'Young America' help actively Europe's

revolutionary liberalism, called upon those less rash than themselves for

an abandonment of

'isolation,

merely with a geographical

From

'

and thus for the

first

time identified

it

not

situation but with a theory of foreign relations.

that time, isolationism

was applied with increasing frequency

"'^^

to that

policy established by the founding fathers, a policy of independence and non-

entanglement.

74

Op

.

cit.

,

That American goals in foreign relations had not changed during

Weinberg, p. 539.
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a century

is

made

evident by the fact that as late as 1885 President Grover

Cleveland, addressing himself to America's foreign policy, maintained that,
the policy of independence, favored by our position
and defended by our known love of justice and by our power.
It is

It is

the policy of peace suitable to our interests.

It is

the

policy of neutrality, rejecting any share in foreign broils and
ambitions upon other continents and rejecting their intrusion
here. It is the policy of Monroe and of Washington and

—

Jefferson "peace, commerce and honest Friendship with
nations; entangling alliances with none."'^^

all

(Actually, while the basic tenets of America's traditional policy had not altered,

the nineteenth century found the United States

much more

global in its interests,

particularly since the opening of Japan in 1853 to American commerce.)
It

was the debate over

the direction of United States' foreign policy in

the early decades of the twentieth century which resulted in the popular

characterization of the traditional policy as one of isolationism.
the United States

was

realized in World

fast

War

I)

becoming a major international power

and due

to the

At this time,
(finally

shrinkage of the world in space-time

relationships, digression from the traditional postulates was inevitable.
the concept of isolationism continued to be

American

politics

employed

Yet,

to distinguish those in

who advocated continued adherence

to principles of

unilateralism and independence from those who sought American participation
in international

communal

efforts such as the League of Nations.

A case

in

point is the turn of the century debate between the imperialists and the anti-

Papers of the
"^^James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and
Office, 1889, 12
Presidents, 1789-1897 Washington: Government Printing
Volumes, Vol XIII, p. 301.
,
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imperalists in connection with American expansion
into the Pacific.

This

debate centered around the question of whether
American interests should

be broadened

to include

areas not contiguous

whether the traditional tenet

The deviation

of

non-entanglement should

meaning

of the

to continental

of isolationism

United States
;s or

still

from

be employed.

its historical

foundations can be clearly established through an analysis
of what
to signify

and how

it

has been used since the 1920's.

it

has c(
;ome

Throughout, the

attempt will be made to note the changes which occur in defining just
what
"isolationism" stands for.

Characterization
principally because

it

of.

isolationism in the 1920's and 1930's

was advocated by several spokesmen who

against different causes in the
that the label "isolationist"

membership

in the

name

of isolationism.

was applied

to

fought for and

is safe to

suggest

who rejected American

League of Nations, who had second thoughts about

America's participation

in

World War

I,

and who sought

States' traditional policy of unilateralism.

policy were Senator

men opposed

those

It

is difficult

Among

the

to retain the United

spokesmen

of such a

William E. Borah and Senator Hiram Johnson.

These

United States' involvement in collective security arrangements,

maintaining that such a policy would be an abandonment of the traditional maxims
of independence and non-entanglement established by the founding fathers.

They placed

the successful attainment of such a policy not in the complete

separation of the United States from the world but rather on the postulates of
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international law and the rights of a
neutral power.

Bassett Moore, Gerald P. Nye.

Others, such as John

Norman Thomas. Arthur Vandenberg and

Bennett C. Clark, placed their hopes for
American isolationism on
neutrality legislation and restriction of the

conduct foreign affairs.

In this

power

of the executive branch to

manner, they hoped

to

keep the nation out

of

international security arrangements and thus out
of war.

The leading spokesman among those mentioned was Senator William
E. Borah.

It is

his statements about

the writer to the conclusion that

American foreign policy

"American isolationism" has

that

little

provoked
or no

foundation in the historical meaning of that word:

matters of trade and commerce, we have never been
isolationist and never will be.
In matters of finance, unfortunately, we have not been isolationist and never will be. When
earthquake and famine, or whatever brings human suffering,
visit any part of the human race, we have not been isolationists,
and never will be
But in all matters political, in all
commitments of any nature or kind, which encroach in the
slightest upon the free and unembarrassed action of our people,
or circumscribe their discretion and judgement, we have
been free, we have been independent, we have been isolationist.'''^
In

.

From

this, it is clear,

the

movement

.

.

according to Manfred Jonas,

that:

did not aim at literal isolation of the United States

from the rest of the world. The cultural ties binding America
to Europe were never challenged by the isolationist; nor was the
necessity for maintaining diplomatic relations with other countries.

No American

made

isolationist

a principle out of cutting off all

foreign trade nor seriously advocated trying to attain economic
self-sufficiency.

None sought

to close this country's

immigrants or foreign travelers.
"^^William E. Borah, Bedrock
Foundation, 1936, p. 58.

,

Washington, D.

'^'^Manfred Jonas, Isolationism in

1966, p. 5.

doors

to

'^'^

America

,

C:

National

Home Library

Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
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Further clarification comes by drawing
a parallel between the

American foreign policy characterized as isolationism

in the 1920's

and

1930's and British foreign policy during the
period of "splendid isolation-

ism.

"

Both were influenced by principles of

development and colonial possessions.

political

freedom, commercial

Both were attuned

holding the key in the international balance of power.

to a nation

For both Britain

and the United States, the issue was independence and
freedom of action,
not isolation.

Much
came from

of the support for the so-called "isolationist" policy in
the 1930 's

a pacifist element in America.

the revisionist

War

I

argument concerning the United

found support.

Manfred Jonas suggests

policy that the isolationist

a kind of pseudo-pacifism.
continents,

involvement

were
in

This became especially true as
States' involvement in
that the

two elements of

movement could agree on were unilateralism and
Wars, especially on the European and Asian

of no interest to

them

them would commit

for the very reason that

The outbreak of war

1939 intensified the controversy surrounding this position.
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in

end of the war.

and embodied

December, 1941,

in

Europe

in

However, with

the issue

was resolved

The anti-war sentiment so prevalent during 1939-41

in the United States

after the Japanese attack.

American

this nation to uphold the interests of others

rather than those of the United States.

until the

World

proclamation of neutrality lost

its

relevancy

"
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War

Post World

With the end of World War

II

the United States

II,

a policy of internationalism.

Membership

military alliance structure of

NATO

committed

in the United Nations

itself to

and the

signaled the abandonment of the

traditional peacetime policy of non-entanglement.

American isolationism

was formally and unceremoniously declared dead by most scholars and
statesmen of American foreign policy.

Yet, there remains even today a

constant and conscious effort to keep alive a debate between American

internationalism versus a return to the "traditional policy of isolationism.
In the early 1950's, there

isolationism."
its

This movement was motivated by five principles.

advocates rejected the term isolationist.

spokesman
for

emerged a movement loiown as "The new

it

of the

movement, declared

was impossible

the globe.

to be one

that

First,

Senator Robert Taft, a leading

nobody was isolationist today

what with the United States committed around

Secondly, they expressed a dislike for allies and demonstrated a

preference for the United States

to "go

it

alone."

Third, they wanted other

nations to build their strength first in order to prove that they deserved

American

aid.

Fourth, they stressed the importance of domestic issues

over international.

And

and were anti-socialist.

finally, they

78

were against large spending and

These were the principles

of a policy labeled

'^^From Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. "The New Isolationism," Atlantic
Monthly, CLXXXIX, May, 1952, pp. 34-38.
,

taxation
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Here again

isolationism.

meaning

the distortion

and digression away from the core

of isolation is apparent.

The 1960's brought about a resurgence
ist debate.

in

It

also brought on

new meaning

of the isolationist-international-

Henry Graff,

to isolationism.

an article entitled "Isolationism Again— With a Difference, ""^^ spells out

the

new connotations

is a policy

the Cold

of

what has become known as "neo-isolationism":

which claims that the days of globalism ought

War

be over; that

cannot be carried on everywhere; and that co-existence with

Communism must be
isolationism

to

It

is

accepted with equanimity.

Graff claims that neo-

not anti-war but only supports wars in which the United

States'

national interest is involved.

takes a

more

call for

major reductions

realistic attitude

Neither

is it

anti-communist, as

toward accommodation with

in the military but

it.

It

it

does not

warns against overextension

of

military capabilities and calls for recognition of the limitations of "military
solutions."

in that

Finally, says Graff,

it

is

wedded

to the idea of collective security

European and American interests are thought

to

be interlocked.

Summary
It is

evident that the use of the concept of isolationism to characterize

American foreign policy has been from
inappropriate application.

the beginning a case of misguided and

Consistently, those policies labeled as

"^^Henry Graff, "Isolationism Again— With a Difference,"
Magazine May 16, 1965, pp. 26-27, 98-100.
,

New York Times
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isolationism have had

little

or no relationship to the core meaning, in

The conclusion may be drawn

historical sense.

against any re-evaluation of

that the recent

its

arguments

American foreign policy commitments and

priorities, couched as they are in accusations and warnings
against a

"return to isolationism," falsely represent the principles of isolationism

and the arguments of their opponents.
It is

hoped that the foregoing discussion has made clear that American

foreign policy never was one of isolationism, and that the subsequent and

ensuing arguments were not and are not between advocates of internationalism

and isolationism.

Rather,

it is

between those who seek new direction and

priorities in foreign policy to cope with the ever changing international

environment and those who battle

and preserve the status quo.

to protect

That the issues have been once again clouded by the inappropriate and misguided use of the concept of isolationism
connotations attached to isolationism

is unfortunate.

make

it

most

policy direction, stigmatized as "isolationist" by
not only support but

more

The challenge
as

it

has been applied

its

opponents, to achieve

American foreign policy can come
finds itself in a

at

to solve.

in foreign policy,

creditation of

The application

if it is

many

no better time

major dilemma over

the direction, values and priorities of its foreign policy which

been able

any new

overworked and nondescript concept of isolationism

The United States

than the present.

difficult for

important, legitimacy.

to the

to

The pejorative

of the isolationist label to

it

has not yet

new

initiatives

allowed to continue, can only result in the dis-

foreign policy

programs

of considerable worth.

CHAPTER

V

THE NEW INTERNATIONALISM
The decade

of the 1970 's

promises

to

be an important period

continuing debate over American foreign policy.

war period

in the

Not since the early post-

of the 1940's has the controversy surrounding isolationism
and

internationalism raged so intensely.

Like the outcome of that earlier

discussion won by those who espouse an international role for the United
States, the end product of the present

argument promises

to

be of great

significance, not only for the United States but for the world.

Thus,

it

is

important that the contemporary controversy be put into a proper perspective.

This chapter will pursue that goal by seeking to examine the present

debate, especially the claims and assumptions of those characterized as
isolationist.

The important task here

ments established
to the current

in

is to apply the definitional require-

Chapter Two and tested

in the

preceding case studies

argument over America's proper international

role.

United States Postwar Foreign Policy

For close

to

two and one-half decades, the United States has adhered

to a global foreign policy largely

containment and intervention.

implemented by the dual measures of

The underlying assumptions

of

American
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foreign policy during this period are
based upon what William D. Coplin
labels as the "folklore of

power politics." Assumptions such as

concern for international peace and

the

stability as the only path to national

security, military and political strength
coupled with the need for

moderation and

flexibility

for dealing with states

and the calculation of self-interest as the basis

formed the foundations of American policy.

^

Overriding these basic assumptions was the concern for
the perceived
threat of

Communism.

In large part,

American foreign policy since 1945

has been one of anti-communism, a war sometimes hot and
sometimes cold
against an oppressive, international, and monolithic ideology.

assumed

that the

Communist movement was

the world to the will of the Soviet Union.
status quo

was assessed

contained.

The policies

to

It

was

united in an effort to subject

Any

threat to the stability of the

be Communist-inspired and, therefore, must be

of containment and

intervention resulted from the

assumption that peace was indivisible and a threat against one part of the

system constituted a threat against the whole.

Peace through war or the

readiness for war remained a fixture in the American mind for twenty-five
years.

The success

years of the Vietnam

of

NATO

War

in

Europe, the Korean War, and the early

are pointed to as proof of the correctness of the

assumptions of globalism.

from Containment
Vietnam, " in Robert W. Gregg and Charles Kegley, Jr. After Vietnam
Garden City, Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1971.
"^William D. Coplin, "The Folklore of

Power

Politics

,

,

to
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The historic conviction

that

American society

is

better than others,

and that this nation has a mission to share the
virtues and values of

democracy with

the world, especially with the

new developing

played a significant role in American foreign policy.

nations, have

America has been

portrayed as the force of good against the dark evils of
Communism.

image resulted
America's

in the policy of intervention

vital interests.

As a

American commitments have

far flung that the rationale for intervention in other parts
of the

world has become tied

to the issue of

ability but the willingness to

for

and increased the scope of

result, national security has been extended

geographically and expanded conceptually.

become so

American

credibility.

play

it

to play

well.

this kind

power

If that

Not only the

carry out commitments has become justification

American actions against universal aggression.

chosen

This

politics must, as General

involves dropping

must be recognized as such.

Henry Higlin says, learn

bombs on
For

The United States, having
to

Indochina, then activity of

at stake in all of this is not only

the security of the nation but the security of the "free world" and the prestige

and power of the United States.

For two decades these assumptions
largely unchallenged.

Despite

international environment,

it

many

was

of

American foreign policy went

radical and important changes in the

not until serious questions

concerning the United States' policy

in

Vietnam

the liberal establishment about the premises of

were raised

that doubts surfaced

from

American foreign policy

in

general.

As

the

American commitment

to stop

communist aggression

in

Indochina grew in terms of troops, deaths, bombing missions,
and dollars,
questions were raised about that commitment and about the nature
of the

war.

The policy which committed the United States

to

spend so much money,

blood, and lives to save an elite and corrupt government from

communism

has given rise to controversy over other American commitments,
of containment and its practice of intervention.

within the supposedly monolithic

its

policy

The apparent schisms

Communist world, notably

that

between

China and Russia, plus the loosening of control exercised by the Soviet Union
over her satellites
of Cold

War

in

Eastern Europe, have not gone unnoticed by the critics

policies.

The re-emergence

of

Western Europe as a potential

superpower has raised questions about

the necessity for maintaining a large

American presence on

Critics have also focused on the

that continent.

defense budget, the sale of arms

to military dictatorships

and the increasing

amount of military aid being distributed under the foreign aid programs.
plight of the

American

cities

and the sagging economy have raised the question

about the need for alternatives to the

globalism.

As a

The

result, with the

arms race and

Vietnam War as

the

American policy

of

the catalyst, a strong and

sustained challenge to the assumptions underlying the foreign policy of the

United States is now underway.

This challenge has not gone unanswered by those who continue

American globalism. Surrounding themselves and

their

to

arguments with

support
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tributes to patriotism and democracy, raising the specter
of the evil and

threat of

Communism

and employing the time-tested virtues of military

strength and capitalist economics, advocates of America's post-war
policy

have attempted

to discredit their critics

as neo-isolationists.

by portraying those who sock change

Fully aware that isolationism carries with

it

an

image of weakness which evokes the inter-war head-in-the-sand posture
the United States to which

many ascribe

the catastrophe of World

War

of

II,

supporters of globalism have characterized the debate over foreign policy as

one between internationalism and isolationism.

References

to the proposals advocated

by critics of American policy

as examples of isolationism are numerous, non-partisan, and most important,
they

come from

high echelons of government.

Richard Nixon speaking

made reference
I

know

at the

For example. President

Naval Officers' graduation

in

March

1971,

to his critics:

the arguments of the

new

isolationists

.

.

.

today,

despite the terrible evidence of this century there are those

who have refused

hard lessons of the history of
as their predessors in other
times have told us, that the appetite for aggression can be
satisfied only if we are patient and that the ambitions of the
aggressor are justified if only we understand them properly.^
tyranny.

to learn the

They would

tell us,

Reporting on Nixon's speech, Robert Phelps of The New York Times

wrote that "President Nixon today denounced 'new isolationists' who favor cuts

^Richard Nixon, Speech before the Graduates of the Naval Officer Candidate
School on March 12, 1971.
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in the defense budget in

order to spend more on domestic programs.

The

President said he also understood the sentiment behind those
who favored
a shift in national priorities, but added,
I

understand the cost of weakness, too.

An

understand these arguments.

»I

•

""^

article in the Washington Post , written by Stephen Rosenfeld,

credits Nixon with this statement, "The great internationalists of the
post-

World War

11

period have become the neo-isolationists. "4

Vice-President Spiro Agnew has also attempted

American foreign policy as advocates
Co-<c-?t

of isolationism.

Guard Academy Commencement ceremonies

in

to label the critics of

Speaking before the
June, 1972, he said.

we bear any burden, pay any price, as President Kennedy
pledged we would? Or is the American ideal now reduced to
maintaining our own personal freedom and to hell with all others. ^
Will

Other supporters of globalism such as Senator Hugh Scott and Senator Barry

Goldwater have linked the

critics'

arguments with isolationism.

Scott, speaking

about the new proposals on disarmament, claimed that the "Unilateral dis-

armers, the
which
of

isolationists, favor withdrawal into a shell of

is unilateral

presumed security

obsolescence."^ Senator Goldwater, a staunch supporter

American globalism argues

Soviet Ascendancy and

in his article

American

"The Perilous Conjuncture,

Isolation," that:

3

Robert Phelps, "Nixon Warns of Peril to U.S. in Domestic Demands
New Isolationists, " New York Times March 13, 1971, p. 1.

of

,

^Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "Word on a Word," Washington Post
p. A18.
^Spiro Agnew, Speech at U.S. Coast Guard
1972, in

New York Times, May

8,

,

Academy Commencement, June

1972, p. 33.

^Senator Hugh Scott, Washington Post

,

June 23, 1972,

June 23, 1972,

p.

A18.

7,
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should be apparent that if the neo-isolationists
the Senate and House succeed in forcing United States'
It

in

withdrawal from world affairs on a massive scale, the
Soviets will win the game of world supremacy by default.'^
In a

speech given before the American Fighter Aces Association

1971, Goldwater depicts the abandonment of the
of

American isolationism.

He ends

his

in

August,

SST project as an example

address with a statement on the

perils of isolationism and a plea for continued support of global policies:

Yet, gentlemen,
that the

I

would remind you that

new isolationism

this is the stuff

made of. It sounds great, actually
that we will once again withdraw
is

very comfortable, to say
between our two oceans and friendly frontiers to the north and
south and let the world take care of itself.
Actually, we went through all this nonsense back in the
days before World War II when important people were assuring
each other that Europe's troubles were strictly provincial and
had nothing to do with the United States of America some two to
three thousand miles away. The idea of an isolated America
proved ridiculous then and we didn't even have the benefit of jet
airplane travel. And I say to you, if it was ridiculous in the late
1930's it is downright ludicrous in the 1970's.
I suggest that the hour is growing very late.
Our credibility
as a powerful nation is coming into serious question. Our defense
policy is rapidly becoming inadequate to the job of defending our
country and the security of 205 million Americans is beginning
to be threatened. ^
.

Finally,

former President Lyndon Johnson

School of Business Administration of

New York

in

.

.

an address

University

in

to the

Graduate

November, 1971,

"senator Barry Goldwater, "The Perilous Conjuncture, Soviet Ascendancy
and American Isolationism," Orbis Vol XV, Spring 1971, No. 1. p. 55.
,

^Senator Barry Goldwater, "International Blackmail," An address before
Fighter Aces
the Tenth Annual Reunion and Honors Banquet of the American
Association, San Diego, California, August 14, 1971, p. 5.
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articulates the classic arguments against isolationism and in
support of con-

tinued

American

policies of globalism:

My

third conviction is this: We must understand and
agree that there is no safety for America in isolation— now,
or as far ahead as we can sec . . .

Another assumption is that we Americans were endowed
by our Creator with a considerable supply of common sense—
and that our policies and actions will be based on that endowment.

There is nothing new about this desire to retreat into
Fortress America. It has been with us for as long as I can
remember. What is new--and disturbing—is how widespread
it has become!
There appears to be forming in the United
States a New Coalition of isolationists which could be mistaken
for the majority opinion

.

.

.

But the New Coalition is something different. It is made
up of conservatives and liberals who seek to diminish America's
role in the world
for entirely different reasons. Some are
angry because what we have done for the world hasn't made other
nations automatically do what we say. Some just don't like
foreigners. Some think we should spend everything on ourselves
instead of trying to help avoid chaos elsewhere. Others just
don't like spending money period. Others just don't want to

—

—

get involved.

We

.

.

.

have to recognize,

first that there is

no safety in a
sudden turning away from Europe or Asia, from the Middle
East or Latin America. If we fall into isolationism, we will

we are the ones who are isolated.
repeat the tragic mistakes of the past .

We

find that

.

cannot afford

Opponents of American globalism have not taken

Many

their proposals and isolationism.
to isolationism, have

aware

lightly the linl<;age

between

of the stigma attached

spoken out against such characterization for they know

Lyndon B. Jolmson, Lecture

November

critics,

to

^
.

15, 1971, pp.

at

New York

11, 12, 13.

University School of Business,
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that

it

is

an effective ploy for muddying the real issues.

one who realizes the pitfalls of such a portrayal.

is

Hans Morgenthau

He writes

that "to

stigmatize a position that falls short of such
indiscriminate globalism as
'new-isolationism'

is a

polemic misuse of terms;

assumption that indiscriminate involvement

American

of

policy. "^^

He suggests

point.

Robert W. Tucker

that, "It clearly

is,

in

as

it

it

derives from the globalist

were, the natural stance

Nation or Empire arg-ues the same

does not follow that one must be an

isolationist to protest against an imperial destiny for

imperal destiny that results

Richard Barnet

is

America, particularly an

war we have waged

in the kind of

in

Vietnam.

""^^

another who maintains that the isolationist label has been

applied inappropriately.

He acknowledges

right to threaten nuclear

war on behalf

of

that

"Those who wish

American

to

renounce the

vital interests, to stop

seeking American security by killing or assisting in the killing of Asians,

Africans and Latin Americans, are stigmatized as 'isolationists,

Barnet 's position

""'^'^
'

is that:

The issue is not whether the United States should or
can withdraw from the world, but the character of American

-'-^See

March

Mike Mansfield, "The Nixon Doctrine,

1

9

at Olivet, Michigan,

Morgenthau, A New Foreign Policy for the United States
Frederick Praeger, 1969, p. 16,

,

New

Robert W. Tucker, Nation or Empire ? Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press,

1968, p.
13

speech

29, 1971.

"'"^Hans J.

York:

"

9.

Richard Barnet, "The Illusion of Security" in Robert W. Gregg and Charles
Kegley, After Vietnam, Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1971, p. 25.
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involvement
the world.

Americans cannot and will not resign from
But they can renounce the myths on
which their
.

.

.

contact with the world has been so largely
based; that the
United States government can manage social
and political
change around the world; that it can police
a stable system of
order; that it can solve problems in other
countries it has
yet to solve for its own people . .
.

Robert Gregg and Charles Kegley

in their edited

concur with Barnet and the other critics.

They counsel

to neglect of foreign

problems or a

ritual

response

to

volume After Vietnam
that "the alternative

them need not be a

Hobson's choice between comprehensive interventionism and
comprehensive
isolationism.

It

can be rather, a flexible policy, evolving from a thoughtful

and searching review.

""''^
.

.

.

Striking at the crux of the issue is Michael Roskin in his article "What

New

Isolationism?"

Pointing to the meaningless

manner

in

which the term

isolationism has been used throughout the debates on American foreign policy,

Roskin concludes:
Will the real "isolationism" please stand up? The meaning of
"isolationism" or "new isolationism" finally dawns on the reader;
it is whatever the user happens to oppose in foreign policy.

While critics of the present United States' foreign policy are adamant

^"^Ibid

15

.

,

pp. 85-86.

Robert W. Gregg and Charles W. Kegley, Jr.
Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1971, p. 5.

,

After Vietnam

,

Garden

City:

'^^Michacl Roskin,

Spring 1972, p. 119.

"What 'New Isolationism' ?" Foreign Policy, No.

6,
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in their refusal to accept the isolationist
label, they have not

define precisely by title their specific plan or
direction for
policy.

Some, such as Senator

J.

William Fulbright A
(

and Michael Roskin Non-intervention) have attempted
(

been able

to

American foreign

New

Internationalism ^

to do so.

It

may

important that one hibcl be fixed on the critics' proposals as a
group,

not be

llnfortunately,

as has been the case noted above, the label of isolationism
has been applied to
the critics' proposals.

Unless an adequate defense of the critical position

is

forthcoming, the stig-ma of isolationism

is likely to

controversy surrounding isolationism

recognized as a conceptual dispute

rather than one of

is

remain.

And unless

the

terminology, where labels have become divorced from

substance, there will be no resolution of that controversy.

Having attempted through the process of conceptual clarification

to

define the specific meaning of isolationism, and because confusion reigns as
to just

what the critics of American foreign policy are advocating, the remaining

discussion in this treatise will attempt to explain the specific and

at

times

various positions on foreign policy of those chastized as isolationists.

Here

as in the past case studies, the effort will be to demonstrate that there remains
a disparity between a foreign policy given the label of isolationism and the

substantive meaning of the concept as defined in Chapter Two.

an effort,

it

can be made clear

that, as

was

Through such

true of British foreign policy

during the period of "splendid isolation" and as was also true of American
traditional policy throughout the nineteenth and half of the twentieth centuries,
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the characterization of the proposals for change
in

American foreign policy

as isolationist are misleading, inaccurate and without
meaning.
In any analysis of the critiques of

ledgment must be made of the

American foreign

fact that criticism

policy,

comes from

acknow-

different sources.

Critics, depending upon their orientation, differ in their underlying
assumptions

about the goals and methods of foreign policy as

A

politics.

tions

from

much

as they do about domestic

radical analysis of foreign policy is based on far different assump-

that of a liberal or conservative critique.

Unfortunately, these

varying critical analyses of American foreign policy, especially the radical

and liberal critiques, have been lumped together as though they were one and
the

same.

In the effort to clarify the positions of those

as isolationists,

it

is

important to recognize that theirs

and not a radical one; a view sustained by those critics
policy

who are

in positions of

who are being labeled
is

of

a liberal critique

American foreign

power, largely within the Congress of the United

States and various political and academic positions of importance.

17

This

analysis is not a critique of the system under which foreign policy is carried
out but rather a difference of opinion about certain decisions and methods.

For those who are

in a position to influence the direction of

policy by having a stake in the system as

odds with

'^'^For

it.

it

is

are not likely

American foreign
to

be at fundamental

Robert Tucker argues this point when he states that "critics

example, Mayor John Lindsay of

New York

City,

Governor John

Robert W. Tucker
Gilligan of Ohio, Hans Morgenthau of New York University,
President of Yale.
of Johns Hopkins University and Kingman Brewster,
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seek change

in style

Fulbright and others
that purpose. "^^

or outlook rather than policy"^^ and "What
separates
is

not disagreement over purpose but

In other

how

to

achieve

words, the indictment by the liberal critics

is

not against the "folklore of power politics" but against
the faulty application
of

it.

<"! Ml.

hand, the radical critique, based almost exclusively in

Mil,.'
I

the

academic community,

finds fault with the

which underlie the American

whole range of assumptions

capitalist system.

Radical critics such as

Harry Magdoff, Gabriel Kolko, William A. Williams, Norman Chomsky,
and Richard Duboff challenge the basic assumption of capitalist economics

and portray the market-place society as the reason for the evils
foreign policy.

Their basic disagreement

For them,

foreign policy operates.

Their critique

it

is

in

American

with the system under which

is not a

question of methods or decisions.

based upon fundamental differences with the capitalist system

is

which has perpetuated an oppressive and imperialist foreign policy.

Richard

Duboff provides an excellent statement of the radical point of view:
".

.

.

the ideology of

preservation, and

its

anti-communism and free world

implementation

the interests of corporate business

in the long

more

run serves

than any other sector

This ideology has helped create a political

of our society.

environment that permits if it does not necessitate interventions
that are irrational if each of them is taken in isolation.
18

^^

Op

.

Ibid

cit .

.

,

,

Tucker, p. 155.

p. 132.

^^Richard B. Duboff and Edward S. Herman, "Corporate Dollars and Foreign
Policy." Commonweal Vol XCVI, No. 7, April 21, 1972, p. 163.
,
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It is

not the purpose here to defend or criticize
either the radical or

liberal critiques.

The

significant point is that they do differ in their
basic

assumptions and hypotheses about American foreign policy and should
not be

grouped as one. 21 However,

it

is the liberal critique

which has been attacked

as isolationism and thus warrants careful examination here.

The following

discussion will examine the general and specific arguments of the liberal
analysis focusing on their relevancy to the definitional requirements of isolation-

ism explicated

in

Chapter Two.

The Liberal Critique

American post-war foreign policy have

In general, critics of

articulated

their proposals for change in such sweeping phrases as "a re-arrangement and

re-examination of priorities,

"

"re-appraisal of communist capabilities and

intentions, " "a policy of detente and co-existence, " "a reduced

presence abroad" and "a policy of non-intervention.
tell little

"

American

Such broad statements

about the basic premises upon which their proposals are based.

what they do indicate

is that

there is needed a review of the fundamental assump-

tions upon which the policies of containment and intervention are founded.

Morgenthau makes

from the burden

this point

But

when he

states that

"We must

of obsolescent policies which have

Hans

free ourselves

become mechanical

routines

and embark upon a radical rethinking of the issues and of the policies adequate

^^See Robert W. Tucker, The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy
Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1971.

,

"
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22
to

them.
Specifically, the liberal critique of
foreign policy has been directed at

three particular but at times overlapping
areas of controversy.

The

first

involves a re-assessment of the communist
threat to the free world.
critics have taken stock of the changes
within the

have noted the schism within

it,

communist movement,

the softening of the hard line which
so

characterized the early post-war years and the
influence

over communism

among

in

Most

determining political postures.

of nationalism

The feeling runs high

the critics that the ardent anti-communist
stance taken by the United

States for nearly thirty years is outmoded and
continues to be an obstacle in
the path of serious negotiations on topics of real
interest to both the United

States and the

Communist

nations. Opposition to the ardent anti-communist

posture along ideological grounds has surfaced recently.
attitude

realistic

toward the communist countries has been advocated which differs

from

significantly

the attitude of the staunch anti-communist ideologue.

Fears that continued belief

means

A more

in the

specter of international communist aggression

the adherence to policies of intervention and containment, which are

responsible for American involvement in Indochina, are abundant among the

Senator

critics.

J.

William Fulbright articulates these fears clearly:

How

have we come to inflate so colossally the importance
of Indochina to our own security? The answer lies in that

22

Op

p. 3.

.

cit .

,

Morgenthau, A New Foreign Policy for the United States

,
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hoariest, hardest,

myth

most indestructible myth of them all: the
Communist conspiracy. ... For

of the international

all the sophistication

and fine distinctions that are supposed
have refined our policy since the bad old days
of the cold
war, there is little discernible difference in spirit
between
Mr. Nixon's ominous reference to "those great powers
who
have not yet abandoned their goals of world conquest"
and the portentous language of President Truman's
proclamation of national emergency twenty years ago.
The myth distorts our perceptions. It has made it
difficult for us to see the Soviet Union for what it
has become—
to

.

a traditional, cautious, and rather unimaginative great power,
jealously clinging to its sphere of domination in Eastern Europe
but limited to methods of pressure and persuasion in its dealings

with other Communist movements especially in Asia. 23

Advocates for change

in the

American response

to

Communism

have argu

against the isolation of mainland China from the international community as a
policy of foolish motives and faulty intent.
tion

It is

their

premise

that the distinc-

between the Communist bloc and the free world obfuscates more than

illuminates and that opposition to

American foreign

policy.

The

Communism

is

critics advocate a

it

a misleading guide for

more

realistic

assessment of

local revolutionary situations as opposed to the mechanical response of inter-

vention every time there is local unrest.

Communist posture seek

more

Finally, opponents of the hard-line

a lessening of the rhetoric of

anti-communism and

a

conciliatory attitude toward peaceful negotiations and cooperation.

The second major controversy revolves around what Robert Tucker
describes as a "broad disparity of view over both the condition and even the

meaning

of

American security and

the other interests whose vindication would

23 J, William Fulbright, "Old Myths and New Realities-I, " Congressional
Record, Vol. 116, No. 51, Part 8, April 2, 1970, p. 10150.

148
justify if

necessary the use of American military power. "^^

American

policies of globalism the critics raise four
questions pertaining

to national security.

What are

threat to those interests?

America's purpose
In

opposing

What

vital interests?

What

to

nature of the

do to preserve those interests?

world and how best may

in the

is the

that

What

is

purpose be realized ?^^

answering these security questions, the critics reject outright the
assump-

tions of the globalists that

America's

vital interests

are world-wide.

Threats

to the national security as justification for intervention and
involvement in

faraway places such as Indochina have been used indiscriminately with no

assessment of or distinction between

vital

and secondary interests.

The

critics reject the belief in the universal crisis; that a threat against one part

of the

system

crit'.^ria for

is

a threat against the whole.

defining

Tucker strikes

They propose

American security needs

at the heart of the issue

in less

the establishment of

grandiose terms. Robert

when he concludes:

Whereas

in the later nineteen-forties, America's purpose was
a function of her security, in the late nineteen- sixties security
has become a function of her purpose. 26

Unless American security

is

defined in a realistic

tions and a cohesive, conscious idea of

where

manner with

its vital

specific limita-

interests

lie,

the critics

predict that the United States will find itself overcommitted and overextended

beyond

military and economic capabilities.

its

^'^Op. cit.

,

Tucker, Nation or Empire ?

25ibid_.

96
Ibid.

,

p. 38.

p. 3.

It

will also find itself wallowing
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helplessly in a sea of change because

it

refuses to abandon

its

policies of

attempting to maintain the status quo.
Critics maintain that the failure or refusal to
reassess changes in the

balance of power inevitably results in an aberration of
that balance.
results in a circumstance where there is no distinction

and secondary interests.

A generalized commitment

It

made between

also

vital

to interests on a global

scale can result in tilting the balance of power one way or the other
causing
instability in areas

that balance of

between

vital

where

power

stability had prevailed,

a foregone conclusion

it is

politics on the international scale necessitates a distinction

and non- vital interests.

Critics claim that such a distinction

has been abandoned under the assumptions of globalism.

though changes in the power balance
policy

makers have

failed to

in certain

a result, even

areas have occurred, American

examine those changes.

States influence has been dangerously overwhelming in

lacking in others.

As

Consequently, United

some places and

sadly

27

The American pre-occupation with

stability

and

its

measures

of inter-

vention and containment have been soundly denounced by those who see change
as inevitable and in fact necessary.

occupation with stability and

its

Richard Barnet argues against

this

pre-

relationship to national security:

^'^Hans Morgenthau suggests that Indochina is an area where the United States
has failed to recognize that the balance of power does not necessitate the
preponderance of power now committed there. The recent India-Pakistan war
in early 1972 is an

example

of

lacking in a critical situation.

where United States influence was found

to

be
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To set as a "national security" goal the concept of
"stability" in a world of convulsion, in which radical
change is as inevitable as it is necessary is as practical
as King Canute's attempt to command the tides.
To be able to roll with the tides and still keep intact
the essentials of our own political experiment and
our own
identity is the real security task. 28

Because American foreign policy has overemphasized
has misunderstood the means of maintaining

it,

the need for order and

all in the

name

of security,

the United States has been pursuing a kind of dangerous international

adventurism.
to

American

The danger, maintain the opponents

of globalism, is not only

interests abroad but to the domestic society as well.

Diversion

of needed domestic resources to bolster right-wing dictatorship simply

because they are anti-communist and thus allegedly reinforce the security
the United States is wasteful and without meaningful purpose.

advocated by critics such as Lincoln Bloomfield

is

What

of

is

a "rolling reassessment of

United States priorities and of interests that are truly, and not just rhetorically,
'vital.

'"^^

The third fundamental criticism
bound

of

to the question of national security.

commitments

to other nations

defend with military power

if

(alleged or real) aggression.

^^Op.

cit.

,

American foreign policy
It

is closely

involves the issue of American

and in particular the commitment to aid and

necessary those nations threatened by Communist
Critics are questioning not only the validity of

Gregg and Kegley,

p. 48.

Atomic
^^L. P. Bloomfield, "After Neo-isolationism, What?" Bulletin of
Scientists, Vol 27, April, 1971, p. 11.

global
to the

commitments but how they are made and
United States.

Many

critics feel that a substantial

commitments abroad, given
outdated relics of the Cold

at the

number

should be discarded.

conclusion

"American policy-makers have tended

in

A merican

all

places at

all

of the 'threats' against which

because we have taken a particular historic position

We must now

positions

is

American

Erwin Knoll

m

1970 that

which were

times.

'"'^^

They

we maintain military

forces exist not where a core interest of the United States

world.

of

Militaris

to believe that policies

successful in one era can be applicable in

"Many

commitments

the changes in the international environment,
are

War era and

and Judith McFadden arrive

also maintain that

the cost of these

is at stake, but

in a particular part of the

reconsider the extent to which the maintenance of these

appropriate.

In line with this thinking, opponents of globalism

American involvement

now seek a reduced

in the political affairs of other nations.

strong rejection of the assumptions of those
calls the "neo-imperialists"

whom

There

is

a

Senator George McGovern

"who somehow imagine

that the United States has

a mandate to impose any American solution the world around.

"

There

is

also growing awareness that American interests are not necessarily identical
to those of other nations

and that the United States has no right

'^^Erwin Knoll and Judith Nies McFadden, ed.

New

York:

^^Ibid.

,

,

to

impose

American Militarism, 1970

Viking Press, 1969, p. 37.
p. 37.

^^George McGovern, A Time for War, A Time for Peace

Random House,

1968, p. 178.

its

,

New York:
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Will on others.

necessarily

An agreement

mean

to give aid

that a nation

American weapons or

that

and assistance

must be armed

needed, claims Stanley Hoffman,

fit

is

interests have a permit to

those corporate interests.

for

Americans

"to

the foreignness of foreigners-to
realize, not only that

less control over

what may be
development)

them than over men and goods

What

is

remind ourselves

we have-quite

of

properly-

of our national policy but also

in their national interest (such
as certain kinds of political
is

not necessarily either in our interest
or a proper concern of

our foreign policy.

""^"^

Included in the desire for a reduced profile abroad

American preoccupation with maintaining
national

does not

to the teeth with sophisticated

American corporate

"develop" that nation's economy to

to a nation

power and prestige and

commitments (perceived or
argues "There

is

its

the hope that the

self-sustained image of inter-

the reflexive policy of rushing to fulfill its

real) will be abandoned.

when challenged,

a tendency,

is

to

At present, Hoffman

be far more concerned with

proving ourselves than with finding out whether our objectives are
worthwhile

or reachable and whether our involvement serves them adequately.
Finally, critics of

"'^'^

American foreign policy have taken issue with

the

tendency to forsake problem-solving via negotiations in favor of the "quick
military solution."

33

The American

Richard M. Pfeffer, ed.

1968, p. 201.
Ibid

.

,

p.

198.

,

faith in military

No More Vietnams

,

power

New

to

cope with

York:

Harper and Row,

political change, claim the critics,
is the classic

paradox

of

American foreign

policy and can only result in failure;
Vietnam being the tragic example.

Military power should be used as a
last resort, not as the
tion that lasting solutions to

first.

The assump-

peace can be achieved through massive
troop

intervention and bombing of indigenous
and ideologically-motivated forces

is

rejected by those such as Senator Mike
Gravel, who argues that "to stand up

and talk about peace when we are really killing
people
That, of course, is the problem with our policy
today.

schizophrenic.
In

summing up

nism as a guide
is

It

schizophrenic.

is totally

"'^^

the disparate generalizations of the liberal critique,

several underlying assumptions are apparent.

Union

is totally

First, hard-line

for United States foreign policy is misleading.

anti-commu-

The Soviet

seen as a status quo power with marginal influence over other

communist nations.

Secondly, the United States should not attempt to main-

tain international stability and order through force.

nor the right

to

It

has neither the power

serve as the policeman of the "free world." Third, peace

is divisible; a threat against one part of the

against the whole and thus,

makes a

system does not constitute a threat

reflexive response unnecessary.

"It is

not clear that development in Latin American, Africa, or Asia (except Japan)

would

affect the security or vital interests of the United States. "^^

^Mike

Gravel, "Foreign Relations Authorizations Act of 1972," Congres^
sional Record, Vol. 118, No. 75, May 9, 1972, p. 7517.

~

•^^Graham Allison, "Cool It: The Foreign Policy of Young America," Foreign
Policy No. 1, Winter 1970-71, p. 159.
,
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Fourth, indiscriminate increases in military
strength will only brin-- increased
national security.

The arms race, unless controlled can only lead

insecurity and possible disaster.

Fifth,

America should be

to further

less blatantly

visible while maintaining her responsibilities
in less grandiose ways.

ments abroad should be re-evaluated so
national security interests.

security.

the domestic

ills

of

that they are in tune with clelined

Finally, domestic health is vital to the national

Pressing problems

ostentatious projects abroad.

Commit-

at

home should

not be neglected in favor of

Sufficient allocation of resources to cope with

American society

is far

more

desirable than a foreign

policy of international adventurism.

So far, the discussion has considered only the broad generalizations
entailed in the liberal critique of foreign policy.

There are, however, specific

projects and movements initiated by critics of American foreign policy that

are aimed at bringing about desired changes.

movement

to

end the war

in Indochina.

The most obvious

is the

peace

But within the Congress of the United

States, principally the Senate, there is a serious effort on several fronts to

reshape United States foreign policy.
to force

changes

in policy

At times, these proposals have sought

through the use of such tactics as withholding of

funds and restricting executive powers.

It is

castigated as examples of isolationist policy.

be examined

to

these proposals which are

Thus,

it

is

important that they

determine the appropriateness of such a claim.

"

Vietnam

The most obvious and best-publicized
their opposition to the

war

in

Vietnam.

activity of the critics has

Opponents of American policy

been
in

Southeast Asia consider the long
involvement there a failure of the Cold

War

assumptions concerning international
communism, the domino theory, and

America as
Vietnam

the guarantor of

is the classic

To the

example of misplaced interests and the failure

"quick military solution.
activity, including the

freedom and self-determination.

"

The assumption

bombing

capitulate and would bring

of North

them

to the

that increased

critics,

of the

American military

Vietnam would force

the North to

peace table has been proved incorrect.

Critics have grown tired of the claims

made by

Vietnam

United States and that in terms of the

is in the vital interests of the

end of the war "there
like

is at last,

light at the

three administrations that

end of the tunnel.

Senator Frank Church maintain that "the bitter truth

including our own,

unrelated to

is entitled to

its vital

interests.

summon

its

"

is that

sons to battle

Opponents
no nation,

in foreign

wars

And Vietnam has always been unrelated

to

the vital interests of the United States, which is to say the freedom and safety
of the

American people.
Further, Church concludes

From

that:

the standpoint of our interests,

we have been

unnecessary war for seven long years, making

it

fighting an

possibly the

37

Frank Church, "Let Us Come Together, " Congressional Record, Vol. 117,
No. 61, Part 10, April 29, 1971, p. 12668.
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most disastrous mistake
policy.
In

much

the

It

same

in the history of

can never be vindicated;
vein, Senator

Mark

it

American foreign

can only be liquidated. 38

Hatfield has argued:

To believe that a declaration and implementation of "all-out
war" will reduce the problems of this conflict is to ignore
the conditions of the struggle that is taking place. Even if
military victory were possible— which under humanitarian

and moral reasons is not--the South Vietnamese people
would still be vulnerable due to the lack of support of their
own government.
What the bombing of the North
accomplished was a vast loss of lives, both military and
.

.

.

civilian, and a loss of international goodwill and

sympathy
and perhaps a naive but growing fear by emerging nations
that we were being colonial in our actions. "^^
Opponents of the war have carried out the attempt
involvement on several fronts.

to

Massive violent and non-violent demonstra-

tions have been frequent during the last eight years.

Support for anti-war

candidates in state and national elections has been growing.
effective, and thus the

most frequently attacked as

involvement by means of the legislative process.
is

but, rather, "how can

But the most

the tools of isolationism,

have been the efforts by the Congressional anti-war critics

question no longer

end the American

to end

American

For many legislators, the

"can we win the war" or even "should we win the war"

we end

the

war?" Senator Edward Kennedy made

a

statement to this point on April 27, 1972:

Ibid.

^^Mark

,

p. 12668.

Hatfield,

"A Vietnam Appraisal, " Congressional Record,

No. 127, Part 16, July 29, 1969,

p. 21143.

Vol. 115,

"
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The President says we will never surrender
enemy, but neither will Hanoi. The sooner

to the

we accept

the fact, the sooner

we

will be on the road to a realistic

compromise and negotiated settlement

in

Paris, the only

road that leads to peace in Indochina.
Until the President
accepts this simple fact, it will be the
responsibility of

Congress

to

seek

to

end the war by legislative means. 40

Proposals for withdrawal have been numerous.

A

bill

sponsored

in

1970 by Senators Church and John Sherman Cooper, while
finally passed

under an amendment offered by Senator Mike Mansfield,
obligated the President
"to withdraw all of its forces and end all military
operations at the earliest

practicable date. "^^ Another formal

bill, S.

376, the Vietnam Disengagement

Act of 1971, called for the withdrawal of American forces by the end
of 1971.

More

recently, in March, 1972, a

new anti-war

Senate by Senators Mondale and Gravel.
of

bombing

in Indochina

from the Republic

bill

was introduced

in the

Bill S. 3409 provided for the cessation

and the withdrawal of United States military personnel

Cambodia and Laos.

of Vietnam,

In support of this bill,

Senator Walter Mondale stated:

Our

simple.

requires total withdrawal within 30 days
in exchange for a release of our prisoners. It would prohibit
all further bombing of Indochina except as the President determined
bill is

necessary

our troops in South Vietnam as they withdraw.
past for lengthy speeches on this war. The
debate or alter the details of our amendment. But in

to protect

The time
Senate

may

the end,

it

It

is

will all

nightmare continue

come down

to the basic question:

Do we

let this

7"^^

E. M. Kennedy, "Statement on President Nixon's Announcement on Vietnam,
Office of Senator E. M. Kennedy, April 27, 1972, p. 1.
41
Mark Hatfield, "Speech before the Senate on the Vietnam War, " Congressional
Record Vol. 117, No. 181, November 23, 1971, p. 19538o
,

^^Walter F. Mondale, "Mondale Urges Speedy Enactment of New Anti-War
Bill,"

News Release, March

1972, p.

1.
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Other efforts have aimed

at cutting off funds for the

war.

Long and

furious debates have occcurred over
appropriations to continue the

The most recent
of 1972"

(S.

effort.

of these involved the "Foreign
Relations Authorization Act

3526).

Angered by the President's docision

to close off (ho ports

of North Vietnam and to step up the bombing
of "military targets"

Indochina, Senator Gravel in

May

Senate, the "National Security

wisdom and

war

in all

1972, attempted to introduce before the

Memorandum

No. 1," which questioned the

effectiveness of such measures.

Gravel's reasoning was that

the effectiveness of such a policy

obligation not to provide funds for

was dubious and
it.

It

was also

that the Senate had the
his intention to

make

public

the conclusion of this study for the purpose of arousing public opinion
against
the President's action.

Public opinion has also played a role in other Congressional efforts to

end the war.

In the interest of the public's right to

applauded the publication of the Pentagon Papers
maintains that

"It

.

documents has given even more prominence

all the publicity

to the deception

characteristic of our involvement in Indochina. "

critic of

Senator Willian Fulbright

has been a victory for the basic principles of freedom upon

which our Government rests, and ironically,

Chairman

know, the critics have

over the

and secrecy so

Senator Fulbright, who as

of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has been an effective

American policy

in

Vietnam also introduced a

bill (S. 1125) to

force

administration officials to appear before committees of Congress Investigating

^^J. William Fulbright, "The Pentagon Papers.
the United States Senate, 1971.

" Bill Fulbright

Reports from
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aspects of foreign policy.
possible the facts about the
policy.

His motive

is to

war and other

make

public as

much

related aspects of

as

is

American

Fulbright states:

The purpose

of this bill is to make a small breach
secrecy which now separates Congress from
the Executive in matters of foreign
policy, and particularly,
matters pertaining to the war in Indochina.
.44
in the wall of

m

.

Measures have been adopted by
tion to

pursue meaningful negotiations

among

the critics that

the

to

There

is

to

end the war.

American proposals

have been unrealistic.

Congress

.

force the Administra-

Feeling runs high

for a negotiated end to the

war

considerable sentiment that negotiations

have been pursued apathetically in hopes that military activities
will be
successful in gaining concessions from the Hanoi government.
the Senate has

moved

to

push the negotiations onto a meaningful

example, Resolution 148 urges the Administration

war regardless
In

some cases,

of the

As

a result,

level.

For

to negotiate an end to the

outcome of the South Vietnamese elections of 1971.

the critics have urged alternative proposals for negotiations

which reflect the desire

to liquidate

American involvement

in the

war rather

than pursuing victory or maintaining American power and prestige.

44
J.

Part
45

4,

Acknowledgment must be made

of the fact that those

William Fulbright, "S. 1125,

Congressional Record

March

"

,

criticize

Vol 117, No. 29,

5, 1971, p. 5232.

For example, see speech by Senator Frank Church

Come

who

of Idaho, "Let

Us

Together,'^ Congressional Record, Vol. 117, No. 61, April 29, 1971.
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American involvement

in

Vietnam do not

withdrawal from Indochina.
the

American dilemma

in

all

advocate Immediate and total

There are many different proposals

Vietnam.

Some

critics of

Vietnam maintain

while the United States has made a
mistake in Vietnam,

withdraw

all of its

influence and

tions of the Asian balance of

power from

power and

for solving

it

that

can not suddenly

that part of the world.

the repercussions on

Considera-

American

credibility in other areas of the world forestall
such action.

Henry Kissinger,

the national security advisor to President
Nixon wrote in an article in

January of 1969,
honorably

is

that

"whatever the judgment of our actions, ending the war

essential for the peace of the world.

Any other

solution

may

unloose forces that would complicate prospects of international
order.

He suggests

that unilateral withdrawal of the United States

from Vietnam

could result in the release of restraints on those in other parts of the world

who are constrained by

the possibility of

American opposition

to their actions.

This situation could have unsettling consequences on the prospects for international order.

There are other variations on

this

theme,

all of

which are concerned

with considerations of the balance of power, American credibility, and national
security.

is

Necessarily there are many shades

an honorable settlement.

^^Henry A. Kissinger,
No.

2,

These result

'*The

January, 1969, p. 234.

to the

Kissinger phrase of what

in differing suggestions for settlement

Vietnam Negotiations," Foreign Affairs

,

Vol 47,
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other than unilateral withdrawal depending upon
the calculations of the

considerations noted above.

Proposals for partial withdrawal from Vietnam

with a bolstering presence in the neighboring nations are
numerous and have
in

them consideration

for the

Asian balance of power.

Proposals for a bi-

lateral troop withdrawal and a political settlement which include
a coalition

government

in South

Vietnam have also been suggested.

Others advocate the

withdrawal of the American presence on the mainland of Southeast Asia but
continued involvement and commitment in the South Pacific.
opt for these proposals while critical of the Vietnam

The

critics

who

commitment are persuaded

that total withdrawal is not a realistic alternative because of its larger

implications on the balance of power and the credibility of future American

commitments.
All of the
in

what

is

considered a tragic mistake.

some changes
in

measures mentioned are designed

War

is that

They are also aimed

a conjuncture of the old and the

Begun under

has resulted

the point

end American participation
at bringing

in the overall conduct and assumptions of foreign policy.

many ways, represents

foreign policy.

to

the assumptions of the Cold

in the rethinl^ing

new

War

in

American

era, the Vietnam

and re-examination of those assumptions

47
where many have been discredited.^' The issue now, claim

they be discarded.

Vietnam,

to

the critics,

Reluctance on the part of three administrations

to

Vietnam, especially within the last
two administrations, no longer feel secure in arguing the validity of the
Domino Theory, nor do they seek to picture Hanoi as a pawn of an international
Communist conspiracy.
'^Defenders of

American involvement

in
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move

in that direction has resulted
in these

new

the liberal critics to seek the
termination of the

The expansion
analysis of the

of the

war

American policy

initiatives on the part of

Vietnam War.

into other parts of Indochina
in

warrants

Laos, Cambodia and Thailand.

American-supported forays by the South Vietnamese

into

The

Cambodia and

Laos and the use of Thailand as a huge air force
base have been soundly
criticized as dangerous escalations of the

American involvement.

Here

again, point out the critics, the United States
is seeking a quick military

solution to problems that can only be resolved
in political negotiations.

From

a staff report of May, 1972, by the Committee of Foreign
Relations of

the United States Senate concerning Thailand, Laos
and

acknowledgment

of the unfortunate situation facing

Cambodia comes

Laos and Cambodia:

Fate has thus forced a cruel bargain on Laos and
Cambodia. On the one hand, American assistance sustains
them for without it they would literally be at the mercy of
the North Vietnamese, forced to accept a solution or de facto
situation which would grant the North Vietnamese unrestricted
to their territory and a strong if not decisive voice in

access

their affairs.

On

the other hand, their reliance on continued

American assistance prevents them from agreeing to the kind
of compromise that would offer them an alternative to continued
them to permit the unopposed
use of their territory by the North Vietnamese. 48
fighting but would, in return, require

The solution

to

such a cruel choice, claim the critics, comes not from continued

military action but from negotiations.
totality of the Indochina

Any

final solution

must involve

dilemma and not each nation separately.

the

Since the

Committee on Foreign Relations, "Thailand, Laos and Cambodia,"
Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1972, p. 38.
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problems of Laos, Cambodia and Thailand
are outgrowths
Vietnam, they must be included as important
elements

reached between the belligerents.

The 1972

in

of the fighting in

any

final

settlement

Staff Report concludes:

It seems clear that the North
Vietnamese will be able to
continue to use the territory of Laos and
Cambodia to pursue
the war in South Vietnam, no matter how
successful Victnamization proves to be and to keep South
Vietnam in a stage of
permanent siege. How long that situation will continue
will

depend on developments
Washington. 49

in

Peking, Paris, Hanoi,

Moscow and

Asia

For a number of years now, numerous people have been raising
questions about the

China.

American

Over the

last

attitude and policy

toward the Peoples Republic

of

two and one-half decades, Communist China has

experienced more than any other nation the brunt of the American policy of
containment and isolation.

Over these years,

it

has been Red China, due

principally to an ideologically-fanatic leadership and

which has been portrayed as the major threat

to

interests in the Asian and sub-Asian continents.

its

large

America and

human resource,
free world

Supporters of American

policies of Chinese isolation and containment have consistently represented

China as the dangerous outlaw of international peace.

"Yellow Peril" have been used time and again

Slogans such as the

to trigger the

American

imagination against the dangers and treachery of the Chinese Communists.

^^Ibid.

,

p. 39.
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Those

critical of such tactics and policies
have argued for a policy of

understanding and the reduction of tension between
the United States and

Communist China.

They claim

through a policy which seeks

normal relationships.

that international

to isolate the

In advocating

peace cannot be achieved

world's most populous nation from

such a reversal

in policy,

Senator

Fulbright has maintained that "we must acquire loiowledge
not only of China
but of the Chinese.
nation, not a society

To most

of us, China is a strange, distant and dimgerous

made up

of menacing abstraction."^^

of 800 million individual

human beings

but a kind

While seeking a policy of understanding with main-

land China, there has also been considerable support for her admittance into
the United Nations and the lessening of the

American commitment

Chinese Nationalists regime on the Island of Taiwan.

to the

Critics point to the contra-

diction in a policy which refuses representation in the councils of the United

Nations of 800 million people while at the same time supporting a Chinese
dictatorship on Taiwan.
In recent months, the

arguments of those

critical of

war policy toward Red China have found favor with

America's post-

the Nixon Administration.

In the last year, there have been indications that the United States is in the

process of a policy re-evaluation on the Chinese issue.

The recent-trip by

President Nixon in February 1972, to the Peoples' Republic was announced as

^^J. William Fulbright, "The United States and China,"
Record, Vol. 112, No. 40, March 7, 1966, p. 3.

Congressional
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the beginning of a

new relationship between

the two nations.

Previous

to the

President's trip, mainland China had been
admitted into the United Nations

and President Nixon had

lifted the

trade with the Chinese.

There has also been a softening

the two

embargo on various non-strategic items

governments reflecting the desire

of rhetoric

for

between

for increased mutual cooperation and

understanding.

Out of these encouraging events has come widespread support from

former opponents of American policy toward China.

They have inspired new

hope that the American commitment to policies of containment and isolation
are to be abandoned.

Furthermore, states Senator Jacob Javits, "There

reason to believe that beneficial consequences of the China
properly followed through, can do much

to offset the

is

initiative, if

enormous damage

inflicted

on the United States role and prestige in the world by the tragically improvident

and miscalculated war

in

Vietnam. "^V52

Western Europe

The issue

of the large

been of particular interest

American commitment

to the critics.

This

is,

in

Western Europe has

of course, expected since

51

Jacob Javits, "After the Nixon Visit: The United States, China and Japan,"
Congressional Record, Vol. 118, No. 41, March 17, 1972, p. 4082.
CO
In a similar vein, the President's trip to the Soviet Union in May, 1972,
promises to result in new efforts at understanding and cooperation between
the communist and non-communist world. These too are applauded by those
who have sought these new directions based upon the assumption of mutual

trust rather than fear.
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a

major contention between

the size,

number and costs

United States security.

commitments vary
point of view.

Bit

the globalists and the liberal critics
involves
of

Arguments

it

is

its

to

guarantee

for and against continuation of the;
!SC

in the specific statistics

used to support a particula

generally agreed as Senator Fulbright suggests that

"The United States has more
ments outside

overseas commitments needed

in the

way

of

men, bases, and military invest-

own boundaries than any other nation or combination

nations— including the other nations

of

NATO

and those

Debate over the American troop commitment

Europe has gone on

for several years.

in the

of

Warsaw

to the defense of

Pact."^*^

Western

In the spring of 1971, Senator

Mansfield brought the debate to the floor of the Senate by introducing a

which sought

to cut the

American troops

in

Western Europe

in half.

Mike
bill

In

defense of his measure, Mansfield stated:

There is no bargaining power in the irrelevant; an
excessive and antiquated U. S. deployment in Europe, and
the enormous costs which it entails cannot strengthen the
U. S. position in negotiations. It can only weaken further
the international economic position of this nation. 55

William Fulbright, "The Mansfield Amendment on Troops in Europe,"
Washington Office of Senator J. William Fulbright, May 19, 1971, p. 1.
^"^J.

54see Mike Mansfield, "New Approaches to Foreign Relations," Speech
at University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, October 26, 1971.

^^Mike Mansfield, "The United States and the Soviet Union: Power in
Transition," Address, 1971 Eisenhower Symposium, The John Hopkins University,
Baltimore, Maryland, November 18, 1971, p. 21.
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In a study he presented to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, Mansfield

commented:

may be

It

the viability ot

understandable, yet

NATO seems

it

is still

yet to depend so

regrettable that

much upon United

States leadership, physical presence and exhortation.
habit is twenty-five years old and may be hard to

The

breal< but

is

it

essential for both Western Europe and the United States
to

move away from

this one-sided

emphasis.
judgment, the question of substantial reductions
of U.S. forces in Europe at this time revolves around a
matter
of political atmospheres, rather than military necessity. Very
few military men will say without numerous reservations that
the presence of four and one-third American divisions in
Germany, along with the total strength of the alliance can prevent
the Soviet Union from reaching the Atlantic if it were to undertake
a full-scale conventional attack. The real deterrent is nuclear.
In

.

.

.

my

.

.

Addressing the same subject but having wider implications, Senator
Fulbright concludes:
the troop and base structure in Europe seems to have
o
acquired a life and momentum of its own, impervious both to
.

.

improvements

our military capability and to significant
It is because this
Administration, as well as its predecessors, has failed to
take the initiative in the past few years in re-examining our
European posture in light of these changes that the Congress
must provide a forum for consideration of the issues

changes

in

in the basic political situation.

involved.

.

.

.

many Americans realize that the United States
has accumulated an investment in European installations
It is not as if a
(including Spain) of almost$1.2 billion.
U.S. withdrawal from some of these facilities would leave
I

doubt that

.

.

.

virtually nothing behind.

Mike Mansfield, "Western Europe and the New Economic Policy,"
Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1971, pp. 12-14.
^'^Op. cit.
p. 2.

,

Fulbright,

"The Mansfield Amendment on Troops

in

Europe,"

.
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Supporters of Mansfield's Amendment inside
and outside of Congress

premise their argument

for troop withdrawals on the contention
"tint the

American military engagement
cultural and historical ties.

means require

is

based upon compelling economic, ideological,

The expression

of the

four and one-third divisions in

sizable logistics network. "58

it is

deterrent a small American force

assumed

is just

engagement need by no

West Germany supported by

that in

terms

a

of a security

as good as a larger one.

maintained that modern transport could get the needed troops

It is

also

to the front in

time to be effective.

One

of the strongest arguments in favor of cutting the European

commitment

is

based on economic issues.

point to the estimated $14 billion dollars

American presence

in

economic burden and
there

is

Europe.

is

it

They claim

Advocates of the proposed cut
takes annually to maintain the
that this involves too

a drastic misuse of funds.

much

They also maintain

of an

that

considerable waste and inefficiency as a result of the large bureaucratic

structure accompanying the military commitment.

Further economic arguments

portray the cuts as a solution to the balance-of-payments problems and the
spending of American dollars abroad.

In this

time of great anguish over the

American economy, these arguments carry much weight.
But the real debate revolves around the threat or the perceived threat
to the security of

Europe and thus the United States.

Opponents of present

^^John Yockelson, "The American Military Presence in Europe: Current
Debate in the United States," Orbis, Vol XV, Fall, 1971, No. 3, p. 798.

1G9

troop levels are convinced that
the threat of war which existed
in the early

post-war period
that there

now

is

now remote.

As a

is

based upon the assumption

exists an informal agreement between
the two super-powers

over the question of Europe.
quo.

Their premise

Both,

result, regardless of

it

is

claimed, want to maintain the status

what the Soviet Union docs

military establishment, the large American
presence

and

is in

is

so

in

terms

much

of

its

extra baggage

urgent need of streamlining.

Finally, in

of troops in

answer

to those

who consider

the

argument for the reduction

Europe as another example of growing American isolationism,

Senator Fulb right responds:.

Adoption of the Mansfield Amendment should not be regarded as
an isolated or spiteful act in reaction to the dollar crisis.
Neither should the Mansfield Amendment be regarded as a
retreat from the

ment

NATO commitment;

it is a reasonable adjustchanging circumstances too long ignored;
believe any bureaucracy is incapable of

to take account of

an adjustment which
inaugurating.

.

.

T

.

The Mansfield amendment
or toward fortress America. It

no move toward "neo-isolationism"
a move to begin to bring some
perspective into our relationships not only with Western Europe,
but with our military relationships elsewhere as well. Unless
we manage to bring under some kind of public control the enormous
military bureaucracy abroad, we will end up as did the Roman

Empire which became so much
that

it

is

is

a slave to

its

foreign

commitments

died at home.*^^

Critics have also been active in their opposition to American policies in

other parts of the world.

what

is

now

The recent

confiict

between India and Pakistan over

the nation of Bangladesh resulted in great castigation of United

^^Op. £it., Fulbright, "Mansfield Amendment on Troops

in

Europe," pp. 3-4.
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States policy.

The continued shipments

of

American arms

to

both bellig-

erents despite an embargo preventing such
assistance in 1965,

the

aiid

small effort made by the United States to relieve the
human suffering

Bangladesh previous
critics, of continued

As a

to the outbreak of hostilities are

adherence

to

in

examples, say the

unsound and contradictory policies.

result, the United States has, because of its implicit support
of Pakistan,

lost a great deal of influence

in the

Asian region.

It

and leverage with India, the largest democracy

has, also, claim the critics,

managed

the side of repression and brutality in that the United States

West Pakistan Army

to halt the homicidal actions of the

in

to line up on

made

little effort

Bangladesh.

Critics have called upon the United States Government to recognize the

nation of Bangladesh as an independent entity.

correct the mistakes of American policy,
ing renewed

American commitment

to

it

While such recognition would not

would go a long way

freedom and independence

in

demonstrat-

for all people

and would bolster the legitimacy of the newly independent nation of Bangladesh.

The American policy
from several sources.
addressed

this

of isolation toward

Cuba has also come under

fire

Both Senators Church and Edward Kennedy have

problem recently.

While criticizing American policy toward the

Southern Hemisphere as a whole, both maintain that the policy of isolating

^'^See Senator

Frank Church, "The India-Palustan War," Congressional

Record, Vol. 117,
It is

p. 189.

ironic that those labeled as isolationists have in the case of both China

and Cuba advocated ending UoS. policy

of isolation.
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Cuba has

failed

and that the "most glaring result of our policy
has been

to

propel the Cuban government into the waiting
arms of the Soviet Union

and the East European bloc. "62

^^^^.^^

toward Cuba, Senator Kennedy poses several

^ ^^^^^^

American policy

initiatives for change:

We must ask whether the policy of isolation ensures the
security of the United States. We must ask whether the
policy
of isolation increases or decreases Soviet military influence
in the

Hemisphere.

... We

must ask whether

the policy of

isolation is retained because of apprehensions

among our Latin
American countries or whether it is the anachronistic opposition
."^"^
to change of our own country which forces its maintenance.
.

.

Other areas which have come under critical analysis include the United
States' support of the
In Greece,

Greek "junta" and the U.

American support

S. policy in the

Middle East.

of an oppressive dictatorship that refuses to

restore the constitutional rights of

its

people has been widely criticized.

A

staff

report for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February, 1971, concludes:

The Embassy appears to have operated on the assumption
regime was sincere in its declared intention to return to
parliamentary democracy and that the continuation of the arms
embargo was harmful to the development of the kind of relationship which would permit the United States to exercise some
persuasion on the Greek regime to restore civil liberties and
that the

parliamentary government. It appears to ocher observers with
whom we talked, however, that the Embassy tends to read more
into the regime's statements than the regime intends or than is
warranted on the basis of the performance to date.
To many with whom we talked, it does not appear that the
United States has placed as much emphasis on pursuing its avowed
political objectives as on pursuing its military objectives. ^4

^^E. M. Kennedy, "Statement on United States-Cuban Relations, 1972," Office
of Senator E. M. Kennedy, April 18, 1972, p. 2.
63
Ibid

64

. ,

p. 2.

Foreign Relations Committee, "Greece: February 1971, " Washington,
United States Government Printing Office, 1971, p. 16.
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Conclusions such as this about the American support of
the Greek

regime have been the premises for advocating withdrawal
and a reinstatement of the arms embargo.
of the underlying assumptions of

example
It is

Greece

American foreign

of the misconstruction of

American

the discarding of these kinds of

difficult situation.

to

burn the candle

is often cited

by critics

policy as a classic

interests and democratic values.

commitments

The Middle-East presents opponents

of that support

of

that is

deemed necessary.

American foreign policy with a

United States policy in the middle-east, while often trying
at

both ends,

tion of all belligerent parties.

has generally been aimed

As such,

at the reconcilia-

the United States has chosen to pursue

a low profile which has been generally supported by all except those
the United States to

commit

Those who fear

itself to one side or the other.

that the middle-east unrest could result in a super-

power confrontation have urged the United States government

measures
is

who want

for a United Nations resolution of confrontation.

to support

Senator Fulbright

one who thinks that "A settlement mediated by the United Nations could serve

as a precedent for the settlement of other conflicts through the procedures of

American support of the Greek regime on the grounds
a democracy may be guilty of the same crime they accuse the ardent

Those who
that

it

is

not

criticize

a foreign policy based on ideological considerations
do
only. To restrict American support to democracies only would probably
irrevocable damage to United States interests.

anti-communist

of, that is

states and the state of Israel.
American corporations have large investments in the Arab oil industry. On
States is quite vocal
the other side, the Jewish population within the United
and constitutes a considerable political constituency.

^^The United States has clients

in both the

Arab
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international organization."^'^

practice of selling

arms

Others have found

to both sides

There are other areas

of the

an inclination to become involved.

with the American

fault

and advocate a policy of restraint.

world where the United States has shown

In advocating policies for these situations

opponents of globalism have generally tended to advise that the United States
either not get involved as

American

interests are not at stake or they have

urged that the United States play the role of mediator, placing emphasis on
the necessity for negotiation, cooperation,

compromise and peaceful change.

Foreign Aid

Until recently, the issue of foreign aid had been conceived as a

massive

effort on the part of the United States to share its wealth with other people not

as fortunate.

ment,

It

was an

to fight disease

idealistic attempt to aid other nations in their develop-

and

to

perpetuate the image of the United States as the

was also assumed

be an effective

tool for coaxing the

friend of humanity.

It

new nations

Western camp away from the Communists.

into the

to

Recently, there has been increasing disillusionment with this image
of foreign aid.

This disenchantment finally found

of the United States Senate on October 29, 1971,

its

expression on the floor

when

that

reject the Nixon Administration's foreign aid authorization

rejection meant different things to different people.

body voted
bill.

As reported

to

The Senate's
in

Middle East,"
William Fulbright, "Old Myths and New Realities, II The
Congressional Record, Vol. 116, No. 147, Part 22, August 24, 1970,
^^'^J.

p. 29812.
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The New York Times, "to Hugh

Scott, the Senate Republican leader,

a manifestation of the new isolationism, an effort to

because we want
counterpart,

burden

off

it

to get off.

'

was a search

But

to

'tell

it

was

the world to stop

Mike Mansfield, Mr.

Scott's

Democratic

for a 'new foreign aid concept' to 'take the

our shoulders. "^^
'

Reasons

for the Senate's rejection of the bill

were numerous, and

they all added up to a strange coalition of political interests.

reporter for The

New York Times summarized
,

The foreign

aid bill

John Finney,

the reasons as follows:

was rejected a few weeks ago

—

Friday for a concatenation of reasons the fiscal conservatism of many Southerners and Republicans, who
never really liked foreign aid; the grassroots resentment
over helping other countries when the domestic economy
is in such trouble; the disillusionment of erstwhile liberal
supporters who have become disenchanted over the way
foreign aid has turned into military programs that seem
to lead to Vietnams; the angry reaction abetted by the White
House to the expulsion of Nationalist China from the
United Nations and the lackadaisical attitude of a White House
which presumed the bill would be passed by the Senate.

Among

those reasons cited by Finney for the downfall of the foreign

aid bill, only one, that of the liberals, had a positive aspect to

vote against the bill represented "a challenge

.

.

.

it.

The

liberal

to a foreign policy that

was

conceived 20 years ago in the anti-communist atmosphere of a cold war and
found

its

financial support in an aid

program which over

^^"Axe for Foreign Aid," New York Times
^^John E. Finney, "Squeeze Play on the
June 11, 1972, Section 4, p. 2.

,

the years

October 31, 1971,

Arms

Issue,"

became more

p.

E2.

New York Times

,
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military than humanitarian in purpose. "^0

specifically exhibited dis-

satisfaction with the policy of aiding
anti-Communist dictatorships.

Frank Church
that

in a recent analysis of

"American

American foreign

aid is being used not to

Senator

aid practices maintains

promote development but for the quite

opposite purpose of supporting the rule of
corrupt and stagnant-but vociferously

anti-Communist-dictatorships."'^! Church also claimed:

A government may
but— from the standpoint

torture and terrorize its own population
of our policymakers—as long as it

remains anti-Communist, provides "stability," generally
supports
American foreign policy and is hospitable to American investment,
it qualifies, for purposes of aid, as a
"free country" l'^^

The
ing a

liberal vote against foreign aid

program which

for military aid.

allocated

more than

was also a refusal

half (58 per cent) of its allotted funds

This growth in military aid represents a distortion of the idea

upon which the foreign aid program began.

made known

to continue support-

their intention to change

The liberal

critics,

by their vote

it.

After the Senate's defeat of the foreign aid program, there have been
initiatives for change.

manner

One change due

to the Senate battle

of consideration of the aid bills.

considered separately, allowed

to stand

Now
or

fall

was reform

in the

military and economic aid will be

on their own merits.

This

70
Ibid

.

,

p. 2.

Frank Church, "Why

I

Voted No,"

New

Republic

,

November

13, 1971,

p. 14.

'^^Frank Church, "A Farewell to Foreign Aid, " Washington Post,
1971, p. Bl.

November

7,
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represents a victory for the liberal reformers because
"military aid can no
longer be used as the 'sweetner' to win conservative votes
for economic aid.
In turn, the liberals and moderates will be in a better
position to challenge

the military aid program.

Previous

way.

March

In

"'^'^

October debacle, foreign aid reforms were also under

to the

1971, S. 1129, a bill to improve and reform the military

assistance program, was introduced.

The purpose

of this specific bill,

sponsored by Senator William Proxmire, a long-time

American military
•

...
It

aid,

was

critic of the

growth

in

threefold:

back and reshape our foreign military aid program.
puts the foreign military aid program back under the Secretary
to cut

of State

where

it

belongs.

places the responsibility to authorize funds back under
Committee and the House Foreign
Affairs Committee who should be the chief congressional watchdogs over foreign policy.
It

the Senate Foreign Relations

The

bill

removes from

the Secretary of Defense the

primary

responsibility for determining and procuring foreign military
aid. . . .74

Liberal criticism of foreign aid has not been limited to military assistance.

There

is

widespread disenchantment with economic aid as well, resulting from

the "abundant evidence that our foreign

we care

"'^5
to portray.

foreign aid

program

in fact,

is patently

program

is

much

less philanthropic than

claim the critics, -figures indicate that the
self-serving.

George Woods, the former

no

Op.

cit.

,

Finney, p. 2.

"^^William Proxmire, "S. 1129." Congyressional Record
Part 4, March 8, 1971, p. 5321.
"^^Op. cit.

,

Church, "Why

I

Voted No,"

p.

15.

,

Vol. 117, No. 30,

,,
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president of the World Bank, has

made

the point that "bilateral

programs

of

assistance have had as one of their primary objectives helping the high-

income covmtries themselves; they have looked toward financing export sales,
toward tactical support of diplomacy, toward holding military positions
thought to be strategic.

"'^^

Others, such as Frank Church, William Proxmire,

and Harry Magdoff, maintain that the American bilateral aid program
effect, the soft loan

window

of the

Export -Import bank. "77 in

fact,

is "in

Church

concludes:

No less that military aid, our economic assistance creates and
perpetuates relationships of dependency. The law requires, for
example, that aid shipments be carried only in American ships
and that purchases be made only in the United States.
.
Dependency on the United States grows steadily too with
the mounting burden of servicing debts. The Peterson Report
.

.

acknowledges that mounting debts, which must be continually
refinanced on an emergency basis, keep the poor countries on
a "short leash.

Awareness

"'^^

of the failures and burdens of

the recipients of that assistance.

American

As one Chilean

aid has also

dawned upon

political scientist

remarked

about the aid program of the 1960's:

what one decade of development does for us, spare
us another. Foreign aid has been used, not to develop us, but
to achieve the political purposes of the donors, to smother us in
'^^
debt, to buy up our most dynamic productive assets.
If that is

77

Ibid

.

p. 15.

Ibid

.

P-

15.

'^^Ibid.

p. 16.

^^ibid

P- 16.

.

)
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Even though
program,

technically the vote of the Senate ended
the foreign aid

not this goal that the liberals seek.

it is

abandonment of foreign

aid.

They realize

responsibility to help the poorer nations.
to

They do not desire the

that the United States has a

They hope

to initiate

new

policies

"transform the program from a slush fund for military
juntas and American

corporations into a long-range cooperative investment in
human welfare. "80

Toward

this end, liberal critics

have suggested that American foreign

aid not be distributed unilaterally; rather,

it

should be allocated to the various

international banking and economic development agencies to insure that

put to its proper use.

is

Another proposal suggested by Senator Stuart

Symington, calls for "more trade, less aid"

in dealing with other countries.

Others have advocated an increase in outright grants rather than loans.
this

it

In

way, a minimal of political strings and military obligations are attached

to

assistance.

80
""""Scrub

It

Up, Don't Wipe

It

Out,"

New Republic November
,

13, 1971, p. 7.

81

This proposal for change advocated by the liberals points up dramatically
arguments of the radical and liberal critiques. Harry
Magdoff in his sophisticated analysis of American foreign aid maintains that
the very institutions to which the liberals would trust to carry out the allocation
of funds in the proper manner are in fact controlled by the developed industrial
the difference between

Magdoff claims that the United States
uses such institutions as the International Monetary Fund, The World Bank,
the Development Assistance Committee and the Inter-American Development
Bank to control the flow and whereabouts of capital. (See Harry Magdoff,
The Age of Imperalism .
nations, principally the United States.

"
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The

liberal critique in no

way represents what Senator Hugh

"a manifestation of the new isolationism. "^2
foreign aid

program

more concerned

of political and

foreign aid

.^^

Scott called

instead, an effort to

make

with humanitarian needs and less a self-servino-

economic interests.

program based upon

It is

an effort to reconstruct a

the assumptions about

and goals articulated by the liberal critique.

American

responsibilities

To these ends, Senator Edward

Kennedy remarks:

Our responsibility is clear, especially as we view the
practical impact of our recent foreign policy on developing
countries in Latin America, in South Asia, and elsewhere.

We

have a responsibility to make people, rather than narrow
military or geo-political interests, an important subject of

our view of the outside world.

Defense Spending and

Arms

Limitation

In attempting to reorder the priorities of

American foreign

policy, critics

have fought long and hard against what they consider the excessive expenditures
for national security and defense.

It is

on this issue that the proponents and

opponents of American foreign policy are

and evaluation of "national security.

at

loggerheads over the interpretation

"

Traditionally the United States has been

lishment.

wary

of a large military estab-

For a Jong period, verbal warnings against the creation

of a large

military complex were sufficient to alert the civilian authority to any danger.

^^Op.
^*^E„

_cit.

,

"Axe for Foreign Aid,"

M. Kennedy, "Address before

Washington, D.

C,

p.

E2.

the International Development Conference,

April 19, 1972, p. 3.
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With the post-war commitment by the
United States
however, the defense community has
grown

to the point

requests approach $80 billion amiually
and there

Growing concern over the lack
to place less

where budget

is little

sign of a decrease.

of fiscal responsibility plus a desire

emphasis on arms and military procurements
has resulted

increased resistance

Congress.

to global interests,

to the

requests for defense expenditures within the

But these anxieties are only manifestations of a
larger concern,

that being the effort to redefine the security
needs of the nation.

Mark

in

Hatfield

makes

Senator

this point clear:

Excessive costs and inefficient management should rightfully
disturb the Congress. Yet, I do not believe this to be the
most
urgent and troubling factor in our rate of defense spending.

We must
ing

begin consideration of defense expenditures by askis in today's world. .
the role of conventional military power in today's world?

what the meaning of national security

What
What

is

is the relation

between the military might we possess and our

political and strategic

international security?

Critics of

priorities.

aims? What

is the

basis for building

^"^

American globalism suggest

rity is greatly distorted

.

that the concept of national secu-

and has resulted in the over-commitment

to

defense

Consequently, they have sought to redefine the needs of American

security through proposals advocating cutbacks in defense spending, by
soliciting opinions

from experts on security from outside the Defense community

and by voting down, when possible, procurements

win-,

•^crn\

rxressive.

Systems,"
Hatfield, "Speech before the Senate on Military Weapons
26772.
Congressional Record , Vol. 116, No. 131, Part 20, June 31, 1970, p.

^^Mark
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In

terms of cutbacks

in

defense spending, most critics have focused

on the waste and inefficiency of the Defense establishment.
done by the Brookings Institute called for a reduction
of

between $6 and $10

billion.

This slash

controls on waste and inefficiency.

is

A

recent study

in the defense

due mainly

budget

to tightening

up the

Senator Hubert Humphrey's calculations

on defense expenditures parallel those advocated by the Brookings Institute.

They, too, are cuts due to "cutting the fat."
budget of Senator George McGovern

is

more

The controversial 1972 defense
in tune with efforts to re-evaluate

McGovern suggests

foreign policy objectives and priorities.

$25 billion from the current budget of $75 billion.

cuts of up to

His argument for such a

drastic reduction is that since the United States at present has the capacity of
overkill twenty times the

defense programs

are

much

the

in

amount needed,

terms

of quality

same as Senator

it is

time to begin evaluating American

and not quantity.

Hatfield's

who maintains

McGovern's assumptions
that our defense posture

"has been an amalgamation of everything that the military can do in the world."

The use

of outside experts has gone far to blunt the

claimed by Defense Department

ments

of costs and

officials.

In

many cases,

weaponry effectiveness have done much

85
Ibid., p. 26773.

85

monopoly on expertize
the outside assess-

to

arouse suspicions

182
as to the accuracy of the Pentagon experts in
these matters.

This was

especially true during the long and heated debate
over the anti -ballistic

missile system.

Its

ments with which

to challenge the

overall effect, besides giving the critics factual
argu-

Defense Department's statistics,

is to

bolster the assumptions of opponents to the large military
establishment.

several cases, notably the

ABM

of influence upon the ability to

ment

In

and SST debates, this has had a great deal

muster up the votes

to

oppose the procure-

of funds.

Closely tied to the question of national security and defense expenditures is the debate over the nuclear

"supremacy over

arms

race.

Critics of the policy of

the Soviet Union" have argued long for

some sort

of

arms

limitation agreement which would restore an element of reasonableness to

what

is

considered

seek a standstill

to

be a suicidal confrontation.

in the

Opponents of the arms race

development of nuclear weapons, particularly missiles
87

equipped with multiple warheads (MIRV).

For

this reason, they

have enthusiastically

The Pentagon has been widely criticized for padding their budget estimates.
They have also been known to xmderestimate the overall cost of new military
weapons to insure congressional support for them. After the project has been
approved and work has begun on it, additional requests for funds to meet the
rise in costs are common. For example, the Army recently (June, 1972)
requested an additional $1.3 billion to meet the increased costs of developing
the SAM-D missile. Other notable examples include the Air Force C-5A
transport plane and the Navy's new F-14 fighter.
^"See Knoll and McFadden, American Militarism 1970, New York:
Press, 1969.
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supported the recent
the

SALT

negotiations and have indicated
strong support for

agreements signed during President
Nixon's May, 1972,

Soviet Union.

The SALT agreements are

trip to the

significant because, for the first

time, accord has been reached
over the limitations of certain

acknowledgement has been made by both sides
inflict total

that

arms and

each has the capacity to

destruction upon the other.

Recently, there has been increasing
apprehension on the part of

who support

the

SALT agreements

that Administration officials are "turning

the recent Soviet-American agreement to
limit nuclear

"enormous escalation
of the

SALT

of the

arms

into an

arms race. "88 ^^^-^g testimony urging approval

agreement. Defense Secretary Melvin Laird declared that
"unless

Congress gives a go-ahead

bomber

many

projects, plus

to multibillion-doUar

some

missile submarine and

others, allowed by the accords and in the

Pentagon's $83 billion budget, "89 he would withdraw his support
from SALT.

Arguments

of this kind have worried the advocates of change.

that the initiative

begun

in

SALT

will be lost in a continuation of the

race, meaning higher costs and less security.
that

what appeared

to

Fears abound

There

is

arms

growing alarm

be a step toward the re-ordering of priorities has been

turned into justification for the continuation of the time-worn policy of nuclear

88Michael Getler, "Laird, Fulbright Clash
Washington Post June 22, 1972, p. A5.
,

^^Ibid.

,

p. A5.

at

SALT

Treaty Hearing,"
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superiority and the stance of "negotiation from positions
of strength. "90

Reassertion of Congressional Power

The
in

initiatives to

Congress.

change American foreign policy have largely centered

Through their

efforts to re-direct

American foreign

policy,

Congressional leaders have become increasingly aware of the usurpation of
their constitutional powers in foreign policy by the executive branch.

The

increased use of measures such as the executive agreement, executive privilege, the

"Top Secret" stamp and secret para-military espionage agencies

has permitted the executive branch to circumvent Congressional authority and

involvement
in

in the

making

order to have a part

of foreign policy.

in the decision

Those seeking

to

change policy

— malcing have been forced to resort to

such negative measures as the withholding of funds for proposed programs.

^-^

^Radical critics maintain that even George McGovcrn's proposals for arms
limitation included in his "Towards A More Secure America: An Alternative
National Defense Posture" implicitly accepts the same assumption of past
Administrations. I. F. Stone in "McGovern vs. Nixon on the Arms Race"
claims that McGovern clings to the "idea of maintaining American technological
superiority in weaponry, which has been the main motive power pushing the
arms race to ever greater levels of destructive power and expense. (New York
Review of Books, 8).
^•^The initiative to reassert the role of Congress in foreign policy by withholding
appropriations may be an effort in futility. In a report by Timothy Ingram, it
becomes clear that the executive branch through means such as Transfer
Authority, Excess Stocks, Secret Funds, The Pipeline (carryover from year to
year of excess funds), reprogramming and the impoundment of funds, has ways
of by-passing Congress and can literally write its own checks. (See Timothy
Ingram, "The Billions in the White House Basement," The Washington Monthly ,

January, 1972.)
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As

of late, there has been an effort to
re-assert Congressional authority

and participation in the making of foreign policy.
" a

counter-movement

policy and

war powers

now gathering momentum

is

role of the

According

Senator Javits,

to

to reassert the foreign

Congress—in order

to restore the balance

so clearly specified in the Constitution and so urgently needed
to establish a
credible order of priorities in our national endeavors at

home and

in the

world.

"^^

Initiatives other than withholding of funds have focused on three
areas.

First, there has been the
legislative action.

tion before

move

to reassert the

The most important

Congress

in

March 1972

war powers

of

Congress through

of the efforts taken has been the introduc-

of the

War Powers

Act,

(S.

2956).

In

response to a situation described by Senator Fulbright as "A well-intentioned but

misconceived notion of what patriotism and responsibility require
world crisis. Congress has permitted the President
to initiate

war and

the Senate's

power

significant foreign commitments."^*^

to take

over

in a

...

time of

to consent or withhold consent

from

The War Powers Act seeks

restore the

to

imbalance resulting from the executive usurpation of war-making powers.
It is

specifically designed

to

make

power

the

rules governing the use of the

"^"^

Armed

92

Jacob Javits, "The Resumption of Congressional Responsibility in Foreign
Affairs," Congressional Record, Vol. 117, No. 87, June 9, 1971, p. 8628.

William Fulbright, "Presidential Dictatorship,
Vol. 117, No. 12, February 5, 1971, p. 1867.
^•^J.

"

Congressional Record,

Senator J. Javits, "The War Powers Act," Congressional Record
Vol 118, No. 49, March 29, 1972.

^See

,

"
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Forces of the United States
Congress.

in the

absence of a declaration of war by the

In this way, critics of the

American policy

of intervention

hope to force Congressional participation in the
decisions as to the

commitment

of military forces in all situations.

Hopefully, Congressional

scrutiny of future "crisis" situations will result in careful
evaluation of

each situation on

its

own merits rather than a general commitment and

response.

A second move by Congressional
constitutional

powers

of the Senate to

critics is the reassertion of the

make

treaties.

In reaction to the

practice of Executive Agreements, which has almost replaced the public

and formal treaty. Senate Bill 596 introduced

in January, 1972,

would

require that'international agreements other than treaties hereafter entered
into

by the United States be transmitted

the execution thereof.

The reason

,

to the

Congress within 60 days after

.

for such a bill is the discovery that "there have been

numerous agreements contracted with foreign governments

in recent years,

particularly agreements of a military nature, which remain wholly unknown
to

Congress and

to the people. "

96

Global commitments of the level that the

United States has entered into under the Executive Agreement have caused

^^J. William Fuibright, "Transmittal of Executive Agreements to Congress,

Calendar 564, Report No. 92-591,
96
Ibid.

,

pp. 3-4,

p. 1.
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great concern

among Congressional leaders who seek a reduced
American

profile abroad and

"Presidential

who are concerned about

Wars" such as Vietnam.

the prospect of

more

In a study conducted

by the Senate

Subcommittee investigating United States Commitments and
Security

Agreements Abroad,

it

was "found

that the United States

major bases and more than 3,000 minor
large

number

of which

understandings.

members

of

Many

Congress.

now maintains 375

installations around the world, a

were established through executive agreements or
of

them were unknown

"^"^

Fulbright, should not be

Commitments

made

to the public

and to most of the

of this kind, argues Senator

without public awareness and agreement.

Our country should not become entangled in such
serious obligations as those incurred through stationing
our forces abroad or storing nuclear weapons in foreign
countries without the participation of the Legislative
Branch, and through

The continuing

it,

the

American people.

battle over this issue has resulted in the recent Senate

vote on June 20, 1972, to "block military base agreements with Portugal

and Bahrain until they are submitted as treaties. "^^ Indications are that this
is only the

beginning of a major confrontation between the executive and

^'^Stuart Symington, "Statement on the Legality of Executive

Press Release

,

April 25, 1972, p.

2.

^^J. William Fulbright, "Foreign Assistance Act of 1972, "

No. 789, Report No. 92-823,

May

Calendar

31, 1972, p. 31.

^^Spencer Rich, "Senate Insists on Role
Post June 23, 1972, p. A2.
,

Agreements,"

in 2

Base Pacts,

"

Washington

—
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legislative branches of

government over their respective roles

in foreign

policy.

Finally, Congressional critics have challenged
the shroud of secrecy
in

decision-making perpetuated by the doctrine of "executive
privilege."

During the Nixon Administration, where the duties and
functions

Department have been largely taken over by a small

staff

of the State

headed by

Dr. Henry Kissinger within the White House, the failure and at
times refusal
to consult with

Congressional leaders has led

to executive privilege.

The reluctance

to

an assault upon the right

of those officials to appear before

Congressional committee hearings has meant that legislative leaders have
little

On

access to information

this point, Senator

vital to their role as representatives of the people.

Symington concludes:

Such isolation from members of the Senate on the grounds
of Executive Privilege not only nullifies the basic constitutional concept of advice and consent, but also distorts the

fundamental premise on which our country was founded
representative democracy.

On

this issue, there is very little that the Legislative

Branch can do

constructively except apply pressure on the Executive to allow those
individuals protected by Executive privilege to testify.
ineffectual in
this issue.

most cases must be pursued

in lieu of

Such tactics while

any real authority on

Unfortunately, for Congressional critics of

American foreign

""^^Stuart Symington, "Further Concentration of Power, Executive Privilege
and the 'Kissinger Syndrome, " Released by Office of Senator Stuart
'

Symington, March

2,

1971, p. 11.
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policy, this is only one of several instances

foreign-policy decisions

is

reduced

to

where the

legislator's role in

such tactics.

Summary
These, then, are the specific areas and issues in which
the liberal
critics have focused their efforts to change

American foreign

policy.

lying these specific issues are general conceptions
about the role of
in the international

community, the scope

of

What has been discussed

in this chapter is not a policy advocating full isolationism or

Instead

it is

America

American security interests and

the nature and intentions of perceived adversaries.

that direction.

Under-

even a trend in

a revulsion against excessive internationalism

carried out by means of interventionist actions in the attempt to maintain the
status quo.

Rather than being isolationism,

it

represents a "new inter-

nationalism" based on a realistic assessment of American interests, goals

and capabilities.

It is

a re-evaluation of changes in the global and regional

balance of power, a redefinition of vital interests and national security, and
it

represents a movement away from the realism of power politics toward a

foreign policy of realistic idealism.

As

J.

L. Steele concludes:

The conflict between the President and an influential
minority of the present Senate is real; but the heart of the
dispute is not isolationism versus internationalismo At
issue is a desire to put space and time limitations on the
fighting in Indochina, to strike a new balance bet"ween the
President and Congress in committing military forces to

combat abroad, and

to avoid further proliferation of U. S.
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commitments around

the globe without congressional

sanctions.

There is also a feeling that the nation's
values should be re-examined so that more money
will be spent on domestic priorities and
less on extravagant weapons systems that may prove to be redundant,

provocative or both.
Finally, in relation to the issue of the characterization
of the liberal

critique as an instance of isolationism

seems clear

it

that the liberal critics

do not seek an American withdrawal from the international sphere.

They

do not advocate cutting off economic, diplomatic or military ties with the
rest
of the world.

isolationist.

If

It

they did, then

would

fulfill

it

Japan and China.

Two and

clarified through the case studies

However, the liberal critics have never argued

foreign policy of that nature.

them as

to label their analysis as

the explicit requirements established by the

definition explicated in Chapter
of

would be correct

isolationists.

Thus,

it

is

for a

inappropriate to characterize

CONC LUSION
The purpose
been made

of this treatise has

to arrive at a meaningful,

been twofold.

working definition

Given the various and disparate meanings attached
such a process
while goal.

is

imperative

The process

if

First, the attempt has
of isolationism.

to the idea of isolationism

concept clarification

is

considered a worth-

of conceptual clarification is a arduous task, one

which raises great controversy among scholars.

Within Political Science,

debates over key concepts such as "power," "sovereignty" and "interest"
reveal striking differences in theoretical perspectives which have divided
the discipline into various and competing

camps.

Yet,

it

is

important that

the language and concepts used in explanation be carefully defined, regardless
of the conflict that such a process might cause.

The task

of reaching a meaningful and objective definition of isolation-

ism has been complicated by
its clarification.

In

Chapter

the

many and mostly unsuccessful attempts

Two

at

several of these efforts at defining

isolationism were presented with the conclusion drawn that they represented

were only S5anptoms

not only a broad range of meanings but that they

of

isolationism rather than the defining criteria.
In selecting a definition of isolationism

it

was thought

that the

most

productive approach would be to take the core meaning of isolation, which
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is withdrawal, or a state of
seclusion

foreign policy on

it.

withdrawal from

all

As a

and base the meaning of an isolationist

result, isolationism

commitments

comes

to

mean

a policy of

into a state of seclusion and self-sufficiency;

a severance of all relationships so as to
place alone.

A

nation adhering to a

policy of isolationism would then seek to sever,
in a conscious way,
significant political, military,
all

all

commercial and diplomatic relationships with

other nations.

Support for this definition and

its

ultimate clarification

is facilitated

by the fact that there are instances in the past where a nation successfully

implemented and sustained a policy

of isolationism as defined here.

This

study focused on two of those instances, Japan in the seventeenth, eighteenth

and half of the nineteenth centuries, and China during the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries.

Further, in support of the chosen definition and also to

bolster the claim that over time there has been widespread misuse and mis-

construment of the core meaning of isolationism, the case studies of
Britain's period of "splendid isolation" and the traditional foreign policy of
the United States

were suggested as

what

is

same

is

and what

the other part of the dichotomy between

not considered isolationism.

That

is,

in applying the

definitional criteria to all four case studies, each of which has

historically been characterized as an instance of isolationism,

that

Japan and China are, according

isolationism.

On

to the

it

was concluded

suggested definition, examples of

the other hand, the studies of the United States and British
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foreign policy revealed evidence that
the characterization of these policies

as isolationism

is

misleading as they do not

fulfill

the requirements

established by the defining criteria.
Unfortunately, even the most current expose on isolationism
continues to deal in

meaning

symptoms and

of isolationism.

In

fails to

Ms most

grasp the historic foundations of the

recent essay

A New

Isolationism

;

Threat or Promise. Robert W. Tucker rejects the above definition
of
isolationism.

He favors a

isolationism.

Tucker maintains

certain relationships rather than
the world and not another.

which would broaden the meaning of

definition

that isolationism is the withdrawal

and that

all

In other

it

can be applied

words, a nation

to

may pursue

from

one area of
a policy of

isolationism toward Asia while adhering to normal international relations of

cooperation and commitment with Western Europe.
isolationist if

it

Likewise, a nation

is

severs economic ties with other nations while maintaining

diplomatic or military relationships.

To

reiterate, the view here is that Tucker, as others before, has

fallen into the trap of dealing with

symptoms rather than

definition treats only parts of the whole.

criteria.

The judgment here

isolation is not isolationism but only a part of that policy.

United States severs

does not

mean

isolationist.

that

If

all

is that political

Because

the

relationships with the Peoples' Republic of China

American foreign policy

meaning

Plus, his

is to

be given

is

on the whole or in total

to isolationism

it

must be recognized
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that

it

is

In other

is

necessary

to deal

words, either one

with the concept as a whole and not
is talking

about isolationism or one

in parts.

is not.

It

not possible as Tucker and others
before him have done to mal<e a distinction

between "genuine isolationism" and isolationism
meaning absence of certain
relationships, and in the long run retain clarity
as to the core meaning of the

concept.

There

is

no advantage in sustaining the confusion and lack of
clarity

surrounding isolationism by these kinds of distinctions.
is that

The suggestion here

isolationism be defined in the narrow sense presented in
Chapter

and that foreign policies which

fail to

Two

meet the defining criteria as established

should be defined as something other than isolationism.

The second purpose

of this discussion has

been

to investigate the

relevancy of isolationism to historical and contemporary American foreign
policy.

In doing so, the task has

been

to apply the criteria of the definition

of isolationism to the circumstances, tenets, and assumptions under which

American foreign
study,

it

is

From such

a

concluded that the United States has never been genuinely

isolated nor has

More
who argue

policy operated from its very beginnings.

it

pursued a policy of isolationism

at

any time.

important, this treatise represents a challenge to those persons

that the recent initiatives on the part of the liberal critics to

change American foreign policy constitute a revival of the isolationist move-

ment within

the United States.

It is

hoped that through the examination of the

general assumptions and the specific programs of the liberal critics

it is
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evident that they do not desire a complete
withdrawal of the United States

from the responsibilities and commitments

of international politics.

Rather than isolationism, opponents of American globalism
seek a new
relationship, a

more restrained

policy which emphasizes multi-lateral

actions over unilateral activity, cooperation and negotiation
rather than
confrontation, and peaceful initiatives rather than a warlike stance.
label such

meaning

programs as

of isolationism

To

isolationist is to continue to misconstrue the

and to further confuse the real issues.

In address-

ing these points Senator J. William Fulbright concludes:

The people who are called neo-isolationists are no such
word is an invention of people who confuse
internationalism with an intrusive American unilateralism,
with a quasi-imperialism. Those of us who are accused
thing; the

of "neo-isolationism" are,

I believe, the opposite:
internationalists in the classic sense of that term
in the

—

sense in which it was brought into American usage by
Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt. We believe in
international cooperation through the international
institutions. We would like to try to keep peace through
the United Nations, and we would like to try to assist the
poor countries through the institutions like the World
Banl<, We do not think that the United Nations is a
failure; we think it has never been tried. ^

The

point is that the debate over

American foreign policy

between internationalism and isolationism.

It is

more

is not

one

a debate over the proper

role that the United States should pursue in carrying out

its

responsibilities

William Fulbright, "The Conduct of United States Foreign Relations,"
Congressional Record Vol. 118, No. 2, January 19, 1972, p. 492.
J.

,
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as an international power.
but

how

to participate.

but

how

to

It is

It is

not a question of whether to participate

not a question of having or not having

power

use that power.

The real issue
of globalist excess

is

excessiveness versus restraint.

who have seen

It is

the critics

this as the important question and

have sought to focus the debate on this issue.
one who has managed to see through the

who

Senator Mike Mansfield

folly of

is

what he calls the "non-issue"

of isolation and has addressed the real issues of importance in the debate

over American foreign policy.

In his

remarks on March

29, 1971, in

Olivet, Michigan, Mansfield stated:

Isolation is no

answer

internationalism

some

to the nation's needs.

But neither is
sort of incantation against the ills of

life.
We will search in vain to safeguard our
security and well-being by an internationalism which leads
us to project military forces into the farthest reaches of the

international

globe and to maintain them there without the comprehension
of the people of this nation and without the understanding and

cooperation of the rest of the world's people.^

What

the critics seek is not isolation but a

more responsible

which focuses not on the excesses of military power, nor on

policy

the excesses of

economic exploitation; but one without the trappings of excessive global

commitments, which pursues and maintains
in line with

its

international responsibilities

and according to humanitarian and democratic values.

As

Senator Fulbright concludes, "the United States must decide which of the two

Mike Mansfield, "The Nixon Doctrine," Remarks
Michigan, March 29, 1971,

p. 4.

at Olivet College, Olivet
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sides of

its

national character is to

predominate— the humanism

of Lincoln

or the aggressive moralism of Theodore Roosevelt."^
Those seeking

change from the excesses of American globalism opt for the
humanism of
Lincoln.

-^J.

And isolationism has never been a synonym

for

humanism.

William Fulbright, "The Two Americas, " Congressional Record

Vol. 112, No. 52,

March

25, 1966, p. 6749.

,
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